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Abstract
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As early as 2000, development partners embarked on a 
decade-long search for “innovative” or alternative sources 
of Official Development Assistance to help finance 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
For their part, developing countries have sought not 
only more financial flows but better financial solutions, 
for example, through partnerships that mobilize private 
finance for public service delivery, risk mitigation 
efforts that promote private entry in the productive 
sectors, and support for carbon trading. This paper 
offers a framework to organize and understand this 
heterogeneous mix of innovations in fund-raising and 
financial solutions for development. It also provides, for 
This paper—a product of the World Bank Group-wide Working Group on Innovative Finance—is part of a larger effort 
to monitor and evaluate innovative fund-raising and financial solutions for development. The Working Group comprised 
several Vice Presidencies and units across the Bank Group including the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships; 
Treasury, Operations and Country Services; the Human Development Network; the Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management; and Sustainable Development Networks, including its Carbon, Agriculture and Rural Development; and the 
Finance, Economics, and Urban Units, as well as the International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Guarantee Agency, 
and the International Development Association-International Finance Corporation (IDA-IFC) Secretariat.. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at girishankar@
worldbank.org. 
the first time, a stocktaking of actual innovations that 
make up the international landscape and highlights the 
World Bank Group’s role to date. The stocktaking shows 
that innovative finance mechanisms have played a more 
significant role in supporting financial solutions on the 
ground than in identifying and exploiting “alternative 
sources of ODA.” Innovative fund-raising therefore 
should be viewed as a complement to—rather than a 
substitute for—traditional efforts to mobilize official 
flows, in particular concessional flows. Going forward, 
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Why Innovative Development Finance and Why Now? 
1.  As early as 2000, development partners embarked on a decade-long search for “innovative” 
or alternative sources of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to help finance achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In response, sovereign and private donors 
championed an array of initiatives: global solidarity levies proposed by France, frontloading 
future aid commitments by the United Kingdom, and results-based financing by various actors, 
including private foundations. Development banks also started issuing new types of bonds that 
link resource mobilization and development objectives, for example, debt offerings for 
sustainable investments with climate change-related themes. For their part, developing countries 
sought not only more financial flows but better financial solutions, for example, partnerships that 
mobilize private finance for public service delivery, risk mitigation efforts that promote private 
entry in the productive sectors, and support for carbon trading. This paper offers a framework to 
organize and understand this heterogeneous mix of innovations in fund-raising and financial 
solutions for development; seeks to provide, for the first time, a stocktaking of actual innovations 
that make up the international landscape; and highlights the World Bank Group’s role to date. 
Rethinking Innovative Development Finance 
2.  Broadly, four types of innovative mechanisms make up the international landscape: Private 
mechanisms involve private-to-private flows in the market and in civil society. Solidarity 
mechanisms support sovereign-to-sovereign transfers and form the backbone of multilateral and 
bilateral ODA and other official flows (OOF). Public-private partnership (PPP) mechanisms 
leverage or mobilize private finance in support of public service delivery and other public 
functions, such as sovereign risk management. Catalytic mechanisms involve public support for 
creating and developing private markets (inter alia by reducing risks of private entry). Three of 
these mechanisms (solidarity, partnership, and catalytic) depend on official flows, which they 
either mobilize or deploy in support of country and global efforts through financial engineering 
efforts that employ an array of instruments (from grants and loans to contingent financing to risk 
mitigation). These are the focus of this paper.  
3.  Intrinsic financial novelty is not necessarily what makes these mechanisms and instruments 
innovative. Rather, innovations are those that depart from traditional approaches to mobilizing 
development finance—that is, through budget outlays from established sovereign donors or bonds 
issued by multilateral and national development banks exclusively to achieve funding objectives. 
They also are those that break from traditional approaches to delivering development finance—
that is, through grants and loans. Innovative development finance therefore involves 
nontraditional applications of solidarity, PPP, and catalytic mechanisms that (i) support fund-
raising by tapping new sources and engaging investors beyond the financial dimension of 
transactions, as partners and stakeholders in development; or (ii) deliver financial solutions to 
development problems on the ground.  
The Evolving International Landscape 
4.  Innovative fund-raising generated an estimated US$57.1 billion in official flows or at least 
4.5 percent of total gross ODA and IFI bond proceeds between 2000 and 2008. The bulk of these 
efforts involved new debt offerings by development banks (such as bonds issued in developing 
country currencies or those targeting sustainable investors). Alternative sources of concessional 
flows including solidarity levies and contributions from emerging donors totaled at least US$11.7  
ii 
billion or 1.3 percent of gross ODA over 2000–8. Carbon finance and frontloading of ODA for 
global programs, while modest in volume terms, also grew. The World Bank Group accounted for 
more than a quarter of these innovative fund-raising efforts. 
5.  Efforts to support innovative financial solutions on the ground used an estimated US$52.7 
billion in official flows or 5.7 percent of official flows to developing countries between 2000 and 
2008. The lion’s share involved catalytic mechanisms to promote private investment in the 
financial, private insurance, and productive sectors at the country level (using partial credit 
guarantees, local currency lending using derivatives, and insurance pools) and Advance Market 
Commitment (AMC) and copayment schemes to strengthen the market for vaccines and essential 
drugs at the global level. A second major component involved PPPs that leveraged private flows 
to support infrastructure and social service delivery using risk management instruments (such as 
partial risk and political risk guarantees) and Output-Based Aid (OBA) schemes. These also 
included sovereign catastrophe risk management and debt swaps funded by private donors. 
Innovative solidarity efforts comprised debt buy-downs by bilateral donors, and counter-cyclical 
loans that adjust terms and conditions in response to shocks. Overall, the Bank Group was 
responsible for supporting nearly half of these innovative financial solutions on the ground. 
Lessons Learned 
6.  The experience to date offers some early lessons for developing countries and their partners.  
7.  Lesson 1: To date, innovative finance mechanisms have played a more significant role in 
supporting financial solutions on the ground than in identifying and exploiting “alternative 
sources of ODA.” Efforts to achieve development results therefore can be strengthened through 
the use of a broader menu of innovative financial solutions: 
  Aside from simply increasing official flows, financial solutions have helped governments and 
economic agents with risk management and risk reduction across sectors (for example, 
through use of insurance, derivative, and other risk management products). Given their 
limited knowledge of risk management instruments, developing countries could benefit from 
intermediation services offered by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to help 
transform and customize development finance flows to their specific needs. These 
arrangements can help build local capacity for financial innovation over time.  
  Development partners can do more with less by proactively channeling official flows through 
catalytic and PPP mechanisms that leverage private flows at the country level. To do this, 
governments have started to employ a richer menu of cash and derivative instruments. These 
instruments will be increasingly relevant, given the lowered risk tolerances of investors as a 
result of the financial crisis. Some catalytic efforts at the global level (for example, AMC) 
employed ODA, which could also be channeled through country-based solidarity.  
  Whereas they already were the dominant form of innovative finance in middle income 
countries, catalytic efforts can be expanded in lower income countries inter alia through 
better packaging of risk mitigation with traditional loans and grants. Scaling up these efforts 
in the financial and productive sectors is essential to any robust response to the global crisis. 
  Among the more innovative solutions in recent years were global market-making 
mechanisms, such as carbon trading and advance market commitments for vaccines. Success 
depends on robust regulatory regimes and clear agreement of roles and responsibilities 
respectively. International advocacy on these issues will likely be important.  
iii 
8.  Lesson 2: Innovative fund-raising should be viewed as a complement to—rather than a 
substitute for—traditional efforts to mobilize official flows, in particular concessional flows. 
Donors should be realistic about the potential of innovative schemes to generate additional flows: 
  Budget outlays from emerging sovereign donors were the only significant source of 
additional concessional flows or ODA. Initiatives supporting global programs (such as the 
International Financing Facility for Immunization [IFFIm]) that also rely on ODA should be 
managed keeping in mind substitution risks. 
  PPP mechanisms that support global programs (for example, through pooling sovereign and 
private donations or frontloading ODA) help broaden the base of support for development. 
They can also contribute to aid proliferation and associated transaction costs. 
  New debt offerings by development banks (for example, those issued in local currencies or 
those targeting sustainable investors) have shown potential. But resources generated were 
relatively modest. Future prospects depend on varying regulations and market conditions.  
9.  Lesson 3: Innovations need to be tested and evaluated to determine value-added. While 
some innovations show promise, the jury is still out on others. For instance, the high start-up 
costs of certain schemes have been noted. Over time, more in-depth evaluation will be required to 
determine the value-added and net benefits of fund-raising efforts and financial solutions. 
Pointers for the Way Forward for Development Partners 
10. Developing countries, donors, and the private sector are eager to bring innovative finance into 
the mainstream of development practice. Leaders around the world are actively exploring the 
potential scalability of innovative schemes, for example, through the High Level Taskforce on 
Health System Strengthening or the Copenhagen meeting on climate change. Agencies like the 
Bank Group can help by using innovative finance more systematically and strategically to further 
funding and operational objectives. Building on existing efforts, they should: 
  Employ Innovative Fund-Raising More Selectively: Innovative fund-raising for country-
based efforts (for example, partnerships with investors and philanthropists) has mobilized 
modest resources to date, but can help broaden the base of support for development. 
Innovative fund-raising for global priorities is more critical to ensuring actual funding for 
international efforts on health and climate change.  
  Mainstream the Use of Innovative Finance across Countries and Sectors: As they prove 
effective, innovations should become a more integral part of the core operational toolkit of 
development agencies. This can be done using country-based platforms to broaden the use of 
innovative finance to countries and sectors where they can add value (for example, mainstreaming 
OBA or finding new applications for AMCs). Doing so requires strengthening internal incentives 
for innovation by rationalizing financial and operational control processes, providing upstream 
advisory support on financial issues, and updating the financial skills of operational teams. 
  Monitor Trends and Results: There is urgent need to monitor the impact of innovative 
fund-raising and financial solutions on development finance and to evaluate what works. 
  Expand Outreach to Partners: Clients should also be better informed about what 
innovative finance can offer. Ongoing outreach to private investors and donors as well as 
DAC and emerging donors will also enhance prospects for mainstreaming innovating finance.   
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I.  WHY INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND WHY NOW? 
1.1  As early as 2000, development partners embarked on a decade-long search for 
“innovative” or alternative sources of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to help 
finance achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In response, sovereign 
and private donors championed an array of initiatives: global solidarity levies proposed by 
France; frontloading future aid commitments under the International Finance Facility by the 
United Kingdom, and results-based financing initiatives by private foundations. Development 
banks began to issue new bonds in part to mobilize official flows, especially for middle-income 
countries (MICs). In addition to more resources, developing countries sought a broader menu of 
financial solutions to enduring and emerging problems. Examples included inter alia partnerships 
to leverage private finance for public service delivery, risk mitigation to promote private entry in 
the financial and productive sectors, and facilitation of carbon trading. 
1.2  Encouraged by early progress on a few high-profile innovative schemes, proponents 
of innovative development finance have developed a significant literature highlighting 
numerous potential applications of these tools. With more than 50 new proposals in the 
literature, there is no paucity of ideas on innovative finance. The growing literature is replete with 
proposals for tapping new sources through innovative fund-raising (for example, private 
philanthropy or emerging donors) or developing new mechanisms to channel those resources (for 
example, public-private partnerships (PPPs) in service delivery). They also include a range of 
suggested uses for financial instruments to solve economic management and sector-specific 
problems at the country and global levels, for example counter-cyclical lending that allows 
adjustment in terms and maturities in response to exogenous shocks or results-based financing in 
the health sector.
1 
A. Taking Stock of Innovations in Practice 
1.3  To some observers, these proposals point to an important shift in the way 
development partners do business. However, until now, it has not been clear how 
dramatically they have impacted the development finance landscape.
2 Donors, international 
agencies, and representatives from developing countries have, in various fora, such as the 
Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development, expressed strong interest in looking 
beyond the proposals to take stock of actual innovations in practice. In response, the World Bank 
Group launched an effort to assess the state of play in innovative development finance. This paper 
proposes an emerging framework to think about innovative fund-raising and innovative financial 
solutions on the ground; provides a snapshot of the actual innovations that make up the 
international landscape, including the World Bank’s role to date; and discusses lessons learned 
and implications going forward.  
1.4  The paper is organized into five remaining sections. The remainder of this section 
offers a simple framework for categorizing innovative mechanisms and instruments. Section II 
provides an overview of innovative finance landscape as a component of development finance 
overall. Sections III, IV, and V describe innovations within each of the three main mechanisms of 
development finance that are the subject of this paper—solidarity, PPPs, and catalytic 
mechanisms. Section VI considers lessons learned from the international experience and 
implications for the World Bank Group. 
                                                 
1 De Ferranti et al., 2008; Labatt and White, 2007. 
2 Doha Communique, 2008; Kaul, 2005.  
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B. Rethinking Innovative Development Finance 
1.5  Since the term “innovative finance” made its way into the development lexicon in 
the early 2000s, it has come to mean many things to many people. It has been used to describe 
a wide array of advancements in how economic development is supported by external actors— 
from financing technological and scientific advancements in a particular sector and improving the 
business processes of development agencies to actual financial innovations in the way 
development funds are raised and deployed. As the international community seeks more concrete 
financial solutions to operational challenges on the ground, there is a need to clearly bound the 
term “innovative finance.”  
An Emerging Framework 
1.6  The primary interest for the international community is not financial innovation for 
its own sake, but the achievement of development objectives and results. To understand the 
ways in which innovative finance can further development objectives, it is important to look at 
the uses and sources of development finance and also at how the resources mobilized can be 
transformed—through mechanisms employing financial engineering—to meet the needs of 
developing countries. 
1.7  Uses: Development finance supports both public and private uses—that is, core 
public functions of government as well as private initiatives in markets and civil society.
3 
The traditional economic rationale for government action is to correct market failures through the 
provision of public goods (for example, basic social and infrastructure services) and regulation of 
markets. In carrying out these public functions, governments are also responsible for mitigating 
governance failures or weaknesses in policymaking, resource allocation, program 
implementation, and enforcement of rules and regulations governing economic production and 
exchange. Private uses of development finance relate to private investment and related initiatives 
between economic agents. In pursuing private initiatives in the market and civil society, 
economic agents have to manage myriad risks and costs associated with information 
asymmetries, agency problems, and arbitrary state actions.  
1.8  Sources: Over the past 60 years, the sources of development finance have continued 
to expand in number and diversity. Public sources originate from the national tax bases of 
donor countries that contribute to development assistance through budget outlays. These countries 
include traditional sovereign donors whose contributions are monitored by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) as 
well as emerging, non-DAC donors. In recent years, countries have identified global or regional 
taxes as a new source of public finance. Ultimately, domestic revenue in lower- and middle-
income countries themselves should be the most stable, long-term source of development finance. 
Private sources include private firms that enter into development country markets, for example, to 
make investment decisions, after assessing profit-making opportunities. They also include private 
giving by individuals and organizations involved in philanthropy, as well as extended family and 
community networks that provide remittances. 
                                                 
3 World Bank, World Development Reports 1997, 2004, and 2005.  
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1.9  Mechanisms: Based on the sources they tap and the uses they support, four types of 
innovative mechanisms are identified (Figure 1.1). Private mechanisms involve private-to-
private flows in the market and in civil society. Solidarity mechanisms support public-to-public or 
sovereign-to-sovereign transfers and form the backbone of multilateral and bilateral ODA and 
other official flows (OOF). Public-private partnership mechanisms use public funds to leverage 
or mobilize private finance in support of public service delivery and other public functions, such 
as risk management. Catalytic mechanisms involve public support for creating and developing 
private markets (inter alia by reducing risks of private entry). It is important to note that three of 
these mechanisms—solidarity, PPP, and catalytic—depend on official flows (primarily ODA), 
which they either mobilize or deploy in support of country and global efforts using a wide range 
of financial instruments.  
1.10  Instruments: Innovations take place within each of these mechanisms through 
“financial engineering” efforts that employ a range of financial instruments, products, and 
services. The instrument array used by development financiers includes cash instruments (such as 
grants, loans, and securities), contingent financing, risk mitigation instruments (such as 
guarantees, swaps, hedging products, derivatives, and insurance pools), and advisory services.  
1.11  Intrinsic financial novelty is not necessarily what makes these mechanisms and 
instruments innovative. Rather, innovative mechanisms and instruments are those that depart 
from traditional approaches to mobilizing development finance—that is, through budget outlays 
from established sovereign donors or bonds issued by multilateral and national development 
banks exclusively to achieve funding objectives. They are also those that break from traditional 
approaches to delivering development finance—that is, through grants and loans.
4  
1.12  Innovative development finance therefore involves nontraditional applications of 
solidarity, PPP, and catalytic mechanisms that (i) support fund-raising by tapping new 
sources and engaging investors beyond the financial dimension of transactions, as partners 
                                                 
4 Innovations in development policy and practice—independent of financial design—are not the subject of 
this paper. These technical innovations may result from advances in science and technology, improvements 
in governance arrangements, or new knowledge about what works in a particular sector. 
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and stakeholders in development; or (ii) deliver financial solutions to development problems 
on the ground. Accordingly, the paper identifies the following innovative mechanisms and 
instruments that are already in existence: (i) partnership and catalytic mechanisms (and 
supporting instruments), by virtue of their focus on leveraging of private flows; and (ii) new 
instruments and new applications of existing instruments (other than traditional lending and 
granting) under solidarity, partnership, and catalytic mechanisms. These initiatives involve 
varying degrees of financial engineering and complexity. 
1.13  Using the framework previously discussed, Table 1.1 identifies innovative 
mechanisms and instruments that made up the international landscape over the 2000–8 
period. These were organized as either innovative fund-raising efforts or financial solutions on 
the ground. For instance, examples of innovative fund-raising that generate additional 
concessional resources in support of global and country initiatives include contributions from 
emerging sovereign donors, the airline ticket tax, and contributions from national lotteries. They 
also include PPP mechanisms such as IFFIm, which borrows on the capital markets against long-
term aid commitments. Examples of financial solutions on the ground include catalytic efforts to 
help create private catastrophe insurance markets for households and farmers, or solidarity efforts 
to improve performance through debt conversions conditioned on output performance.  
Table 1.1: A Snapshot of the International Innovative Finance Landscape 
  Fund-Raising Financial  Solutions 
Traditional 
  ODA financed by budget outlays 
from developed countries 
  Some private flows 
  Transfers (cash or contingent) to public entities 
Innovative 
Solidarity mechanisms 
  ODA financed by budget outlays 
from emerging sovereign donors 
  Global solidarity levies (such as 
airline ticket tax, Adaptation Fund) 
  National lotteries 
  Stolen Asset Recovery 
 
Public-private partnership mechanisms 
  Joint financing with private donors 
  New bonds (those in local currencies 
or those targeting sustainable 
investors) 
  Sovereign catastrophe risk (incl. 
derivatives, currency swaps) 
  Frontloading ODA 
 
Catalytic mechanisms 
  Carbon funds 
Solidarity mechanisms 
  Counter-cyclical lending 
  Debt swaps for results  
 
Public-private partnership mechanisms 
  Private participation in social sectors and 
infrastructure (incl. through guarantees, OBA) 
  Sovereign catastrophe risk finance (through 
derivative and hedging, deferred drawdown 
options or DDOs)  
 
Catalytic mechanisms 
  Leveraging private investment in the financial 
and productive sectors (through local currency 
lending, guarantees, risk-sharing facilities) 
  Creating private insurance markets (through 
insurance pools and DDOs) 
  Advance market commitments 
  Copayment schemes 
Evaluating the Value Added of Innovation 
1.14  Innovations need to be tested and evaluated to determine their value-added and 
therefore net benefits. While some innovations show promise, the jury is still out on others. For 
instance, the high costs of complex financial engineering in support of fund-raising or financial 
solutions have been noted. While preliminary analysis of these costs is available, more in-depth 
evaluation of the value-added and therefore, the net benefits is needed (Box 1.1). Innovative  
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fund-raising mechanisms should be evaluated in terms of their ability to mobilize adequate and 
predictable resources from a given source at the minimum cost and risk. In particular, global 
solidarity levies and taxes should be evaluated in terms of the incentives they provide to achieve 
policy goals, their revenue potential, and their distributive impact. Financial solutions on the 
ground should be reviewed in terms of their ability to efficiently and effectively deliver 
development results or maximize net development benefits. It is important to note that, unlike 
fund-raising efforts, solutions on the ground often take time to materialize. 
1.15  In addition to the costs of financial engineering, the risk profile of fund-raising 
schemes and financial solutions should be considered. Financial risks affecting funding 
sources include currency, market, donor nonpayment, and commercial credit risks, and those 
affecting uses can include currency, liquidity, and over-commitment risks, as well as sovereign 
and portfolio or project risks.
5 Managing these risks involves financial and administrative costs; 
they can also affect the likely impact of both fund-raising schemes and financial solutions on the 
ground. While this stocktaking does not cover the impact of innovations on development 
outcomes, these evaluative criteria should be considered going forward. 
                                                 
5 World Bank. Trust Fund Financial Compendium, 2008. 
Box 1.1: The Role of Financial Engineering in Enhancing Value Added 
 
Innovative finance can enhance the value added of development finance at various points, from the 
initial mobilization of concessional funds to their deployment. Typically, this involves new approaches 
that perform financial transformation of development flows—through “financial engineering”—and 
then disburse to implementing entities, such as development institutions, governments, civil society 
organizations (CSOs), or private sector actors. Financial engineering approaches can be used to:  
  Transform the flow of ODA or investor funds to better correspond to the timing of actual 
development needs (e.g., through frontloading long-term ODA grants for immediate use (IFFIm)) 
and to help countries address various types of risks (e.g., through gross domestic product (GDP), 
commodity price or inflation-indexed bonds; MDG contracts providing countercyclical loan flows; 
indexed/parametric or catastrophic risk insurance; local currency bonds and currency swaps). 
  Increase the concessionality of flows through approaches that facilitate funding—whether from 
private investors (e.g., impact investments), governments or foundations (e.g., blending 
arrangements transforming loans to grants)—at costs lower than market rates. 
Recently approved by the World Bank’s Board, the pilot Advance Market Commitment (AMC) is an 
example of how financial engineering can help to transform development finance flows to meet country 
needs and strengthen results. The sources of funds for the AMC subsidy are ODA and foundation grants 
(totaling US$1.5 billion), provided under unusually long-term payment agreements. The pledge flows 
are enhanced by an IBRD “guarantee.” The AMC targets private sector engagement via a unilateral 
offer to industry designed to spur development of manufacturing capacity to make needed vaccines. The 
funds flow to The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) (which is itself portrayed as 
an innovative public-private partnership) and, with GAVI copayments, are used by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to procure vaccines. The AMC thus comprises financial transformation 
(long-term contributions, the World Bank’s backing), is “results-based” since it is used only for 
vaccines that meet the needs of developing countries, and is “country-owned” since funds are only used 
for vaccines demanded by developing countries. Financial engineering approaches can help make better 
use of ODA, while involving the private sector in supporting development. As such, they are likely to 
assume greater significance.  
Source: Multilateral Trusteeship and Innovative Financing Department, World Bank.  
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II. THE INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE LANDSCAPE 
A. How We Got Here—Development Finance in Transition 
2.1  The evolution in external financing in development countries over the 2000s 
provided the context within which innovative development finance evolved. The scale and 
composition of private and official flows to developing countries will continue to influence 
prospects for innovative approaches to mobilizing official flows and innovative financial 
solutions to development problems on the ground. 
Private Flows and Market-Based Innovations 
2.2  In the years preceding the current global financial crisis, external financing to 
developing countries grew rapidly, driven primarily by private flows.
6 For middle income 
countries (MICs), external flows grew from US$264 billion in 2000 to US$757 billion in 2007, 
and in lower-income countries (LICs), from US$24 billion to US$68 billion over the same period. 
Much of the growth in external financing to developing countries was driven by private flows. 
For MICs, these private capital flows—in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI), and private 
equity and debt—recorded considerable growth and were critical to relieving financing 
constraints. While steadily increasing in MICs, remittance flows became the largest source of 
external funding for LICs in 2007. Even though private flows to LICs increased through 2007, 
these countries relied more heavily on ODA.  
2.3  Buoyed by higher risk tolerance and the promise of high returns, market actors 
developed innovative strategies and instruments to increase private flows. Privately-provided 
export credit insurance and political risk insurance schemes supported investments in the 
financial sector and productive sectors. For instance, in 2007 alone, export credit insurance—a 
highly concentrated market and dominated by private sector players—insured just more than 
US$2 trillion of world trade, 11 percent of which went to developing countries. Similarly, in 
2005, the smaller political risk insurance market had a total potential exposure of US$122–172 
billion. Over the mid-2000s, developing countries looked to other market-based innovations, such 
as diaspora bonds, securitization of future remittances and other future receivables, and 
reductions in the cost of remittances. Precrisis estimates indicated that these innovations could 
generate up to US$30 billion in private flows to Africa.
7 
2.4  Closely associated with these trends was the emergence of new sources of flows to 
market actors, such as sovereign wealth funds. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are technically 
and legally sovereign entities; however, they have been empowered with broader and more 
aggressive market-oriented investment mandates. Estimates by market participants suggest that 
assets under management of SWFs range from US$2 trillion to $3 trillion and account for about 
one-fourth to one-third of foreign assets held by sovereigns. Notwithstanding the likely impact of 
the crisis on SWFs, their potential as a source of investment in developing countries is worth 
noting. 
2.5  Private giving by civil society to lower- and middle-income countries also grew in 
volume and visibility. In 2006 alone, roughly US$40 billion in private donations and 
nongovernmental program funding flowed from OECD countries to developing countries. This 
                                                 
6 Developing countries are defined as those countries that received ODA from OECD countries in 2006. 
7 Ketkar and Ratha, 2009.  
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compares to a total of US$80 billion in ODA for core development and emergency programs in 
the same year. Recent estimates of various segments of private giving suggest that the rapid 
growth in private giving for development activities was largely driven by foundations.
8 
2.6  With the onset of the global economic crisis and the virtual seizure of capital 
markets in 2008, prospects for increasing private flows purely through market-based 
innovations have been severely dampened. Private flows to developing countries were halved 
from US$929 billion in 2007 to US$466 billion in 2008, and fell further to US$200 billion in 
2009. Middle income countries with large financing needs and highly levered financial systems 
have been hit most directly. Lower income countries also were impacted by sharp declines in 
private flows. The indirect impact is expected to be even more severe including reductions in 
export volumes, commodity prices, remittances, tourism, and possibly aid.
9 Given the prevailing 
financial environment, market-based innovations alone may not be able to counter reversals in 
capital flows to developing countries. Any robust response to the global crisis necessarily requires 
increased official flows to developing countries and their better use. Described in subsequent 
sections, innovative uses of official flows can help developing countries respond to the crisis. 
Official Development Assistance and Innovative Finance 
2.7  Over the 2000s, official flows and in particular ODA underwent considerable 
evolution as well. ODA, the other major component of external financing to developing countries 
(in particular, to lower-income countries), relies entirely on budgetary outlays from donor 
countries to mobilize concessional flows. Net ODA disbursements grew steadily between 1997 
and 2005, reaching a peak of US$107 billion in 2005. Much of the increase in ODA over this 
period was due to debt relief and, to a lesser extent, to emergency assistance and administrative 
costs of donors. Even though official flows increased during this period, it was clear that 
achieving the MDGs required a significant acceleration in the growth of ODA. As they contended 
with this large and looming financing gap, developing countries also had to manage the 
transaction costs associated with the proliferation of aid channels and ODA fragmentation.  
2.8  In response to the MDG financing gap in 2000, development partners embarked 
on a decade-long search for “innovative” or alternative sources of ODA. Soon after the 
declaration of the MDGs, noting likely shortfalls in achieving ODA levels of $50 billion per 
annum, the 2002 Zedillo report strongly advocated searching for innovative financing solutions. 
Over the 2000s, sovereign and private donors championed an array of innovative fund-raising 
initiatives, from solidarity levies to frontloading of ODA commitments. Some of these have been 
implemented, including the airline ticket levy and the IFFIm pilot.  
2.9  Over this period, developing countries also started to demand not only increased 
financing but more effective financial solutions to development problems. The solutions 
sought to utilize a broader menu of financial instruments than traditional development loans and 
grants. For instance, new performance-based solutions, such as the credit buy-downs, aim to 
sharpen the results- and poverty-focus of traditional development lending in the health sector. 
Similarly, countries are seeking to reduce their fiscal exposure to weather-related and commodity 
price shocks and natural disasters through catastrophe risk finance.
10 
                                                 
8 Hudson Index of Global Philanthropy 2008.  
9 World Bank. Global Monitoring Report 2009. 
10 Cummins and Mahul, 2009.  
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B. The International Innovative Finance Landscape 
Innovative Fund-Raising 
2.10  International efforts in innovative fund-raising generated an estimated US$57.1 
billion
11 or at least 4.5 percent of total gross ODA and IFI bond proceeds between 2000 and 
2008 (Figure 2.1).
12 This represented an average annual growth of 5 percent. The lion’s share of 
innovative fund-raising involved new types of bonds by multilateral and national developments to 
leverage the capital markets. Nearly three quarters of funds raised over this period were generated 
as local currency bond proceeds. Twenty percent came in the form of concessional flows through 
budget outlays from emerging sovereign donors and revenues generated by global solidarity 
levies, accounting for US$11.7 billion or 1.3 percent of gross ODA. Resources generated for 
global programs accounted for US$1.9 billion or 16 percent of concessional funds raised through 
innovative schemes. Carbon finance accounted for 3 percent of total innovative financing.
13 
2.11  The World Bank Group was responsible for US$15.6 billion or more than a quarter 
of total official resources mobilized through innovative schemes over the 2000–8 period 
(Annex 2.2a). While the composition of Bank Group efforts largely mirrored international ones, 
some specific Bank Group innovations can be highlighted. These include partnership efforts 
between the Bank and private investors through International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) debt offerings for sustainable investments, IBRD-managed IFFIm bond 
issues, and the pooling of contributions from private and sovereign donors under International 
Development Association (IDA) and World Bank trust funds (TFs). Through carbon funds, the 
Bank is playing an early catalytic role in mobilizing additional flows to developing countries. 
                                                 
11 Data on contributions from emerging donors for 2007–8 are likely to be underestimated.  
12 This is a ratio between official flows mobilized through innovative fundraising efforts and the sum of 
ODA budget outlays from established sovereign donors and the bonds issued by IFIs in a given year. Bond 
issues are gross of refinancing of maturing bonds both in the numerator and in the denominator, while 
ODA refers to gross disbursements. This ratio does not capture the full complexity of the innovative 
finance landscape but provides an aggregate measure of resources mobilized through innovative means. 
13 Administered through a market-based mechanism, carbon funds generate additional flows between 
economic agents in developed and developing countries. As such, it is considered an innovative source. 
Figure 2.1: Innovative Fund-Raising and Financial Solutions 
as an Estimated Share of Development Finance, 2000–8 
  
  9
Financial Solutions on the Ground 
2.12  International efforts to support innovative financial solutions on the ground 
employed at least an estimated US$52.7 billion in official flows or 5.7 percent of total official 
flows to developing countries between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 2.1). These innovations, which 
were more heavily focused in middle-income countries, grew an average of 10 percent annually 
in volume terms over this period. The World Bank Group was responsible for nearly half of these 
international efforts (or US$23.7 billion over the 2000–8 period). As such, the Bank Group’s 
catalytic efforts at the country and global levels as well as its PPP efforts to promote private 
finance for public service delivery both have influenced international trends, highlighted below: 
  Over the 2000–8 period, US$39.4 billion (or three-quarters of all innovative uses) 
supported catalytic country-level efforts in the financial and productive sectors. These 
efforts typically used risk-mitigation instruments, primarily partial credit guarantees and local 
currency lending using derivatives. Even though developing country efforts to catalyze 
private catastrophe insurance markets, for example, property catastrophe insurance for 
householders and crop insurance for farmers, totaled only US$181 million to date, it remains 
a cutting-edge area with initiatives in the pipeline. Also in the pipeline is the US$1.5 billion 
pilot AMC, which aims to correct market failures in the global market for vaccines. 
  Public-private partnership mechanisms employed a range of available multilateral and 
bilateral risk management instruments, totaling US$8.6 billion in guarantee amounts, to 
leverage private finance for public services in infrastructure and the social sectors. Of 
these, most were carried out using partial risk and political risk guarantees. OBA schemes 
accounted for US$3.7 billion or a third of international PPP efforts. Multilaterals, such as the 
Bank Group, have helped countries access global insurance markets to cover sovereign 
catastrophe risks. To date, US$451 million in support and intermediation services supported 
such efforts. Debt conversions, totaling US$87 million, were financed by private donors. 
  Innovative solutions using solidarity mechanisms totaled only US$481 million. These 
comprised debt buy-downs financed with bilateral aid, as well as counter-cyclical lending, 
which allow countries to adjust terms and conditions in response to shocks.  
2.13  PPPs, and to a lesser extent, catalytic mechanisms, leveraged additional resources 
on the ground (Annex 3.3). While complete estimates of international efforts were not available, 
Bank Group-supported PPP mechanisms registered leveraging ratios of 6.7 through Bank Group 
partial risk guarantees and insurance schemes, 7.5 through partial credit guarantees, and 5.6 on 
debt buy-downs using private donations. The leverage from OBA schemes was conservatively 
estimated to be 1.8. Similarly, leverage estimates for catalytic mechanisms were 2.8 using Bank 
Group partial risk guarantees and 2.2 using partial credit guarantees. 
2.14  Middle-income countries tended to benefit in terms of official flows deployed 
through innovative mechanisms. Annual per capita official flows supporting innovative 
financial solutions in IBRD countries averaged US$78 over the 2000–7 period.
 14 IDA and blend 
countries together averaged US$54 per capita official flows (by definition, ODA).  
                                                 
14 As noted earlier, the data on IBRD-eligible middle-income countries may be underestimated. A 
significant portion of these funds flows were uncategorized in part because IFC local currency lending was 
not classified by country. Another US$1.5 billion of commitments went to the AMC global program.  
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2.15  More could be done to extend catalytic efforts in IDA-eligible countries, and to 
promote PPPs in both IDA and IBRD-eligible countries. There is also considerable potential 
to expand sovereign risk management portfolios across the board. IBRD-eligible countries 
deployed an average of US$54 per capita of official flows through catalytic mechanisms to 
promote private sector development compared to an average of only US$23 per capita by IDA-
eligible and blend countries (Figure 2.2). By contrast, IDA-eligible and blend countries deployed 
an annual average of US$32 per capita of official flows through PPPs, compared to only US$23 
per capita per annum by IBRD countries. 
2.16  Geographically, Latin American and the Caribbean benefitted most from 
innovative financial solutions, followed by Africa, and Europe and Central Asia (Annex 
3.2a-b).
15 Countries in Latin America enjoyed the lion’s share (32 percent) of innovative finance-
based support, followed by Africa (17 percent) and then Europe and Central Asia (9 percent). 
Public-private partnerships accounted for two thirds of innovative finance flows to Latin 
American countries, and half of innovative finance flows to African countries. Of the various 
regions, Europe and Central Asia was relatively more ambitious in its use of catalytic schemes, 
which accounted for 88 percent of flows to countries in the region.  
2.17  The financial and extractive sectors, followed by traditional infrastructure sectors 
benefitted most from Bank-supported catalytic and PPP efforts. Efforts to promote private 
entry into the financial and extractive sectors totaled US$8.6 billion or 37 percent of the total 
portfolio in volume terms over 2000–08. These were followed by PPP efforts to leverage private 
finance for service delivery, which generated US$6 billion in flows to the transport, health, and 
water sectors or 25 percent of the total portfolio in volume terms.  
World Bank Corporate Units and Business Processes 
2.18  In supporting innovative finance, the Bank Group has used all its corporate units, 
such as IBRD, IDA, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and a variety of business processes and instruments, for 
                                                 
15 The percentages may underestimate actual flows since the sectoral, geographic, or temporal breakdown 
for a large portion of initiatives was unspecified. 
Figure 2.2: Average Annual Official Flows by  
Objective and Country Type, FY2000–7 
 
Note: Not including IFC local currency loans, WB local currency bonds, 
carbon finance, AMCs, and a few IFC PCGs without countries specified.  
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instance, lending/grant-making, risk management, and advisory and intermediation 
services. In volume terms, IFC and MIGA each supported more than a third each of innovative 
finance solutions on the ground by the World Bank Group, followed by IBRD (17 percent), trust 
funds (8 percent), and finally IDA (7 percent) over the 2001–8 period. IBRD and IFC drove much 
of the growth in the Bank’s innovative finance efforts with average annual growth rates of 187 
percent and 66 percent, respectively, over the same period. 
2.19  As far as concessional and grant resources were concerned, trust funds—
particularly those relating to global programs and partnerships (GPPs)—were a rapidly 
growing component of the Bank’s business. As Figure 2.3a illustrates, 82 percent of the 
US$1.86 billion in innovative finance-related TF grant disbursements between 2002 and 2008 
were channeled through 28 (out of a total of 193) global programs. Eighty-one percent of 
disbursements for innovative schemes under GPPs were focused on health and the environment, 
and were concentrated in the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships, Sustainable 
Development, and Human Development Vice Presidencies.
16  
2.20  Trust-funded innovative finance schemes also demand more intensive inputs in 
terms of specialized sectoral or financial expertise. While the costs of managing complexity 
and risk are hard to quantify, a review of the components of trust-funded innovative finance 
schemes highlights the cost and knowledge dimensions of innovative finance applications or uses 
(Figure 2.3b). Over the 2002–8 period, on average, investment flows accounted for 84 percent of 
grant disbursements, technical assistance (for example, supporting design and supervision) 
accounted for 11 percent, and administration costs accounted for 5 percent.
17  
2.21  Trust-funded innovative finance schemes, in particular those supported by 
Financial Intermediary Trust Funds (FIFs), carry both generic as well as specialized risks. 
Standard risks relate to weaknesses in financial management and accounting, upstream 
                                                 
16 Data reflect disbursements at the fund level. At the grant level, Africa accounts for the third-largest 
volume of disbursements under GPPs supported by innovative finance schemes. 
17These costs are likely to be underestimated. There are difficulties in estimating the average administrative 
cost of innovative initiatives because the full administrative costs of implementing agencies are not 
available. 
Figure 2.3a-b: Disbursements from World Bank-Administered Trust Funds  
Supporting Innovative Finance Applications, 2002-8 
2.3a: Volume of TF Disbursements   2.3b: Composition of TF Disbursements  
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assessment and ongoing risk monitoring, cost-efficiency, data quality, results orientation, and 
donor relations. Specialized risks associated with FIFs include potential impact on the Bank’s 
strategy, its country-based model, start-up costs, and management of partnerships and conflicts of 
interest. According to the 2007 Trust Fund Management Framework, core operational and trust 
fund controls should capture generic risks. Distinct financial review processes are being applied 
for trust-funded innovations involving financial engineering components. Innovative initiatives 
that support regional or global programs are subjected to an upstream Senior Management 
Review instituted since 2006.
18 Efforts are ongoing to rationalize these various controls.  
                                                 
18 World Bank. Trust Fund Management Framework, 2007.  
  13
III. STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY: 
NEW SOURCES, MORE PRODUCTIVE USES 
3.1  This section discusses innovative efforts to strengthen international solidarity inter 
alia by increasing the scale and effectiveness of ODA. An overarching priority for the 
development community is to augment aggregate official flows by expanding solidarity 
mechanisms and simultaneously improving their effectiveness. 
A. New Sources of Solidarity 
Support from Emerging Donors for Country-Based Aid 
3.2  Since the publication of the 2002 Zedillo report, the only substantial alternative 
source of concessional finance was aid from emerging non-DAC sovereign donors. Estimates 
indicated that annual ODA commitments from these donors reached US$3 billion by 2006. 
While data on emerging sovereign donors are not collected systematically by DAC, their role is 
becoming increasingly visible. Chinese ODA in particular has grown rapidly in recent years. 
Estimates for the current level of Chinese ODA vary from US$1.1 to $2.5 billion annually. 
3.3  The World Bank Group has helped broaden the base of support for country-based 
solidarity efforts. Cash and promissory note contributions from non-DAC sovereign donors 
through the Bank Group, to IDA and trust funds, totaled US$2.1 billion over the 2001–8 
period (Table 3.1). The number of non-DAC donors has steadily grown since IDA12. Even 
though non-DAC donors have participated in a number of IDA replenishments, the support of 
several first-time non-DAC donors during the most recent IDA15 replenishment is particular 
noteworthy. These included China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Latvia, Singapore, and Slovenia. 
Contributions in cash and notes to IDA from all non-DAC donors totaled US$1.32 billion over 
the fiscal 2001–8 period. Non-DAC donors have also contributed a total of US$780 million over 
the 2001–8 period to Bank-administered trust funds to lower and middle income countries.
19 
National Lotteries 
3.4  In addition to bringing in new donors, international solidarity efforts have also 
benefitted by tapping national lotteries. To date, Belgium and the United Kingdom have 
financed aid programs through their national lottery funds. Since 1987, Belgium has 
mobilized nearly €330 million in ODA from its national lottery fund for the Belgian Survival 
Fund (BSF). BSF funds long-term projects carried out by Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), 
NGOs, and international organizations to improve food security in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, for every £1 that the public spends on Lottery 
                                                 
19 This figure includes contributions to Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs), which inter alia support pass 
through arrangements for global funds. The World Bank often does not play an operational role in these 
funds. 
Table 3.1: Emerging Sovereign Donor Contributions through World Bank Group, FY2001–8 
(US$ million)  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Non-DAC Sovereign Donors   186    136   205   189   166   253   679    283    2,097 
IDA
    159    104   119   124   113   189   377    131    1,316 
Trust Fund
    27    31   86   65   53   64   302    152   780  
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tickets, 28 pence goes to the Lottery “good causes.” Lottery funders are the organizations that 
distribute the “good causes” money. The largest of the UK’s Lottery funders, the Big Lottery 
Fund, has contributed £213 million (US$310 million) for projects in developing countries since 
1995, of which £15 million was contributed in 2007 alone.  
Recovery of Stolen Assets 
3.5  Recovery of stolen public assets from developing countries is a first step in reclaiming 
considerable resources that could have supported poverty reduction. Luxembourg is 
channeling resources recovered from illicit activities to bilateral ODA. The cross-border flow 
of the global proceeds from criminal activities, corruption, and tax evasion is estimated at US$1–
1.6 trillion per year. Since its establishment in 1993, Luxembourg’s Anti-Drug Trafficking Fund 
has approved projects worth more than €11 million in developing countries. The Stolen Assert 
Recovery (StAR) initiative, supported by the World Bank and the United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), also shows promise but is in its early days. While there are no formal 
estimates of resources channeled back as a result of the initiative, anecdotal evidence suggests up 
to US$134 million was returned to Mexico and Zambia in 2008.  
Global Solidarity Levies for Global Priorities 
3.6  In addition to new national revenues that support country-based aid, new global 
taxes have been instituted to support global priorities. The levy on airline tickets and a share 
of proceeds on Certified Emission Reductions (CER) sales constitute noteworthy efforts to tap 
new revenue sources. In both cases, revenues are “ring-fenced” for specified global programs in 
health and the environment. 
3.7  Revenues from the solidarity levy on airline tickets—which total US$600 million to 
date—are expanding access to drugs and diagnostics critical to treatment for HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and tuberculosis. France opted for a progressive mechanism based on destination and 
class and instituted the tax in July 2006. Ninety percent of the 2007 tax product of US$359 
million was dedicated to UNITAID, which is responsible for implementing efforts to leverage 
quality drug- and diagnostic-price reductions and accelerating the pace at which these are made 
available. Prospects for broadening the base of support for programs funded by this tax are high. 
Several beneficiary countries, including Brazil, Chile, Mauritius, and Niger, have implemented 
the tax and raised modest sums for UNITAID.
20  
3.8  Proceeds of sales of a share of certified emission reductions will shortly begin to 
finance the Adaptation Fund (AF), which has been launched to support climate change 
adaptation projects and programs. The AF’s primary funding comes from a 2 percent share of 
proceeds of certified emission reductions (CERs) issued by the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM registry forwards 2 percent of CERs issued for each 
CDM project activity to the AF’s registry account. The AF’s financial base is thus a precedent-
setting international “tax” with a global base arising from an international treaty. 
3.9  Considered a “developing country fund,” the AF is expected to generate 
approximately US$68 million in its first year based on 3.73 million CERs collected to date at 
mid-December 2008 market prices. Its growth will depend on CER volumes through 2012. The 
World Bank serves as the Fund’s trustee and the GEF as its secretariat. Supporting the AF as 
trustee is consistent with the Bank’s current work on climate change. 
                                                 
20 Air ticket levy funds also support IFFIm.  
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B. Innovative Uses of Solidarity 
3.10  Sovereign donors have developed innovative financial solutions that improve the 
uses of official flows through solidarity mechanisms. An emerging crop of financial 
instruments aim to provide developing countries greater flexibility, for example, by adjusting the 
terms and conditions of sovereign lending in response to external shocks or by sequencing of 
grants and loans based on achievement of sectoral performance targets.  
Managing Vulnerability: Counter-Cyclical Lending 
3.11  Counter-cyclical loans allow adjustments in terms and maturities in response to 
export-related shocks. In 2007, the Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) approved two 
such loans: one to Senegal for €30 million and another to Burkina Faso for €15 million. Prior to 
2000, the European Commission had utilized similar instruments, such as the Stabex and Sysmin, 
which allowed flexibility in terms and maturities to smooth the fiscal impact of commodity 
shocks. Both were abolished in 2000 with the Cotonou Agreement. 21 The World Bank has 
offered flexibility to respond to shocks in IDA-eligible countries via the Deferred Drawdown 
Option (DDO) and grants.  
Debt Swaps and Debt Conversions for Results 
3.12  Debt swaps have helped drive the results agenda by allocating a part of government-
secured debt to achieve specific sectoral spending and performance targets. For instance, the 
history of Poland’s EcoFund dates back to 1991, when the Paris Club decided to reduce Polish 
debt by 50 percent provided that the remainder was paid off by 2010. Poland proposed that an 
additional 10 percent of the debt be allocated to environmental protection. Over the 1992–2006 
period, debt swaps under EcoFund funded more than 1,300 projects, totaling US$450 million, in 
air protection, nature conservation, water protection, and waste management.  
3.13  Similarly, debt conversion agreements, such as those funded by Germany under 
Debt2Health, are helping increase and prioritize health sector spending. Under Debt2Health, 
the Global Fund identifies and negotiates debt conversion opportunities and then facilitates a 
three-party agreement among creditors and the beneficiary country. Creditors forgo repayment of 
a portion of their sovereign debts on the condition that the country invests an agreed-upon amount 
in health through a Global Fund–approved program. Germany has made the first offer to forgo 
repayment of 50 million Euro provided that Indonesia invests Euro 25 million in health.  
3.14  World Bank debt-conversion efforts involve credit buy-downs, which convert 
credits into grants. IDA credit buy-downs were first piloted to support polio eradication in 
Nigeria and Pakistan, and IBRD buy-downs in support of a tuberculosis project in China. 
Prior to Board approval of a credit, a donor pays the estimated cost of the future credit buy-down 
into a trust fund. Following an independent performance audit, trust fund resources are paid to 
IDA and the credit is “bought-down.” To date, seven credit buy-downs have been approved 
totaling US$242 million, and two have completed the buy-down cycle. Similarly, IBRD buy-
downs rely on third-party funds to reduce the effective interest rate of the loan by an agreed level. 
In the first IBRD buy-down in China, Department for International Development (DFID) grants 
were used to reduce the cost of borrowing from IBRD to 2 percent. Two more buy-downs in 
China’s education and rural development sectors followed. 
                                                 
21 In 1998, an independent evaluation found that, even with large amounts of funds, Stabex did not 
significantly influence, or compensate for, the overall worldwide drop in producers’ earnings at the time.  
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IV. PROMOTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:  
PRIVATE FINANCE FOR PUBLIC SERVICES 
4.1  Public-private partnership mechanisms (PPPs) that leverage private sources to 
support public service delivery and other public functions play a critical role in 
development finance. For decades, multilateral and national development banks have mobilized 
resources to global capital markets to support lending in middle income countries. Partnerships 
with private donors have also helped raise concessional flows for lower income countries, and for 
global programs. Fund-raising through partnerships helps broaden the base of support for 
development among private sector actors. On the ground, PPPs enable governments in developing 
countries to leverage private flows to fill funding gaps, transfer sovereign and service delivery 
risks, and improve the cost effectiveness of service delivery. They employ a range of financial 
instruments beyond loans and grants in leveraging private flows. By their very nature, PPPs break 
from traditional solidarity transfers and are therefore considered innovative. 
A. Innovative Fund-Raising through Partnerships 
Pooling of Private and Public Resources to Support Country and Global Programs 
4.2  Historically, multilateral agencies in the United Nations (UN) system have been 
leaders in leveraging private donations, and pooling these contributions with other aid 
resources in order to support development activities. UNICEF receives approximately 
US$750 million in private donations—largely from individuals—net of fundraising expenses. 
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) received US$47 million in 2007 
largely from private individuals and is ramping up efforts. The World Food Program received 
more than US$100 million in private donations, a significant portion of which comes from in-
kind donations, such as the logistics and supply chain services. In addition, the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has engaged private corporations, high-net-worth individuals, 
and the mass market through its Product Red campaign.
22 Some multilateral agencies, such as the 
Islamic Development Bank, have benefited from unsolicited donations such as a US$130 million 
gift in 2008 from philanthropist Fael Khair for cyclone shelters in Bangladesh.
23 
4.3  World Bank Group partnerships with private donors—primarily through trust 
funds, and to a much lesser extent IDA—have been modest (Table 4.1). Over the 2001–8 
period, private contributions to Bank-administered trust funds totaled US$269 million. In volume 
terms, the bulk of these resources were provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. To 
date, two private corporations have made contributions totaling US$1 million to IDA.  
                                                 
22 Company Web sites. 
23 Islamic Development Bank Web site. 
Table 4.1: Contributions by Nonsovereign Donors through World Bank Group, FY2001–8 
(US$ million)  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  Total 
Nonsovereign Donors   9    18   47   19   31   25   55    64   269 
IDA  -  Corporation  - - - - - - - 1    1 
Trust  Fund  -  Corporation  0    1 0 2 2 3 5      17    31 
Foundation  8    15   45   15   29   21   40    27   200 
Civil  Society/NGO  1    2 1 1 1 1    10      19    37  
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Innovative Debt Offerings by Development Banks to Support Country Programs 
4.4  Since their inception, multilateral and national development banks have leveraged 
private funds on the world’s financial markets to help finance country level development 
efforts. Between 1995 and 2008, these development banks raised a total of US$1.35 trillion in 
proceeds on the capital markets, of which IBRD and IFC accounted for approximately US$235.4 
billion.
24 World Bank bonds and debt products, issued by IBRD, provide investors with the 
reassurance of an AAA credit rating, a wide choice of products, and strong secondary market 
performance for liquid World Bank benchmark bonds. It customizes its debt offerings to meet 
investors’ specific asset and liability needs. 
4.5  Some donors, such as Germany and France, have raised funds on their domestic 
capital markets, through their national development banks, to fund bilateral aid programs. 
Both countries make substantial use of loans as part of their ODA. For instance, Kreditanstalt fuer 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) Entwicklungsbank sought to “expand the scope of development cooperation 
by combining federal budget and capital market funds.” In 2007 alone, contributions of KfW’s 
bonds and own funds reached 20 percent of Germany’s ODA commitments in 2007.  
4.6  Innovative debt offerings by MDBs target sustainable investing (SI).
25 A leader in SI 
bonds, IBRD has raised a total of US$2.15 billion through bonds that tap new sources by 
                                                 
24 Includes IFFIm. 
25 “Sustainable investing” (SI) describes an investing approach that is becoming increasingly popular, 
especially among retail investors. It integrates social and environmental concerns into investment decisions. 
Box 4.1: World Bank Targets Sustainable Investing with Climate-Related Themes 
World Bank Eco notes (total USDeq 390 million, in three transactions: September and December 2007, 
and February 2008) are six-year euro-denominated notes with a coupon of 3 percent, plus a potential 
additional return linked to an ABN-Amro index of “green” equities. The notes raised funds for IBRD at 
attractive rates, while raising awareness for funding “green” activities, at the same time that the hedging 
activities of IBRD’s swap counterparties also supported capital available to companies in the index. ABN-
Amro and Fortis Bank distributed the notes in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium, primarily to 
retail investors. Proceeds were used in the general operations of IBRD. 
World Bank Cool bonds (total USDeq 31.5 million to-date in two transactions, June and September 
2008) are five-year, USD-denominated notes paying a coupon of 3 percent for an initial period, and a 
variable coupon amount for the remaining maturity of the note tied CERs generated by specified 
greenhouse gas (GHG)-reducing projects in China and Malaysia. Hedging exposure to CERs by IBRD 
counterparties contributes to expansion of this market as well. Daiwa Securities and Mitsubishi UFJ 
Securities distributed the notes to Japanese investors. Proceeds were used in the general operations of 
IBRD. 
World Bank Green bonds (USDeq 350 million, October 2008) are 6-year, Swedish kronor notes paying 
investors a 3.5 percent annual interest rate and raising funds at a spread of 0.25 percent over comparable-
maturity Swedish government paper. They enabled IBRD to raise funds at an attractive cost despite the 
challenging market environment. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) underwrote the issue and 
distributed mainly to Scandinavian institutional investors, who were attracted to the investment because 
the proceeds would be credited to a special account at IBRD that supports World Bank loan 
disbursements on qualifying climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. 
Source: IBRD.  
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engaging investors beyond the financial dimension of the transactions, as partners and 
stakeholders in development. While these new financing products can be purchased by 
investors that are not new to the Bank, their product “content” is radically different. Along with 
their safe investment return, World Bank bonds offered through La Poste, Westpac, and 
DekaBank, as well as those issued for the World Supporter Fund, provide investors an 
opportunity to help with broader development goals. Proceeds from these SI bonds, launched 
over the 2005–8 period, totaled US$1.3 billion.  
4.7  SI bonds with climate change-related themes have enabled investors to support a 
specific cause and raised a total of US$771.5 million through 2008 (Box 4.1). The proceeds 
from the World Bank Eco notes and World Bank Cool Bonds support the general country-based 
operations of IBRD. Proceeds from World Bank Green Bonds aim to provide some degree of 
earmarking in order to demonstrate the linkage between resources mobilized and specific World 
Bank projects that support climate change mitigation and adaptation. World Bank Cool Bonds 
offer the additional benefit of paying a portion of its returns based on the fast-growing market for 
CERs in China and Malaysia. 
4.8  Several development banks—and in particular regional ones—have also sought to 
issue local currency bonds to fund country operations. Between 1995 and 2008, development 
banks raised US$52 billion through local currency bond issues. In addition to the financial 
rationale for issuing bonds in certain local currencies, these debt offerings fund local currency 
lending (discussed in Section V). An ancillary benefit of issuing bonds in developing countries’ 
currencies is that they open potential markets for these countries’ governments and corporations 
to raise funds in their own currencies on international markets (thereby reducing currency risks). 
This benefit may be pronounced for local currency bonds issued on local markets if they help 
develop local capital markets. Table 4.2 indicates that key issuers of local currency bonds were 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (26 percent of all such issues), 
IBRD (23 percent), followed by KfW (14 percent), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (8 percent each).
26  
                                                 
26 Variations can be explained in part by the different mandates and policies of development banks. 
Table 4.2: Funds Raised by Development Banks through Bonds  
Denominated in Developing Countries’ Currencies, 1995–2008 (US$ million) 






EIB 1996  13,701  2,335 
IBRD 1996  11,853  1,773 
KfW 2004  7,125   
IDB 1996  4,280  2,159 
ADB 1998  4,033  1,254 
IFC 1996  3,904  861 
EBRD 1995  3,346  325 
AfDB 1997  1,279  264 
IIC 2001  44   
Others   2,812   
Total   52,377  8,973 
Source: Dealogic.   
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4.9  While the bulk of these consisted of Eurobond issues, US$8.97 billion or 17 percent 
of all such local currency bonds were issued on local financial markets themselves. In addition 
to IBRD, the regional banks—and in particular, the European Investment Bank (EIB), IDB, and 
ADB—were major issuers of local currency bonds on local markets. These are described below: 
  In Eastern Europe, the EBRD launched its first floating-rate bond in 2005, thereby 
setting a benchmark in Russian capital markets. This 5 billion rouble (€140 million) bond 
issue in 2005 was followed by two more rouble bonds in 2006 totaling 12.5 billion roubles 
(€360 million). The proceeds of this bond supported local currency lending to municipalities, 
electricity utilities, and small businesses without exchange rate risks.  
  In East Asia, the ADB and KfW mobilized funds from local financial markets in China 
and Thailand in order to finance local currency lending. In 2006, the ADB launched the 
first Yuan denominated bond for CNY1 billion (US$124.9 million) in order to boost local 
currency capital markets in the region and increase funds available to the private sector in 
China. In 2007, KfW issued its first bond in Thai baht for approximately €65 million. 
  The Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) has issued several bonds with 
investors in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to fund local currency operations. 
It has raised US$118 million as of this writing through two bond issues in Colombia and 
Mexico and has registered a new bond issue in Peru equivalent to US$80 million at the then-
current exchange rate.  
4.10  To date, the World Bank Group as a whole accounts for US$15.76 billion or 30 
percent of total local currency bond issues by development banks over the 1995–2008 
period. Of these, IFC accounted for US$3.90 billion or 24.7 percent. IFC in particular 
undertakes local currency bond issues to support local currency lending, where there is no 
currency swap market, often with back-to-back borrowing and on-lending arrangements. Notably, 
the potential of IFC’s efforts in Africa to channel local currency bond proceeds back into 
operations is gaining attention. For instance, in fiscal 2007, IFC made its first local currency bond 
offering in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This five-year bond, equivalent to US$44.6 million, was 
sold to funds, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds in the eight countries that use the 
West African franc. All of the proceeds will be invested locally, where they are intended to help 
finance domestic companies that need long-term financing in local currency. 
4.11  The World Bank Group promotes the development of local currency bond markets 
through the innovative Global Emerging Markets Local Currency (Gemloc) bond program. 
Gemloc was designed in response to numerous governments that wanted to strengthen their bond 
markets and better support economic growth with stability. Under the program, a leading private 
investment manager, is developing investment strategies for local bonds. Markit, a private sector 
index company, is collaborating with IFC to create a new, transparent bond index, and the World 
Bank is providing advisory services to strengthen local markets and improve their “investability.” 
Frontloading of ODA for Urgent Global Priorities 
4.12  Global programs can also benefit from innovative fund-raising on capital markets. 
The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) experience with 
“frontloading” ODA represents a breakthrough for the international community. The 
initiative originated in a 2003 U.K. proposal that sought to borrow from private investors against 
legally binding long-term ODA commitments, which would serve as assets to back bond  
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issuances.
27 The key feature of the proposal was its ability to “frontload” resources needed to 
support MDG-related programs. In 2006, the IFF proposal materialized with the launch of a pilot 
for immunization, which was supported by France, Italy, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. Supporters have together pledged to contribute US$ 5.3 billion to 
IFFIm over 20 years. IFFIm aims to mobilize about $4 billion in the capital markets in the first 10 
years.
28 Net proceeds are provided to the GAVI Alliance, which channels these resources to 
support immunization efforts. 
4.13  IFFIm mobilized US$1 billion and doubled GAVI’s annually available resources in 
its first year of existence. IFFIm’s inaugural bonds, issued on November 14, 2006, raised US$1 
billion. The bonds were bought by a broad range of investors, including several central banks, 
pension funds, fund managers, and insurance companies. The second issuance saw IFFIm’s debut 
in the Japanese market on March 18, 2008, with a principal amount of ZAR 1.7 billion (US$223 
million). It constituted the largest South African rand-denominated bond seen to date in the 
market and was also the first initiative of this kind in Japan to use the capital markets to raise 
funds for a specific development purpose. This second issue sought retail rather than institutional 
investors. As of November 20, 2008, it had disbursed an almost equivalent amount.  
4.14  The World Bank serves as the treasury manager for IFFIm. It manages donor 
contributions to IFFIm, manages IFFIm’s capital markets activities through bond issuances and 
also provides risk management, investment management, accounting, legal, and other 
administrative services. IFFIm funds are channeled as grants to developing countries’ 
immunization programs through GAVI. The Bank also administers the GAVI Fund Affiliate 
Account, which receives bond proceeds from IFFIm and makes disbursements for GAVI 
programs. The Bank does not play an operational role. 
4.15  Two caveats relating to the adequacy and allocation of resources should be noted. 
First, IFFIm does not generate additional ODA flows from private sources, but rather 
intertemporally shifts funds available for immunization. The expected benefits of frontloading are 
therefore investment returns on high payoff projects through earlier investment (less the cost of 
capital for borrowing on the markets). Second, resources mobilized through IFFIm are allocated 
to GAVI. Vertical funds, such as IFFIm, may still have to contend with the transactions costs 
associated with earmarked ODA channels. 
B. Innovative Partnership Solutions at the Country Level 
Private Finance for Infrastructure and Social Service Delivery 
4.16  Over the past two decades, developing countries have recognized that private 
finance is critical to filling infrastructure deficits and improving service delivery. A key 
motivation for developing countries is to leverage private finance to fill large service delivery 
financing gaps. Annual volumes of private investment in emerging markets infrastructure rose 
from US$20 billion per annum in 1990 to more than US$120 billion in 1997. The Asian crisis 
and other factors contributed to its subsequent decline, which was only partially reversed in the 
2000s.  
4.17  These public-private partnerships in infrastructure have evolved since the 1990s 
and will continue to do so in response to the ongoing global economic crisis. The 1990s 
                                                 
27 Atkinson, p. 110–111. 
28 Current mobilization levels for IFFIm are less than US$3 billion.  
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approach to PPPs, with its heavy reliance on privatizations and concessions that did not always 
involve appropriate risk allocation between governments and the private sector, faced limitations. 
While infrastructure investment from external sources continue to follow the 1990s model in 
certain sectors (telecoms, ports, airports, freight railways, and natural gas pipelines), the approach 
is evolving and the capacity of developing country governments to develop, procure, negotiate, 
and oversee PPP contracts is strengthening. PPPs increasingly emphasize better risk- and cost-
sharing between public and private sectors, and a more systematic poverty focus. The ongoing 
crisis is impacting PPPs in infrastructure and the social sectors. From August to November 2008, 
the level of investment in new projects registered a decline of about 40 percent compared with the 
level in the same period in 2007. Around 27 percent of surveyed projects by investment have 
been delayed, canceled, or are at risk of being canceled. Projects delayed and at risk of being 
delayed amount to US$82 billion. The financing and risk management requirements of sustaining 
PPPs could mean a greater role for governments and their partners. 
4.18  To date, multilateral and bilateral support to PPPs in infrastructure—in the form of 
lending, risk management, and technical assistance services—has been modest. But it 
remains critical to crowding in private investment. While they account for only 3 percent of 
total investment commitments in volume terms, their involvement in a relatively large share in 
the number of projects reflects their ability to crowd in private investors. Loans to sovereigns, 
either direct or through syndication, provide support for launching and sustaining PPPs. Several 
multilateral players, such as the IDB, ADB, and EBRD, have directly financed a large percentage 
of projects that use PPPs. In so doing, they have crowded in private investment in the energy 
sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. 
Guarantees were also critical to leveraging private finance in infrastructure in middle- and lower-
income countries. For example, they accounted for 30 percent of multilateral support in transport 
over 2001–07 (Annexes 4 and 5). 
4.19  In lower income countries, in particular, ODA has been critical to leveraging private 
investment in infrastructure. Three-quarters of infrastructure spending (and 90 percent in IDA 
countries) are financed entirely by the public sector through budgets or external borrowing. ODA 
accounted for about 15 percent while public funding accounted for almost 50 percent over the 
period of review. Donors have helped African organizations of various kinds set up their own 
infrastructure project preparation facilities, in part as a way of attracting private investors. One 
example is the Private Infrastructure Development Group, which is a multidonor, member-
managed organization that encourages private infrastructure investment in developing countries.  
4.20  Local public banks as well as multilateral, bilateral, and export credit agencies have 
been also been financiers of PPPs for infrastructure service delivery. Companies from 
developing countries mobilized 51 percent of funding for infrastructure projects with private 
participation in 2005–6 in contrast to the 1990s when large international companies played a 
dominant role. Projects in Brazil and India, countries accounting for a large share of private 
activity, have sourced financing largely from public sector banks. Local banks can provide local 
currency denominated financing in part to management foreign exchange risks. 
4.21  The World Bank Group has played a critical role in assisting countries attract 
private capital for infrastructure through lending (including in local currency debt 
financing),
29 guarantees and other risk management tools, OBA schemes, and advisory services. 
Over the fiscal 2004–7 period, World Bank Group lending to infrastructure increased 
                                                 
29 Under Mexico’s US$108 million Decentralized Infrastructure Loan, IBRD provides local currency 
financing by executing swap transactions with a financial intermediary before each disbursement.  
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significantly to US$41 billion—of which US$33 billion was IBRD and IDA lending. These 
commitments leveraged an additional US$70 billion in public and private financing. In 
supporting infrastructure investments, the World Bank Group also shifted its strategy from a 
focus to flexible PPPs to meet diverse developing countries needs.  
4.22  The role of various World Bank Group guarantees provided by IBRD, IDA,
30 
MIGA, and IFC are critical to leveraging private finance for public service delivery. Over 
the 2000–8 period, guarantees issued by multilateral and bilateral organizations to support 
investments in infrastructure and social sector investments in developing countries totaled 
approximately US$8.5 billion in guarantee amounts. Of this amount, US$4.5 billion, or 53 
percent, were provided by the World Bank Group alone. In terms of guarantee amounts, the 
overwhelming majority or 87 percent were covered by political risk insurance provided by 
MIGA. Taken together, over the 2000–7 period, MIGA and IBRD/IDA’s partial risk guarantees 
were more heavily focused on leveraging private flows in support of service delivery investments, 
for example in energy and mining (40 percent), followed by transport (7 percent) and water and 
sanitation (4 percent). By contrast, and as would be expected, IFC’s partial credit guarantees were 
overwhelmingly focused on the financial and productive sectors (discussed in Section V). 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean received the lion’s share of Bank Group support in 
the form of partial risk guarantees (40 percent in terms of guarantee amounts), followed by Africa 
(25 percent) and Europe and Central Asia (21 percent).  
4.23  Some of these World Bank Group risk management instruments were embedded in 
lending products that support PPPs in infrastructure and social sectors. IFC’s portfolio of 
local currency loans with derivatives has grown steadily since 1999.
31 Approximately 14 
percent of the total $5.3 billion in IFC local currency lending using derivatives supported 
investments in infrastructure. Four percent supported investments in the health and other social 
sectors. Specific examples include support for hydroelectric generation in northern India, private 
hospital upgrading in the Philippines, the development of rural access and regional roads in 
Russia, and the health sector in Nigeria (Box 4.2).  
4.24  World Bank Group efforts to package concessional lending, targeted subsidies, and 
risk-mitigation instruments in support of infrastructure have helped leverage IFC and 
private flows, particularly in IDA countries. A number of joint financing models between IFC 
and IDA have supported a range of infrastructure projects. For instance, IDA, through a Partial 
Risk Guarantee (PRG), covered political and government-related risks faced by commercial 
lenders (for example, Bujagali) or by the project company (Kenya-Uganda railways), coupled 
with an IFC investment to the project, upstream IFC advisory work, and MIGA insurance on the 
equity stake of private operators. Similarly, IDA/IBRD has funded a line of credit facility to 
increase the availability of long-term financing for infrastructure PPP projects, together with IFC 
cofinancing for select subprojects. Furthermore, an IBRD enclave guarantee (for example, 
SASOL); and IBRD enclave loan support the government’s equity position (for example, Chad 
Cameroon Pipeline), together with an IFC investment.
32 
                                                 
30 Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs) available under the IDA guarantee pilot program cover commercial debt 
owed to private lenders or investors relating to private sector projects against debt service default, where 
such defaults are caused by a government’s failure to meet its contractual obligations related to the project.  
31 Companies with revenues in local currency should generally borrow in their local currency rather than a 
foreign currency. For these firms, hedging against currency risk is a prudent financial strategy.  
32 World Bank. World Bank-IFC Collaboration in IDA Countries. Annual Progress Report, 2009.  
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4.25  Output-Based Aid (OBA)—a form of public-private partnerships—involves 
contracting arrangements with the private sector that tie the disbursement of public 
funding or “subsidies” to the achievement of specific service delivery results. First introduced 
in 2000, OBA schemes compensate service providers (usually the private sector but in some cases 
also community or nongovernmental organizations or public sector utilities) with subsidies upon 
delivery of a specified output, such as water connections of a specified quality, to a targeted 
beneficiary. Subsidies, provided in the form of payments for the provision of services to targeted 
groups, cover the gap between the cost of provision and the user’s ability to pay.  
4.26  Of the total 159 OBA projects identified around the world, 123 are supported by the 
World Bank Group, totaling US$3.8 billion in investments (US$2.6 billion Bank and US$1.1 
billion government).
33 The plurality of these schemes was focused in the water and energy 
sectors, followed by health and other social services. However, in terms of funding volumes, the 
transportation sector represented about half of OBA-related flows. While a third of OBA projects 
were in Africa, in volume terms those in Latin America were largest. Of the 123 OBA projects, 
more than 60 percent (75 projects) are in IDA countries, 33 are in IBRD countries, and 15 are in 
IDA/IBRD blend countries. Increasingly, OBA schemes are being mainstreamed into the design 
of IBRD and IDA lending operations. 
                                                 
33 A handful of projects involve well-functioning public sector service providers and involve partnerships 
between public institutions. 
Box 4.2: Local Currency Loans Using Derivatives: The Case of Hygeia Nigeria 
 
IFC offers local currency loans in any country where it is possible to hedge its resulting currency 
exposure from the local currency loan. It uses long-term derivatives or swaps to synthetically transform 
the cash flows from a local currency loan into dollar cash flows. In addition to the development impact 
of the projects they finance, local currency loans also help improve the client’s currency risk 
management and develop financial markets in other countries. 
 
Hygeia Nigeria Limited, a private sector provider of hospitals and Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO) services in Nigeria, was founded in 1984 as a multispecialty hospital in Lagos. The company 
has evolved into an integrated health care services group with an HMO, three hospitals in Lagos, 25 
worksite clinics, and a network of more than 200 clinics across the country. In 2006, Hygeia was 
interested in borrowing money to finance an expansion and renovation of its hospitals and to improve 
its HMO business. Historically, Hygeia has borrowed in dollars and was exposed to significant currency 
risk.  
 
From 2000 to 2003, the Nigerian naira depreciated by more than 40 percent relative to the U.S. dollar. 
Then, from 2003 to 2008, the currency appreciated more than 15 percent relative to the U.S. dollar, only 
to depreciate again 15 percent. This extreme volatility in currency markets demonstrates the importance 
of linking a company’s revenues and liabilities to the same currency. Hygeia was seeking long-term 
local currency debt in a market where any kind of long term debt financing is limited.  
 
Using derivatives, IFC provided Hygeia with a loan of 390 million Nigerian naira (US$3 million). The 
swap used to fund this loan was the longest maturity currency swap in the Nigerian naira market to date. 
It is expected to pave the way for more long-term naira/dollar swaps, leading to more local currency 
investment in Nigeria. 
 
Source: IFC  
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4.27  The Bank Group helps pilot OBA projects with grants provided through a 
multidonor trust fund financed by the DFID, the Netherlands, Australia, and IFC. A similar 
initiative is IFC’s Performance-Based Guarantee Initiative (PBGI), which has dedicated US$250 
million of funds to subsidies in infrastructure and small and medium enterprise (SME) projects. 
USAID and KfW are also supporting OBA projects in the health, water, and energy sectors. The 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) of Switzerland provided OBA funding for a joint 
IFC/IDA energy project in Tajikistan. AFD is involved in implementing OBA approaches in 
water and sanitation projects in Morocco, Kenya, and Cambodia.  
4.28  Advisory services constitute a significant component of the World Bank’s work in 
promoting PPPs for public service delivery. Since 1999, the World Bank–managed Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) has funded more than US$130 million in 
technical assistance (TA), facilitated more than 100 transactions, and strengthened more than 50 
institutions.
34 IFC has also allocated $100 million to Infra-Ventures, which assists private 
sponsors with prefeasibility studies and risk capital in order to promote private investment in 
power, water, and municipal services, and transport. Finally, between 2000 and 2008, IFC 
advisory mandates on PPPs helped mobilize US$10 billion in investment, US$1.7 billion in 
concession fees and other fiscal benefits for governments.
35  
Sovereign Catastrophe Risk Finance 
4.29  In recent years, there has been growing recognition that exogenous shocks are more 
frequent and costly in developing countries.
36 According to the OFDA/CRED International 
Disaster Database, the estimated direct damage caused to developing countries alone by natural 
and human made disasters. Damages reached almost US$33 billion in 2007. As a result of 
underdeveloped local insurance markets, the estimated insured losses caused by natural disasters 
have remained stable at less than 5 percent in low-income countries over the past decade. 
Hydrometeorological events from droughts to floods cause 90 percent of the damage. 
4.30  Developing countries are recognizing, however, that they can no longer rely purely 
on ex post relief and recovery measures. Delays in provision of ex post relief and recovery 
efforts compound the costs of crises. Also, following a disaster, funds in developing countries’ 
budgets are diverted from development objectives to immediate relief and then reconstruction. 
Donors covered an estimated 2 to 14 percent of economic losses from natural disasters, often with 
significant delays and disproportionate generosity for the most visible disasters.
37 
4.31  Catastrophe risk finance is an important means of leveraging private finance to 
support ex ante management of sovereign risks. Specifically, risk management tools can help 
transfer a part of the government’s assessed financial risk or its contingent liability from 
catastrophe to the domestic and/or international insurance markets. Because domestic insurance 
markets are underdeveloped in most developing countries, development partners can help 
governments transfer sovereign risks to global capital markets.  
4.32  Even though catastrophe and sovereign risk financing is relatively new to 
development finance institutions, donors can help in coordinating and catalyzing the 
process, by supplying initial funding to cover startup costs, deploying capital, and providing 
                                                 
34 PPIAF. 2008 Annual Report. 
35 IFC. 2008 Annual Report. 
36 Guillermo Perry, 2009. 
37 Cummins and Mahul, 2006.  
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technical assistance. Key instruments include contingent loans, regional catastrophe insurance 
pools, weather derivatives insurance, and technical assistance and advisory services. Described 
below, these applications allow countries to secure immediate liquidity and budget support 
following a major natural disaster or other exogenous shocks. Among development partners, the 
World Bank has supported a number of firsts in this area, including the following: 
  IBRD’s first contingent loan of US$65 million, approved in September 2008, supports Cost 
Rica’s Disaster Risk Management Program through a development policy loan with a 
Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (CAT DDO). It is expected to be followed by 
similar operations under preparation in Albania, Colombia, Croatia, and Guatemala.  
  IBRD assisted 16 countries in establishing a multicountry catastrophe insurance pool that 
offers parametric insurance against major hurricanes and earthquakes. Through the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), governments can purchase coverage—akin to 
business interruption insurance—that provides immediate liquidity in case of a major event. 
CCRIF’s financial capacity depends on its own reserves (initially provided by donors) and 
international reinsurance. It placed more than US$110 million on international reinsurance 
and capital markets in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, a 7.4-magnitude earthquake triggered 
indemnity payments to St. Lucia and Dominica totaling US$1 million. Hurricane Ike in 2008 
triggered a US$6 million payout to the Turks and Caicos Islands. 
  As part of the reinsurance placement of the Caribbean Facility (noted above), IBRD also 
arranged to transfer a portion of the risk to capital markets through a US$20 million cat swap. 
This derivative transaction between IBRD and CCRIF was the first to enable developing 
countries to access capital markets to insure against natural disasters. 
  IBRD provided technical assistance and intermediation services to the Government of 
Mexico in issuing a cat bond, which was designed to make its self-insurance fund less 
dependent on government for the allocation of post-disaster funds. Mexico purchased 
US$450 million in catastrophe coverage, of which US$160 million was issued as a cat bond 
to cover earthquakes. Institutional investors in the United States and Europe paid into a 
single-purpose reinsurer created for the Government of Mexico. If an earthquake of a 
specified magnitude were to occur in designated areas of the country within three years, the 
Government can draw on these funds. If none occurs during this period, the money will be 
returned to the investors.  
  IBRD intermediated its first weather risk management contract to help Malawi protect itself 
against the risk of severe drought. It marks the first time that a member of IDA is able to 
access World Bank market-based risk management tools. On behalf of the Government of 
Malawi, the DFID financed the premium payment for the contract (Box 4.3). 
4.33  Other Sovereign Risks. Currency risk arises when the currencies borrowers owe are 
different from what they receive from their net earnings or revenue streams. Such risk can 
have a more significant impact on debt service requirements than interest rate risk primarily 
because it affects both principal and interest. Access to local currency financing to protect public 
resources against exchange rate volatility is limited for most borrowers. Developing countries can 
therefore use local currency swaps to better manage these risks. Such swaps allow borrowers to 
convert the currency of disbursed loan amounts into their local currency.   
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4.34  Multilateral development banks, such as IBRD, are increasingly involved in 
providing technical assistance and intermediation services for currency swaps, for example, 
by embedding them in IBRD Flexible and Fixed Spread Loans or as stand-alone products for 
other IBRD loans and non-IBRD creditors’ debt. The Bank’s intermediation of swaps allows 
borrowers to benefit from IBRD’s superior credit rating to achieve better terms at a lower cost. 
For instance, an IBRD swap for Mexico transferred foreign currency risk from the borrower to 
the market. Swap intermediation for Bulgaria helped reduce the vulnerability of its debt portfolio 
to external shocks by reducing its exposure to U.S. dollars. Swaps can also help change the 
currency composition of developing country debt portfolios. In 2004, IBRD contracted with 
financial intermediaries in the market to swap U.S. dollars for euros, and a variable interest rate 
for a fixed rate for the maturity of the loan. This reduced Morocco’s U.S. dollar liabilities and the 
interest rate risk of its external debt portfolio. 
4.35  In countries where swap markets are illiquid or nonexistent, back-to-back financing 
allows IBRD to extend a loan in local currency to sovereign borrowers. To undertake this 
transaction, IBRD issues a local currency-denominated bond in the domestic market and uses the 
proceeds to extend a loan with similar terms. Depending on country conditions, this type of 
transaction can help mitigate currency risks while enabling domestic market development. For 
instance, in one application of this approach, IBRD issued a Uruguayan peso-denominated bond 
at levels lower than the Government of Uruguay’s own cost of funding. 
Box 4.3: World Bank Intermediation Services for Malawi Weather Indexed Insurance 
 
Weather derivatives are designed to provide compensation for financial loss related to adverse weather 
events. Contracts can be based on measureable weather events, such as excessive or insufficient rainfall, 
temperatures (extreme heat/cold), and tropical storms, hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons. Contracts are 
based on an underlying weather index and payments are triggered by adverse weather events according to 
prespecified conditions. Weather risk management transactions can be customized according to each 
country’s specific needs: the type of weather hazard, level of protection, and estimated financial loss 
associated with a severe and catastrophic event. These can be applied to agriculture and energy 
production, as well as hedging tourism revenues.  
 
Even though these instruments became available in the late 1990s, some countries, such as Malawi, have 
reduced access to market-based risk-management tools because of market inefficiencies and limited 
capacity. Almost 90 percent of Malawi’s population lives in rural areas and engages mainly in 
smallholder, rain-fed subsistence farming. Agriculture contributes 38 percent of the country’s GDP, and 
the weak and erratic performance of the agricultural sector, mostly a result of the impact of drought, has 
constrained growth in the country. Maize production, in particular, is a crucial element of food security 
and recurrent drought leads to chronic and widespread malnutrition. 
 
In response to the Government’s request, the World Bank helped identify when weather risk management 
instruments can be appropriately used as part of a comprehensive agricultural risk management 
framework. Based on this analysis, the Bank structured a market-based tool for commodity price risk 
reduction. The contract was designed as an option on a rainfall index. The index links rainfall and maize 
production so that, if precipitation falls below a certain level, the index will reflect the projected loss in 
maize production. Under the contract, if the maize production in the country, as estimated by the rainfall 
index, falls 10 percent below the historical average, Malawi will receive a payout of up to a maximum of 
US$5 million. DfID paid the premium for the contract on behalf of the Government and the World Bank. 
The Bank’s Treasury Department then transacted the contract with a market counterparty. The payout 
could be used as part of a broader framework to finance commodity price risk management strategies.  
 
Source: IBRD.  
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V. CATALYZING PRIVATE ENTRY AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
5.1  A major component of innovative finance solutions on the ground involves the use of 
official flows to catalyze market creation and development, including by reducing the risks 
and costs of private entry into existing markets. These catalytic mechanisms can also be used to 
tap new sources of official and private flows. Like other mechanisms discussed in this paper, 
these deploy an array of financial instruments. 
A. New Sources for Catalyzing Market Development 
Carbon Finance 
5.2  Carbon finance represents an emerging source of development finance.
38 By 
establishing a framework for trading “reduction(s) in greenhouse gases by the equivalent of 
one metric ton of CO2,” signatories to the Kyoto Protocol have essentially created a new 
globally traded commodity. This commodity, which has a market value, is traded across borders 
both in markets within developed countries (through emission trading systems), between 
developed countries and developing countries (through the Clean Development Mechanism, or 
CDM), and between developed countries and economies in transition (through Joint 
Implementation, or JI). With the Kyoto Protocol coming into force in February 2005, the market 
for emission reductions has expanded with the sale of emissions reductions from developing 
countries. While there were private purchasers in the market early on, most generally traded in 
small quantities in pilot projects.  
5.3  The global market for greenhouse gas emission reductions through project-based 
transactions has been growing steeply, doubling in value between 2006 and 2007, reaching 
US$13.6 billion in commitments,
39 of which US$5.5 billion were traded on the secondary 
CDM market. However, only a few—mostly middle income—countries have benefitted to 
date. At the end of March 2008, there were 3,188 projects in the CDM pipeline,
40 of which 
roughly one-third are registered or in the process of registration, while roughly two-thirds are at 
validation stage. It can take between one and two years for a project to go from validation to 
registration. European buyers account for 90 percent of the CDM market. For the third 
consecutive year, China was the world leader in CDM supply with a 73 percent market share in 
terms of 2007 transacted volume (compared to 54 percent market share in 2006). Brazil and 
India, at 6 percent market share each, transacted the highest volumes after China, although this 
represented a drop for each from 2006 levels. Africa followed with 5 percent.
41  
5.4  As an experienced developer of CDM projects, the World Bank Group has played 
an important role in helping to deepen carbon markets. To date, the Bank has sought to 
support developing countries in fully exploiting the capital transfers available from carbon 
finance by assisting in the identification and preparation of projects that reduce carbon emissions; 
moving to a programmatic approach (through the Carbon Partnership Facility); and promoting 
carbon projects in countries, sectors, and activities yet to benefit from carbon finance (including 
through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, which aims to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation). It also raises additional carbon finance, and supports 
                                                 
38 Carbon finance here refers to purchases of greenhouse gas emission reductions in developing countries 
and economies in transition to offset emissions by governments and firms in industrialized countries. 
39 The global carbon market was US$64 billion in 2007. Of this, EU ETS accounted for US$50.4 billion. 
40 By the end of December 2008, the number of projects in the CDM pipeline had grown to about 4,200. 
41 World Bank. State and Trends of the Carbon Market. 2008.  
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investments by partnering with industrialized governments and private corporations seeking to 
buy carbon credits in developing markets. Overall, the Bank tries to ensure that all carbon 
projects that it promotes have sustainable development benefits.
42  
5.5  Although it accounts for a small portion of the overall transaction volume, the 
World Bank has played an important intermediary role in supporting project-based 
transactions (Table 5.1).
43 Since 2004, the Bank supported 160 projects in 26 countries 
(including 3 IDA and 2 Blend countries). The total volume of transactions reached nearly $280 
million as of fiscal 2008 end. As of fiscal 2008 end, donors had contributed more than $850 
million in 11 World Bank carbon funds. On average, the annual volume of transactions increased 
two-fold every year since 2004. Through its carbon trust funds, the World Bank has mobilized 
more than US$2 billion of equity, 57.4 percent of which was from private sources. These funds 
have been committed to Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) worth US$638 
million, most of which were in Asia.
44 
5.6  The actual financial flows generated by the primary market for Carbon Emission 
Reduction certificates (CERs) totaled only US$1.55 billion over the 2005–8 period.
45 Of 
these, only 4.5 percent, or US$69.6 million, were supported through World Bank carbon 
funds.
46 Globally, the lion’s share of carbon finance flows went to China (58 percent), India (22 
percent), and Brazil (13 percent). Bank carbon funds contribute only a small portion of these 
                                                 
42 The Role of the World Bank in Carbon Finance: An Approach for Further Engagement, 2006. 
43 The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit does not lend or grant resources to projects, but rather purchases 
project-based emission reductions in developing countries and economies in transition, using resources 
provided by governments and private participants in industrialized countries.  
44 An ERPA is the agreement that governs the purchase and sale of emission reductions. 
45 This includes retroactive purchases from 2002 and 2004. 
46 The Umbrella Carbon Fund (UCF)was created to offload excess CERs generated by the two HFC deals 
(and not absorbed by the participants in the existing funds). Only 28.1 percent of annual HFC 
disbursements are attributed to UCF payments. The Bank’s participation increases if the CERs in the UCF 
were included. 
Table 5.1 World Bank Share of ERPA Commitments and Payments,* 2005–8  
(US$  million)  2005 2006 2007  2008  Total 
Carbon Finance or ERPA Commitments 
Primary Market CDM  2,417  5,804  7,426  --  -- 
ERPAs under WB Carbon Funds   339  242  186  218   
Share  (%)  14 4 3  --  -- 
Carbon Finance Flows or ERPA Payments 
Africa/Middle and Near East  0.3  2.8  14.1  4.6  21.8 
Asia  74.9 107.3 529.4  538.1  1,249.7 
Latin America and Caribbean  33.6  38.8  113.1  90.0  275.6 
Others --  ---  --  --  -- 
Total  108.9 149.0 656.7  632.7  1,547.1 
World Bank Carbon Fund (ERPA Payments) 
Amount 3.0  4.8  24.8  35.6  69.6 
Share  (%)  2.8 3.2 3.8  5.6  4.5 
* From the two hydroflourocarbon (HFC) deals signed by the Bank in China in 2006, only the emission reductions 
acquired by the participants in its existing funds were considered in the commitment and payment calculations. 
Source: World Bank Carbon Unit.  
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flows in part because they aim to catalyze rather than crowd out other market players. It will be 
important to monitor the Bank’s success in helping to identify projects in lower income countries. 
5.7  The emerging carbon market is at a critical juncture. While demand for emission 
reductions is conservatively estimated at 3.5 billion tons by 2012, the challenge of 
identifying viable projects remains. Although the Kyoto Protocol continues until 2012, viable 
projects that can generate large volumes of emissions to meet demand have not been developed at 
the scale needed. At the same time, geographic and technological diversity of GHG emission 
reduction projects is important for those that seek to buy and sell CERs. So far projects have been 
concentrated in a few sectors and have not reached many countries, in particular some of the 
poorer developing countries. Further deepening of the carbon market requires more proactive 
efforts to identify viable projects in lower income countries. 
5.8  Various risk management tools can also help strengthen the credibility of the carbon 
market as well as the predictability of the long-term price of carbon. For instance, carbon 
delivery guarantees, such as those provided by IFC, include efforts to maximize the price of 
credits to project developers through credit enhancements that guarantee the delivery obligation 
of primary market projects to secondary market buyers (e.g., the premium in pricing obtained by 
the buyers in the secondary markets is passed on to the projects net of guarantee fees). Other 
promising examples include insurance to protect investors against factors, such as advance 
payments, pricing fluctuation, delivery risks, and projects/credits eligibility under regulatory 
schemes. While still early, there is a growing market for derivatives, options, and swaps that 
provide hedging alternatives for investors who feel overexposed to a specific carbon asset.
47 
Finally, monetization of future carbon receivables and carbon-linked bond transactions can 
generate capital to be channeled for investment in new low-carbon projects. 
5.9  The long-term market for carbon depends on ensuring a robust and enforceable 
post-Kyoto regulatory framework along with the supporting institutional structures. In 
anticipation of the importance of the CER market over time, the World Bank Group and other 
multilateral agencies, such as the EIB and ADB, have launched post-2012 carbon funds. 
B. Catalytic Uses at the Country and Regional Level 
Promoting Entry into the Financial and Productive Sectors through Guarantees 
5.10  In addition to funding constraints, investors in the financial and productive sectors 
in developing countries routinely face sovereign, currency, and project risks that hinder 
entry into markets.
48 As recognition of these risk factors has grown, so has the market for 
private providers of political and commercial risk guarantees and other risk management tools. 
For several years, private investors have utilized risk mitigation measures, such as guarantees and 
insurance schemes to reduce the risks and costs of market entry in the financial and productive 
sectors in developing countries.
49 Political risk guarantees cover specific risk events related to 
noncommercial factors (such as currency convertibility, transferability of currencies outside the 
host country, and government nonperformance). Partial credit guarantees cover payment risks for 
                                                 
47 Kossoy, 2008. 
48 Bestani, et al. 2005. 
49 “The terms guarantee and insurance are used interchangeably by providers. A guarantee differs from an 
insurance policy because it envisages timely unconditional payment for nonperformance, while an 
insurance involves claim investigation and, depending on terms and conditions, other intermediate steps.” 
IEG Review, 2008.  
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debt obligations or trade finance transactions. Between one-sixth and one-third of all foreign 
direct investments and one-fifth of all exports are insured. 
5.11  Over the 2000s, the major issuers of insurance or guarantees included members of 
the Berne Union and multinational agencies. Together, they offered a diversity of risk 
mitigation products available to private investors in the financial and productive sectors 
(Annex 4). Export credit agencies are also major issuers. However, comprehensive data on their 
activities are not available.
50 It is important to note that guarantees are often embedded in 
portfolios comprising direct or syndicated loans, equity, and grants for technical cooperation. 
5.12  Excluding export credit to developing countries, the largest shares of guarantees 
were focused on the banking and financial (34 percent) and productive (18 percent) sectors 
over the period 2001–7. Since a large portion of guarantees in the banking sector involved local 
currency and interbank loan guarantees that benefitted companies in industry, agriculture, and 
mining, the share of direct and indirect guarantees supporting investment in the productive sector 
was probably more significant. Geographically, East Asia alone accounted for almost two-thirds 
of all guarantees and insurance (including export credit) over the period. Excluding export credit, 
Latin America and the Caribbean received about one-third of guarantees, Eastern Europe
51 30 
percent, and Asia 22 percent. In both cases, Africa’s role was marginal.  
5.13  The following salient features of the guarantees and insurance markets are critical to 
investors involved in the financial and productive sectors in developing countries: 
  Even though the export credit insurance market is highly concentrated and dominated by 
private sector players, state-owned export credit agencies accounted for more than a fifth of 
total credit insurance for exports to developing countries.
52 
  While private insurers account for more than 50 percent of the political risk insurance market, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies have played a catalytic role through issuance of partial 
political or credit guarantees in support of financial market development and trade finance. 
  Local currency loan guarantees are mainly aimed at facilitating credit to SMEs. Since 
2003, IIC has provided credit guarantees in several countries, thereby allowing firms to 
obtain local currency loans. The African and Asian Development Banks, as well as AFD have 
similar facilities that offer credit guarantees to SMEs. 
  Bond guarantees have also been used for infrastructure and financial sector projects. IDB 
has guaranteed bonds issued by firms operating toll roads, including in Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. IIC has also issued guarantees for bond issues of cable operators in Mexico and 
mortgage backed securities issues in Colombia. 
  Interbank loan guarantees are mainly used for trade finance facilitation. Trade finance 
facilitation has become one of the most common uses of guarantees. These programs involve 
revolving partial credit guarantees designed to play a counter-cyclical role by providing 
                                                 
50 These do not include all guarantees because most export credit agencies publish only a fraction 
(sometimes only 50 percent) by country destinations, while others treat data as “commercial in confidence” 
and do not disclose them. Some guarantees were “policy renewals” and did not back additional flows. 
51 Europe’s share may be overestimated since it is difficult to separate it from Russia’s share.  
52 USAID’s Credit Development Authority alone issued 114 guarantees totaling $335mm, mobilizing 
US$856mm in private investment in 36 countries.  
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liquidity to the international trade finance system, particularly during times of economic 
difficulties. Key players include the EBRD, IDB, ADB, and the World Bank Group.  
5.14  Over the 2000–8 period, the World Bank Group issued guarantees totaling US$7.7 
billion in guarantee amounts to support investments in finance and the productive sectors. 
This comprised more than a third of all guarantees issued by multilateral and bilateral 
organizations in these sectors. IBRD and IDA’s Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs) as well as 
MIGA’s 
53guarantees worth US$4.66 billion leveraged total project costs of US$13 billion in 
support of financial sector and other productive sector investments. This amounts to a leverage 
ratio of 2.8. Over the period of review, IFC’s Partial Credit Guarantees (PCGs) totaling US$3.03 
billion in guarantee amounts, leveraged total investment costs of US$6.74 billion—a mobilization 
rate of 2.2.  
5.15  IFC, in particular, has spearheaded World Bank Group efforts to support country-
level catalytic efforts through risk-management instruments. As noted above, PCGs have 
been offered on both single- and multiborrower portfolios of loans in 2000. These included 
nontrade-related loan obligations, totaling US$683 million, mostly on local currency instruments. 
IFC has also issued bond guarantees totaling US$323 million in support of local currency bond 
issuance of US$861 million, assisting in local capital market development. Guarantee products 
also assisted in the placement of securitizations in both local and cross-border capital markets. 
Over the past six years, IFC has credit-enhanced several emerging-market securitizations, 
typically through the assumption of mezzanine-level risk. Accordingly, since 2000, it has assisted 
in the issuance of US$5.7 billion in securitization transactions through investing in, or 
guaranteeing, US$596 million in securitization-related exposures. Finally, an important 
component of IFC’s catalytic efforts relates to trade finance. Since late 2005, IFC’s Global Trade 
Finance Program issued 884 guarantees in support of transactions worth more than US$1.5 
billion. 
Managing Currency Risks in the Financial and Productive Sectors 
5.16  As noted earlier in Section IV, access to local currency financing can help mitigate 
the risks of currency mismatches. Managing such risks is particularly important in the case 
of private investors in the financial and other productive sectors. Since the mid-2000s in 
particular, MDBs and other development finance institutions have begun to expand local currency 
financing to private firms in these sectors. Example include ADB’s approval of 13 local currency 
loans to private firms in Central and East Asia, totaling US$779.5 million; EBRD’s provision of 
long-term Russian rouble finance, including its single large rouble syndicated loan to 
Volkswagen Rus to set up a car plant in 2007; IDB’s approval of 10 new operations to private 
firms under its new Local Currency Facility (LCF); and the launch of a global partnership 
between FMO, a Dutch development finance institution, and Citigroup, which supports a US$540 
million risk-sharing facility. Through this facility and other efforts, FMO has increased local 
currency financing to 17 percent of its portfolio and aims to reach 20 percent by 2010. 
5.17  Currency swaps can also help mitigate currency risks for firms. Because these 
swaps are only possible for a few developing countries’ currencies, development partners 
have launched efforts to develop markets for long-term finance in local currency. TCX—a 
special purpose fund created by donors, development banks, and international banks—provides 
currency and exchange rate risk-management products to investors active in emerging markets, 
                                                 
53 This allows senior obligations in these securitizations to achieve higher credit ratings than would be 
possible without the credit enhancement.  
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such as basic currency and interest rate derivatives.
 It focuses on currencies and maturities that 
are not covered by regular market providers. As of November 2008, TCX has approved 49 
benchmarks in 60 countries. TCX’s current paid-in and committed Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital is 
equal to US$585 million.  
5.18  Leading the World Bank Group’s efforts in this area, IFC committed more than 
US$5.3 billion equivalent of local currency loans using derivatives in 26 different 
currencies, the bulk of which focused on the financial and productive sectors. IFC works 
actively with swap market counterparties to increase the number of hedging currencies that are 
available. In 2007 and 2008, it committed loans using derivatives for the first time in Ghanaian 
cedi, Kenyan shillings, Nigerian naira, Romanian leu, Vietnamese dong, and Zambian kwacha. 
As Figure 5.1 illustrates, 63 percent of IFC local currency lending went to the financial sector, 
followed by 11 percent in industry and trade sectors. More than a third of these flows went to 
Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by East Asia and the Pacific, and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia.   
Developing Private Catastrophe Insurance Markets 
5.19  Domestic catastrophe insurance markets (for example, for households, farmers, and 
herders) are under-developed in middle- and lower-income countries. Demand and supply-
side constraints hinder the emergence of markets for property catastrophe insurance and 
agriculture insurance. While more than 40 percent of the direct losses from natural disasters are 
insured in developed countries, less than 10 percent of these losses are covered by insurance in 
middle-income countries and less than 5 percent in low-income countries.
54 On the demand side, 
development of efficient markets is undermined by low nonlife insurance penetration, inadequate 
awareness of catastrophic risk exposure, and limited ability to pay insurance premiums due to low 
incomes. On the supply side, these countries have limited technical capacity, undercapitalization 
of local insurers, and regulatory impediments. 
                                                 
54 Cummins and Mahul, 2008. 
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5.20  Given these constraints and the high exposure of economic agents in developing 
countries, there is a rationale for public support to catalyze catastrophe insurance markets. 
A number of developing countries are already actively fostering meso- and micro-level insurance 
markets by encouraging private insurers and reinsurers to offer competitive products to 
homeowners, SMEs, and farmers and herders. These markets would allow for the transfer to 
private insurers of catastrophe risks, which would otherwise be retained by economic agents.  
5.21  The World Bank has helped countries developing markets for private property 
catastrophe insurance through national insurance pools and regional reinsurance pools. A 
precedent involved the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), established in the aftermath 
of the 1999 Marmara earthquake. The pool ensures that all property-tax-paying domestic 
dwellings can purchase affordable and cost-effective earthquake insurance coverage; relieves 
pressure on government to provide housing subsidies ex post; and transfers catastrophe risk to 
international reinsurance markets. TCIP was initially capitalized with a World Bank–committed 
contingent loan facility of US$100 million, extended to US$180 million, in 2004. Full-risk capital 
requirements are met through commercial reinsurance and build-up of surplus. In 2007, 2.8 
million policies were issued at market-based premium rates, compared to 600,000 at initiation.  
5.22  Turkey’s success also brought worldwide recognition. To date, more than a dozen 
other mostly middle-income countries—including China, Colombia, Greece, India, Iran, 
and Philippines—are preparing their own property catastrophe insurance programs. Also 
supported by the Bank, the South Eastern Europe Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility will 
facilitate the development of a catastrophe insurance market in Eastern European countries and 
thereby provide homeowners and SMEs access to affordably priced (but not subsidized) 
catastrophe insurance across the region. The soon-to-be launched Romania Catastrophe Insurance 
Pool provides homeowners with coverage against earthquake and flood risks. 
5.23  The World Bank has also helped countries develop private insurance markets to 
protect farmers and herders against weather-related shocks using insurance pools. A 
noteworthy example of insurance pools in the agriculture sector involves Mongolia’s Livestock 
Insurance Indemnity Pool, which combines self-insurance by herders, market-based insurance, 
and social insurance to protect herders against excessive livestock mortality caused by harsh 
winters and summer drought (Box 5.1).  
Box 5.1: Mongolia’s Livestock Insurance Indemnity Pool 
Combining self-insurance by herders, market-based insurance, and social insurance, Mongolia’s 
Livestock Insurance Indemnity Pool (LIIP) is a syndicate pooling arrangement, which allows 
participating insurance companies to build collective reserves. Excess-of-loss reinsurance is provided 
by the Government, backed by a US$5 million World Bank contingent credit facility. Accordingly, 
herders retain small losses, larger losses are transferred to the private insurance industry, and extreme or 
catastrophic losses are transferred to the Government using a public safety net program. The insurance 
pays out to individual herders whenever the mortality rate in a local region exceeds a specific threshold.  
Individual herders receive an insurance payout based on local mortality, irrespective of their individual 
losses. They therefore have a strong incentive to manage their herds in a manner that minimizes the 
impact of major livestock mortality events. Pilots in selected areas over the 2005–8 period should 
provide the basis for expanding the program nationwide. In the third sales season, about 600,000 
animals were insured, representing 14 percent insurance penetration, for a total premium volume of 
US$120,000. The 2008 season saw a major loss of US$230,000 which triggered the contingent credit.  
Source: World Bank.  
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5.24  Interest in using index-based insurance has grown as countries seek to tackle the 
systemic component of agricultural production losses. Notwithstanding basis risks, parametric 
index insurance offers advantages over traditional insurance relying on individual losses, 
including lower monitoring costs and a more transparent indemnity structure. They rely on the 
measurement of an objective and independent parameter that is highly correlated with the actual 
loss incurred by a farmer (for example, rainfall or temperature as a proxy for yield loss). Payouts 
are based solely on the measurement of a particular parameter (for example, of rainfall at a named 
meteorological station) according to an agreed-upon payout scale (established in the insurance 
policy).  
5.25  To date, about 20 index-based insurance programs—many supported by the World 
Bank—have been implemented in middle- and lower-income countries. In India, for instance, 
the Bank is assisting the government with two index-based insurance schemes, the Modified 
National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (MNAIS) and the Weather Based Crop Insurance 
Scheme (WBCIS). MNAIS offers coverage to farmers against crop yield losses, using an area-
yield index in the indemnity payment schedule. To date, about 20 million farmers are insured 
under this program, for a total liability of US$7 billion, making this the largest crop insurance 
program in the world in terms of insured farmers. WBCIS protects famers against specific 
adverse natural events (e.g., rainfall deficiency, excess rainfall) through weather-based insurance. 
More than 600,000 farmers purchased weather-based crop insurance in 2007 in India. Building on 
India’s example, other countries are piloting national and regional weather-based crop insurance 
schemes, including Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi, Nicaragua, and Thailand (through a Central 
American, regional weather risk-management program).
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5.26  As demand for these efforts grows, key challenges include the availability of 
affordable reinsurance for country schemes and the development of in-country expertise in 
the private sector. The World Bank and other development partners are utilizing the Global 
Index Insurance Facility (GIIF), a multidonor trust fund linked with a specialized index-based 
reinsurance company that promotes index-based insurance in developing markets. Technical 
assistance provided under the GIIF would support local insurance companies and other private 
institutions. Donor funding, including €25 million from the European Commission, has been 
secured to support the development of index-based insurance in the Group of African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific Countries (ACP) countries. In addition, the Bank and the UN are supporting the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), which is providing technical 
assistance to a number of agriculture insurance schemes in Ethiopia, Malawi, India, and Nepal, as 
well as property catastrophe insurance schemes in Albania, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Guatemala, 
and Mexico, as well as in South Eastern Europe and the South Pacific Islands.  
C. Correcting Global Market Failures 
5.27  An emerging class of innovations using ODA involves efforts to correct global 
market failures through advance market commitments and copayment schemes. Sovereign 
donors, private industry actors, and developing countries are making progress in using catalytic 
mechanisms to create and deepen markets for essential vaccines and drugs.  
                                                 
55 Weather-based crop insurance for farmers is different from the weather indexed derivative (Box 4.3), 
which was designed to help manage sovereign catastrophe risk.  
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Advance Market Commitment for Vaccines 
5.28  The Advance Market Commitment (AMC) pilot for vaccines aims to accelerate the 
creation of a viable market for pneumococcal vaccines for developing countries, by 
providing a financial commitment to subsidize the future purchase (up to a predetermined price) 
for a vaccine needed in developing countries, when and if it is developed and demanded. It is 
focused on pneumococcal vaccines, for which the key technological issues have been resolved 
and there is substantial demand in poor developing countries. Pneumonial infections are the 
largest killer of children in Africa and worldwide, and the largest cause of pneumonia deaths. 
Therefore, the pilot is expected to yield high benefits, saving an estimated 7.7 million lives by 
2030 with a low estimated cost per DALY (Disability-Adjusted Life Year). 
5.29  Approved by the World Bank’s Board in 2009 and pending approval by donors, the 
AMC is financed by ODA and foundation grants. These resources are provided under 
unusually long-term payment agreements, which are placed directly on IBRD’s balance 
sheet to provide a “guarantee.” Donors include Italy (US$635 million); United Kingdom 
(US$485 million); Canada (US$200 million); Russia (US$80 million); Norway (US$50 million); 
and the Gates Foundation (US$50 million). The GAVI Fund and the World Bank are lead-
implementing agencies for the pilot. The Bank’s role is to administer the pilot and advance funds 
to GAVI according to agreed-upon plans. As such, it provides AMC’s financial platform and 
related financial management, legal, accounting, IT systems, and reporting functions. 
Copayment Schemes 
5.30  Also dependent on ODA, the Affordable Medicines Facility–malaria (AMFm) is a 
financing system designed to make a new generation of antimalarial treatments more 
affordable and accessible. The AMFm involves negotiating a reduced price for artemisinin-
based combination therapies or ACTs, and making a copayment to further lower their sales price 
to end users in malaria-endemic countries. These drugs are then be distributed by public, private, 
and not-for-profit providers. By reducing their cost, the facility aims to help countries expand 
access to ACTs and curtail emerging resistance to artemisinin-based single-drug treatments.  
5.31  In 2007, the Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria decided to host 
and manage the AMFm. Even though no resources have been disbursed thus far, AMFm will 
negotiate with manufacturers to reduce the minimum suggested price to US$1 for all buyers and 
make a US$0.95 copayment. Phase I will cover 11 African countries and will cost about 
US$312–$337 million, including US$212 million for copayments, and US$100–$125 million for 
supporting interventions. The Government of the United Kingdom has pledged £40 million, and 
UNITAID has provisionally committed up to US$130 million for 2009–10.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
A. Lessons Learned 
Innovative Finance as Potential Tool for Development Effectiveness 
6.1  To date, innovative finance mechanisms have played a more significant role in 
supporting financial solutions on the ground than in identifying and exploiting “alternative 
sources of ODA.” Efforts to achieve development results can be strengthened by expanding the 
use of these innovative financial solutions. For instance, developing countries are increasingly 
interested in solutions that support risk management and risk reduction across sectors (for 
example, through use of insurance, derivative, and other risk management products). Through 
their intermediation services, MDBs can help customize these tools in response to their specific 
needs and help build indigenous capacity to undertake similar transactions in the future. 
Similarly, development partners can do more with less by more systematically channeling official 
flows through catalytic and PPP mechanisms that leverage private flows at the country level. 
Catalytic efforts in particular should be expanded in middle and lower income countries as part of 
the response to the global crisis. Global market-making efforts, for example, in carbon trading 
and advance market commitments for vaccines also have demonstrated their potential but depend 
on robust regulatory frameworks and clear agreements on roles and responsibilities. 
Need for Realism about Innovative Fund-Raising 
6.2  Innovative fund-raising should be viewed as a complement—rather than a 
substitute—to traditional efforts to mobilize official flows, in particular concessional flows. 
Donors should be realistic about the potential of innovative schemes to generate additional flows. 
Budget outlays from emerging sovereign donors were the only significant source of additional 
concessional flows or ODA. PPP mechanisms that support global programs (for example, 
through pooling sovereign and private donations or frontloading ODA) can help broaden the base 
of support for development, but can also contribute to aid proliferation. New debt offerings by 
multilateral and national development banks, such as those issued in local currencies and those 
targeting sustainable investors, have shown potential. But they were modest in comparison to 
traditional efforts and are subject to market conditions. 
Understanding What Works, What Doesn’t 
6.3  Innovations need to be tested and evaluated to determine their value-added. For 
instance, the high start-up costs of certain schemes have been noted. Over time, more in-depth 
evaluation will be required to determine the value-added and net benefits of fund-raising efforts 
and financial solutions. It is important to note that, unlike fund-raising, solutions on the ground 
can take time to materialize. 
B. Pointers on the Way Forward for Development Partners 
6.4  Innovative finance is a small but emerging component of the development business. 
Developing countries, donors, and the private sector are eager to bring innovative finance into the 
mainstream of development practice. Leaders around the world are actively exploring the 
potential scalability of innovative schemes, for example, through the High Level Taskforce on 
Health System Strengthening or the Copenhagen meeting on climate change. Agencies like the 
World Bank Group can help by using innovative finance more systematically and strategically to 
further funding and operational goals. Building on existing efforts, they should:  
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  Employ Innovative Fund-Raising More Selectively: While innovative fund-raising for 
country-based efforts (for example, partnerships with private donors and investors) has 
mobilized modest resources to date, it can help broaden the base of support for development 
among private actors. Innovative fund-raising for global priorities is more critical to ensuring 
actual funding for international efforts on health and climate change.  
  Mainstream the Use of Innovative Finance across Countries and Sectors: As they prove 
their effectiveness, innovations should become a more integral part of the core operational 
toolkit of development agencies. This can be done inter alia by using country-based 
platforms to broaden the use of innovative finance to countries and sectors where it can add 
value, for example, mainstreaming OBA, or finding new applications for Advance Market 
Commitments (Box 6.1). Doing so requires strengthening internal incentives for innovation 
by rationalizing financial and operational control processes; providing upstream advisory 
support on financial issues; and updating the financial skills of operational teams (for 
example, using a handbook that builds on the glossary in Annex 9). 
  Monitor Trends and Results: There is urgent need to monitor the impact of innovative 
finance on the international aid and development finance architecture and to evaluate “what 
works” in innovative fund-raising and financial solutions.  
  Engaging Partners: Clients should also be better informed about emerging good practice. 
Ongoing outreach and dialogue to private investors and donors as well as DAC and emerging 
donors will also enhance prospects for mainstreaming innovating finance. 
Box 6.1: A Country-Based Platform for Mainstreaming Innovative Finance 
Critical to effective official assistance is the country-based approach. During the IDA15 replenishment, 
donors noted several core strengths of the country-based approach, including a knowledge base that cuts 
across sectors, the ability to integrate finance ad knowledge across programs and projects, the ability to 
promote strategic coherence through harmonization and alignment across sectors, and the ability to 
sustain results over time. They also noted various “derivative” strengths of this approach, including 
flexibility to adapt to country circumstances; preparedness to act as a “first mover” when appropriate; 
and the ability to leverage other funding and scale up poverty reduction interventions by other partners. 
These strengths of the country-based platform can also facilitate the development and mainstreaming of 
innovative fund-raising and financial solutions in both middle- and lower-income countries. For 
instance, the platform can enable: 
  efficient pooling of multilateral, bilateral, and nonsovereign resources and leveraging of private and 
philanthropic donations to support credit buy-downs;  
  integrated delivery of financial and advisory support for PPPs and catalytic efforts in priority 
sectors (such as IDA/IBRD policy dialogue and lending, identification of carbon projects, IFC 
lending and guarantees, and MIGA guarantees); 
  supporting South-South learning on key innovations, such as catastrophe risk finance; 
  strengthening linkages between global programs supported by innovative finance and country 
priorities and systems; and  
  scaling-up of intermediation services that customize solutions to problems of sovereign and private 
risk management, in the context of a sound macroeconomic and fiscal framework. 
Source: “The Role of IDA in the Global Aid Architecture.” IDA15 Paper. World Bank, June 2007.  
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ANNEX 1. DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
General Issues 
 
1.  To ensure consistency across the World Bank and other data sources, the paper uses the 
OECD DAC definition of “developing country.” As such, certain IBRD countries are not 
reflected in the data (for example, on guarantees). According to the DAC, the term “developing 
country” employed without qualification has generally been taken to mean a country eligible for 
ODA. Other organizations have their own definitions. The World Bank usually uses the term to 
refer to low- and middle-income countries, assessed by reference to per capita GNI. The new 
DAC List of ODA Recipients is consistent with World Bank practice, except that it excludes 
countries that are members of the G8, or the EU, or that have a date of admission to the EU. This 
means that as of 2005, it excludes the following middle-income countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, and  Slovenia. 
2.  All data are in current prices, US$. 
3.  While the bulk of the data was presented in calendar years, World Bank Group data on 
financial solutions (for example, those involving guarantees) were presented in fiscal years. Over 
the period reviewed, differences between calendar and fiscal years were found to be marginal. 
4.  Given the diversity of instruments presented in this paper (for example, cash and 
derivative instruments), data on innovative applications or uses does not differentiate between 
disbursements and commitments.  
Specific Issues 
5.  Philanthropy and Private Donors: All data are from OECD DAC Table 1, grants by 
private voluntary agencies. These were verified with data from McKinsey’s report to Bank. 
6.  Guarantees and Insurance: All data on guarantees were derived from financial statements 
of export credit agencies and MDBs, except for the World Bank Group where information was 
gathered internally. No effort was made to harmonize financial and calendar years. Data on 
export credit agencies might include a few nondeveloping countries as amounts were provided by 
region. Data expressed in currencies different from US$ were converted into US$ by using end of 
the year exchange rates. Data used in the analysis reflects guarantee amounts. 
7.  Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI): All data on PPI were derived from the online 
PPIAF’s PPI database. Guarantees were excluded to avoid double counting. Data refer only to the 
share of PPI that was supported by donors. 
8.  Carbon Trade: The value of CERs paid in each year was calculated using the UNFCCC 
database for the number of CERs issued during each year. The amount was then multiplied by the 
prevailing primary market price two years before the CERs were issued. This time lag is an 
approximation to account for the fact that CERs are mostly sold through ERPAs, which lock in 
the price. 
9.  IFFIm: Data from IFFIm financial statements were also verified by World Bank Trust 
Fund data on encashments. Disbursement data were received from relevant implementing 
agencies.   
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10.  Catastrophe Risk Insurance: Data from the Bank’s Treasury Department and the GFDRR 
Unit were collected and verified against data presented in the recent Management report to the Board. 
11.  IDA and IBRD Buy-downs: Data were provided by various teams including FRM, 
HDNHE, and PTO. These were verified. 
12.  Output-Based Aid: Data were drawn from the latest update by the GPOBA team. 
13.  Emerging Donors: Data on emerging donors were gathered from the following sources: 
Turkey and Korea – OECD DAC; China – D. Brautigam, private communication; G.D. 
Rawnsley, A Survey of China’s Public Diplomacy;
56 Brazil – Catrina Schlager, FES Briefing 
Paper 3, March 2007; India – Matthias Jobelius, FES Briefing Paper 5, March 2007; Russia – 
Alexander Alimov, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, Russia’s Participation In Global Development Cooperation; Thailand – 
OECD DAC and Thailand Development Cooperation Agency, Thailand as an Emerging Donor. 
14.  IDA non-DAC donors: These included Barbados, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Turkey.  
15.  Emerging donors to World Bank-Administered Trust Funds: These included Afghanistan, 
Andorra, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, 
Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Palau, Philippines, Poland, Monaco, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uganda, Samoa, Zimbabwe. 
16.  Local Currency and Countercyclical Loans: Data were based on analyses of financial 
statements of key multilateral and bilateral development banks. 
17.  Local Currency Bonds: All data were gathered through Dealogic’s Bondware with the 
help of the World Bank Treasury Department.
57 An item-by-item analysis was carried out to 
determine which bonds were issued on developing countries’ markets to fund activities in 
developing countries through MDBs. When calculating the overall share of local currencies 
bonds issued by MDBs on developing countries markets, EIB and KfW were not included since 
neither is an MDB. 
18.  New Taxes: The only taxes that are operational are the Airplane Ticket Tax, for which 
data are available in UNITAID’s financial statement and the Adaptation Fund’s tax on CERs, 
which was calculated using data available at Bank and current CER prices. 
19.  National Lottery: Data were gathered from Web sites of Belgian and UK lotteries. 
 
                                                 
56 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/070502_a_survey_of_chinas_public_diplomacy/. 
57 Dealogic is a leading provider of global investment banking analysis and systems, and one of the few 
sources of information on trade finance developments.  
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ANNEX 2: INTERNATIONAL INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE LANDSCAPE, 2000–8 
Annex 2.1a: International Innovative Development Finance by Source, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Mechanism  &  Instrument  2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 
Solidarity   186 1,200 1,353  1,697  2,644  3,045  1,104  485 11,713 
Emerging donors 
1/   186 1,200 1,331  1,667  2,615  2,784  [679]  [283] 10,744 
Global Taxes 
2/                  
  Adaptation  Fund               68  68 
  Airline  Ticket  Tax           221  359    580 
National  Lottery      21  29  29  40  66    187 
StAR  Global  Program               [134]  134 
Catalytic         112  154  681  668  1,615 
Carbon Finance 
2/         112  154  681  668  1,615 
PPP  2,910  1,133 866 556 2,139 6,786  7,034 10,977 11,352 43,754 
Frontloading of ODA (e.g., IFFIm)
 2/          1,000    223  1,223 
 Innovative Debt Offerings by MDBs             
 Local Currency Bonds  2,910  1,124  848  509  2,120 6,700 5,961 9,925  10,020  40,116 
 Sustainable Investments (climate)             350  419  769 
  Sustainable  Investments  (general)         56  48  347  76  527 
 World Supporter Fund                300  550  850 
Pooling with Private Donors 
5/   9  18  47 19 31 25 55 64  268 
Total  2,910 1,319 2,067 1,908  3,836  9,542 10,233 12,763 12,505 57,082 
 
Annex 2.1b: International Innovative Development Finance by Use, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Mechanism  &  Instrument  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  Unspec Total 
Solidarity     38   36    66     140 
Buy-down (with sovereign support)
 3/     38   36        74 
Counter-cyclical  loans          66     66 
Catalytic  1,832 4,110 4,201 4,996 3,821 4,642 5,734 7,138 1,192  1,688 39,355 
Advanced Market Commitment (AMC)
 2/            1,500  1,500 
Affordable Medicines Facility for Malaria (AMFm)
 2/           188  188 
Investment Insurance    1,464  1,727  1,944 682 627 465 378      7,287 
Local  currency  loans  (others)  5  161  401  350  745 1,439 2,100 2,939 1,192    9,331 
Risk Mitigation for Finance, Industry and Trade              
 Partial Credit Guarantees (PCG)  823  1,407  1,273 1,316 1,508 1,713 2,552 3,341  ..   13,933 
  Partial  Risk  Guarantees  (PRG)  306 182 529 489 350 395 213  88  ..    2,553 
 Political Risk Insurance (PRI)
 4/  548 895 271 868 536 468 404 326  ..    4,316 
Guarantee,  Unspecified          65  ..    65 
Private Catastrophe Insurance               
  Agricultural  Insurance      30   0   1     31 
  Property  Catastrophe  Insurance  150            150 
PPP  2,014 1,216 1,099  961 1,727 728 761  1,067 464 3,190  13,227 
Buy-down  (with  nonsovereign  support)      25   42  21      87 
Local  currency  loans  (sovereign)       258  9  66   8    341 
Output-Based  Aid  (OBA)     28 10 96  5  8 24  386  3,190  3,748
5/ 
Risk Mitigation for Infrastructure and Social Services              
 Partial Credit Guarantees (PCG)  196  132  155  103  33  23  63  28  ..    734 
  Partial  Risk  Guarantees  (PRG)  936 509 110 502  1,115 213 136 498  ..    4,019 
 Political Risk Insurance (PRI)
 4/  882 575 806 321 226 285 305 447  ..    3,848 
Sovereign Catastrophe Risk Insurance            150  161  70  70    451 
Total  3,846 5,327 5,339 5,958 5,584 5,369 6,495 8,271 1,656  4,879 52,723 
Note: Data on uses do not differentiate between commitments and disbursements. 
1/ Comprehensive data on ODA from emerging donors are not 
available for 2007–8. 
2/ Linked to global programs. 
3/ Breakdown for debt swaps under Poland’s EcoFund is not available. 
4/ Political risk 
insurance and partial risk guarantees are similar. For the WBG, Partial Risk Guarantees require a formal “indemnity” agreement from the 
government. Political risk guarantees are supported by similar, but informal arrangements. 
5/ Data on other donors are not available. 
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Annex 2.2a: World Bank Group Innovative Development Finance by Source, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Mechanism  &  Instrument  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  Total 
Solidarity   186 136 205 189 166 253 679 485  2,299 
Adaptation Fund 
1/           68  68 
Emerging  donors   186 136 205 189 166 253 679 283  2,097 
StAR  Initiative           134  134 
Catalytic        3  5  25  36  68 
Carbon Finance 
1/        3  5  25  36  68 
PPP  1,431  117  376  180  397 1,060 1,631 3,458 4,562 13,212 
Frontloading of ODA (e.g., IFFIm)
 1/         1,000   223  1,223 
Innovative Debt Offerings by MDBs             
  Local  Currency  Bonds  1,431 108 358 133 378 973 558  2,405  3,230  9,574 
 Sustainable Investments (climate)          350  419  769 
 Sustainable Investments (general)            56  48  347  76  527 
 World Supporter Fund                300  550  850 
Pooling  with  Private  Donors    9 18 47 19 31 25 55 64 268 
Total  1,431  303  511  385  586 1,229 1,890 4,162 5,082 15,579 
 
Annex 2.2b: World Bank Group Innovative Development Finance by Use, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Mechanism  &  Instrument  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  Unspec  Total 
Solidarity     38   36        74 
Buy-down  (with  sovereign  support)     38   36        74 
Catalytic  1,205 1,477  631 1,350 1,298 1,619 2,028 2,081 1,192  1,500  14,381 
Advanced Market Commitment (AMC)
 1/            1,500  1,500 
Local  currency  loans  (others)  5 161 134  88 466 787 807  1,368  1,192   5,007 
Risk Mitigation for Finance, Industry and Trade              
  Partial  Credit  Guarantees  (PCG)  503 420 226 364 197 113 818 386  ..   3,027 
 Partial Risk Guarantees (PRG)
        100  250    ..    350 
 Political Risk Insurance (PRI)
 2/  548 895 271 868 536 468 404 326  ..   4,316 
Private Catastrophe Insurance               
  Agricultural  Insurance      30   0   1     31 
  Property  Catastrophe  Insurance  150            150 
PPP  964 707 840 459 610 601 685 729 464 3,190 9,250 
Buy-down  (with  nonsovereign  support)      25   42  21      87 
Local  currency  loans  (sovereign)       258  9  66   8    341 
Output-Based  Aid  (OBA)     28 10 96  5  8 24  386  3,190  3,748 
Risk Mitigation for Infrastructure and Social Services 
3/              
 Partial Credit Guarantees (PCG)  21  132  5  28  31  23  63  28  ..    332 
 Partial Risk Guarantees (PRG)
   61    75   87  60  160  ..    443 
 Political Risk Insurance (PRI)
 2/  882 575 806 321 226 285 305 447  ..   3,848 
Sovereign Catastrophe Risk Insurance            150  161  70  70    451 
Total  2,169 2,184 1,509 1,809 1,944 2,220 2,713 2,810 1,656  4,690  23,704 
Note: Data on uses do not differentiate between commitments and disbursements. 
1/ These are linked to global programs. 
2/ Political risk 
insurance and Partial Risk Guarantees are similar. Only Partial Risk Guarantees issued by IBRD and IDA require a counter-guarantee. 
Political risk guarantees are supported by similar, but informal arrangements. 
3/ Data for guarantees in 2008 are not available.  
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Annex 2.3: International Innovative Development Finance Landscape at a Glance by Source and Use, FY2000–8 
 
 
2.3a: International Innovative Finance Sources and World Bank Share (US$ million) 
Mechanism  &  Instrument  2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 
Solidarity    186  1,200  1,353 1,697 2,644 3,045 1,104  485  11,713 
of  which  World  Bank   186 136 205  189  166  253  679  485 2,299 
Catalytic         112  154  681  668  1,615 
of  which  World  Bank        3 5  25  36  68 
PPP  2,910  1,133 866 556 2,139 6,786  7,034 10,977 11,352 43,754 
of  which  World  Bank  1,431 117 376 180  397 1,060 1,631 3,458 4,562  13,212 
Total  2,910 1,319 2,067 1,908  3,836  9,542 10,233 12,763 12,505 57,082 
of which World Bank  1,431 303 511 385  586 1,229 1,890 4,162 5,082  15,579 
 
 
2.3b: International Innovative Finance Uses and World Bank Share (US$ million)
Mechanism  &  Instrument 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  Unspec  Total 
Solidarity     38   36    66     140 
of  which  World  Bank     38   36        74 
Catalytic  1,832 4,110 4,201 4,996 3,821 4,642 5,734 7,138 1,192  1,688 39,355 
of which World Bank  1,205  1,477  631  1,350  1,298 1,619 2,028 2,081 1,192  1,500 14,381 
PPP  2,014 1,216 1,099  961 1,727 728 761  1,067 464 3,190  13,227 
of  which  World  Bank  964 707 840 459 610 601 685 729 464 3,190  9,250 
Total  3,846 5,327 5,339 5,958 5,584 5,369 6,495 8,271 1,656  4,879 52,723 
of which World Bank  2,169  2,184  1,509  1,809 1,944 2,220 2,713 2,810 1,656  4,690 23,704  
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Annex 2.4a: Innovative Finance with Local Currency Bonds as an Estimated Share of Development 
Finance, 2000–8 (US$ million)
  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Source                           
Total gross ODA and IFI Bonds  103,231  116,258  116,948 117,556 127,939 159,772 157,601 172,539 183,566 
Sources    2,910 1,319 2,067 1,908  3,836  9,542 10,233 12,763 12,505 
  Global          112  1,375  1,040  1,093 
  Country    2,910 1,319 2,067 1,908 3,836 9,430 8,858  11,722  11,412 
Sources over ODA+ bonds (%)  2.8%  1.1%  1.8% 1.6% 3.0% 6.0% 6.5% 7.4% 6.8% 
 of sources (Global)  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 
 of sources (Country)  2.8% 1.1% 1.8% 1.6% 3.0% 5.9% 5.6% 6.8% 6.2% 
Use           
Total ODA and Emerging donors  65,476  65,493  72,975  89,221 104,929 134,257 135,707 134,994 134,183 
Innovative ODA (all uses)  3,846  5,327  5,339  5,958 5,584 5,369 6,495 8,271  [1,656] 
Innovative ODA share of uses  5.9%  8.1%  7.3% 6.7% 5.3% 4.0% 4.8% 6.1%  [1.2%] 
 of uses (Global)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  [0.0%] 
 of uses (Country)  5.9%  8.1%  7.3%  6.7% 5.3% 4.0% 4.8% 6.1%  [1.2%] 
 
Annex 2.4b: Innovative Finance without Local Currency Bonds as an Estimated Share of Development 
Finance, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Source                           
Total gross ODA  65,476 65,493 72,975 89,221 104,929 134,257 135,707 134,994 134,183 
Sources   -  195  1,218  1,400 1,716 2,787 4,224 1,840 1,440 
 Global          112  1,375  1,040  1,093 
 Country   -  195  1,218  1,400 1,716 2,675 2,849  800  347 
Sources over ODA (%)  0.0%  0.3%  1.7%  1.6% 1.6% 2.1% 3.1% 1.4% 1.1% 
 of sources (Global)  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.1% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 
 of sources (Country)  0.0% 0.2% 1.0% 1.2%  1.3% 1.7% 1.8% 0.5% 0.2% 
Use              
Total ODA and Emerging donors  65,476 65,493 72,975 89,221 104,929 134,257 135,707 134,994 134,183 
Innovative ODA (all uses)  3,846 5,327 5,339 5,958  5,584 5,369 6,495 8,271  [1,656] 
Innovative ODA share of uses  5.9% 8.1% 7.3% 6.7%  5.3%  4.0%  4.8%  6.1% [1.2%] 
 
Annex 2.4c: Estimated ODA from Some Emerging Donors, 2002–6 (US$ million) 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  Notes 
Brazil  24 24 24 24 24  Excl.  debt  relief 
China  650 678 788 970  1,100  Excl.  debt  relief 
India       300   
Korea  358 435 471 752 425   
Russia        97  100  Excl. debt relief, target for 2008: US$500 million 
Thailand        95  74  DAC for 2006, Thailand for 2005 
Turkey  117  86 305 601 675   
Others  51  108 79 76 86   
Total  1,200 1,331 1,667 2,615 2,784  
Sources: Data on emerging donors were gathered from the following sources: Turkey and Korea – OECD DAC; China – D. Brautigam, 
private communication; G.D. Rawnsley, A Survey of China’s Public Diplomacy;
58 Brazil – Catrina Schlager, FES Briefing Paper 3, 
March 2007; India - Matthias Jobelius, FES Briefing Paper 5, March 2007; Russia – Alexander Alimov, Department of International 
Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russia’s Participation In Global Development Cooperation; 
Thailand – OECD DAC and Thailand Development Cooperation Agency, Thailand as an Emerging Donor. 
                                                 
58 http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/070502_a_survey_of_chinas_public_diplomacy/.  
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ANNEX 3: COMPOSITION OF WORLD BANK GROUP INNOVATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE PORTFOLIO, 2000–8 
 
Annex 3.1: WB Innovative Finance by Sector, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Sector  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Unspec  Total 
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry  150      30    150  161  71  70    632 
Education    8    7  36  19  29  28  8  239  374 
Energy and Mining  1,019  427  363  567  245  409  206  465  10  150  3,862 
Finance  632  787  413  807  471  392  1,069  323      4,894 
Health and Other Social Services      38  25  5  45  21    11  2,751  2,895 
Industry and Trade  231  433  84  156  202  101  63  389      1,660 
Information and Communications  132  248  355  41  98  99  82  140    52  1,246 
Public Administration, Law, and Justice          30            30 
Transportation    102  73  66  124  200  186    330  1,415  2,497 
Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection    18  48  21  268  17  89  26  36  84  607 
Unspecified  5  161  134  88  466  787  807  1,368  1,192    5,007 
Total  2,169  2,184  1,509  1,809  1,944  2,220  2,713  2,810  1,656  4,690  23,704 
 
Annex 3.2: WB Innovative Finance by Region, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Region  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  Unspec  Grand 
East Asia and Pacific  24  328  78  436  202  164  86  118  16  66  1,517 
Catalytic  24  152 40  227 53 31 46 75     648 
PPP   176   208 113 133  40  42  16  66  795 
Solidarity     38   36        74 
Europe  and  Central  Asia  437 105 366 328 532 300 100  3    14 2,184 
Catalytic  381  44 231 328 532 300  97  3     1,916 
PPP  56  61  135     3   14  268 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  950  1,260 422 355 343 444 630 720  70 2,346 7,542 
Catalytic  313 843 123 191  17 264 237 462     2,450 
PPP  638 417 299 164 327 181 392 258  70 2,346 5,092 
Middle East and North Africa  40  73  26  88  75  8  269  112  6  12  710 
Catalytic  40 73 26 88    6  228 60     521 
PPP       75  2  41  52  6 12  188 
South  Asia  191  105  112 79 37 58  129 93  5  289  1,098 
Catalytic  109 52 21 70 37 41 30 13     373 
PPP  82 53 91  9   18 99 80  5  289 725 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  522 151 370 435 229 459 693 397 366  464 4,087 
Catalytic  334 151  56 358 133 190 584 100     1,905 
PPP  189   315  78  96 269 109 297 366  464 2,181 
Unspecified  5 161 134  88 526 787 807  1,368  1,192 1,500 6,567 
Catalytic  5 161 134  88 526 787 807  1,368  1,192 1,500 6,567 
Total  2,169 2,184 1,509 1,809 1,944 2,220 2,713 2,810 1,656  4,690 23,704 
 
Annex 3.3: Estimated Leverage of Select Mechanisms and Instruments, 2000–7 (US$ million) 
(US$ million) 
Buy-downs  OBA PCG PRGs/PRIs 
Solidarity PPP  PPP  Catalytic PPP Catalytic  PPP 
Bank Commitments  74  87  3,362  3,027  332  4,666  4,291 
Total Project Costs  390  484  6,203  6,743  2,502  13,035  28,720 





Annex 3.4: WB Innovative Finance by Country Lending Category, 2000–8 (US$ million) 
Lending Category  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Unspec  Total 
Blend  175  125  124  218  110  136  56  15  5  97  1,062 
IBRD  1,213  1,662  718  591  1,088  705  1,021  857  78  2,252  10,185 
IDA  662  236  423  652  121  592  760  474  381  841  5,141 
Other  119  161  243  348  626  787  876  1,465  1,192  1,500  7,317 
Total  2,169  2,184  1,509  1,809  1,944  2,220  2,713  2,810  1,656  4,690  23,704 
 
 
Annex 3.5: WB Innovative Finance by Corporate  
Entity and Business Line, FY 2000–8 




IFC 7,957  33.6% 
IBRD 3,949  16.7% 
TF 1,895  8.0% 
IDA 1,710  7.2% 
GOVT 
2/ 30  0.1% 
Total  23,704  100% 
Note: 
1/MIGA’s PRI data are not available for FY2008. 
The percentage has been underestimated. For FY2000–7, 
MIGA’s innovative finance share is 37.0%. 
2/The GOVT 
US$30 million (0.1%) belongs to two OBA projects that 
were funded by “Local Govt.,” as labeled by the OBA 
team. 
 
Annex 3.6: Average Annual Flows under WBG Innovative  
Finance by Use and Objective, 2000–8 
Objective and Country Type  Avg. US$ per capita 
per annum 
IBRD 78 
Managing fiscal exposure  1 
Improving service delivery  23 
Catalytic 54 
IDA and Blend  54 
Managing fiscal exposure  0 
Improving service delivery  32 









Annex 3.8a: Innovative Development Finance in World Bank Trust Funds, 2002–8 
Overall Total 
(Innov. Finance + TA + Admin Cost) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Global Program  17 37 40 48 69 825 471  1,506 
Country Program/Others  9 10 35 50 49 95 81  329 
O t h e r s    113457   2 1  
Total 25 49 76 101 122 925 559  1,856 
 
Annex 3.8b: By Usage—Admin. Cost, 2002–8 
By Usage – Admin. 
Cost 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total Avg.  Cost 
Global Program  0  5  6 10 20 18 25 84 12.02 
Country Program/Others  0  0  0 0 0 0 2 2 0.34 
Total 0  5  6 10 20 18 26 87 12.36 
 
Annex 3.8c: By Usage—Innov. Finance 
Investment 2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Global Program  7  20  16 20 27 782 420 1,292 
Country Program/Others  9  10  30 45 34 77 52 256 
Total 16  29  46 66 61 859 472 1,548 
 
Annex 3.8d: By Usage—TA 
Fiscal Year  2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Global Program  9  13  17 18 22 25 26 130 
Country  Program/Others 0 1 5 4 15 18 27 70 
Total 9  14  22 22 37 43 53 200 
 
 
Annex 3.8e: By Usage (in US$ million) 
Fiscal Year  2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Innovative Finance  16  29  46 66 61 859 472 1,548 
TA 9  14  22 22 37 43 53 200 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n   C o s t  0  5  61 02 01 82 68 7  
O t h e r s  -   1   13457 2 1  
Total 25  48  76 101 122 925 558 1,856 
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Annex 3.8f: TF Disbursements by Managing Unit of the Trustee Fund (US$ million) 
VPU  of  Main  TF FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 Total 
CFPVP  - - 0 0 0  735  236  972 
SDNVP  10 19 26 31 51 63  206  406 
HDNVP  1  1 28 25  7 33 13  108 
AFRVP  12 19 14 16  7 16 15  100 
IFC  - - 1 7  18  26  43  95 
EAPVP  - 3 1  11  12  22 8  58 
FPDVP  2 3 3 5  10  10  14  47 
SARVP  - - - - -  10 1  11 
LCRVP  - - - - - - 9  9 
ECAVP  - - - - 9 0 0  9 
WBIVP  0 0 0 0 2 2 3 8 
DECVP  0 1 1 1 2 1 2 7 
CSRND  - - 0 0 0 0 1 2 
OPCVP  0 1 0 0 0 0 - 1 
PRMVP  - - - - - 0 0  1 
MNAVP  0 0 0 0 0  (0) - 1 
MIGEX-VPU  0 - 0 0 0 - - 0 
LEGVP  - - - - - - - - 
Total  25 48 75 98  118  920  552  1,835 
 
Annex 3.8g: TF Disbursements by Managing Unit of the Grants (US$ million) 
VPU  of  Grant FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 Total 
CFPVP  - - - - -  735  236  971 
SDNVP  10 19 26 31 51 63  206  406 
AFRVP  12 19 14 17  8 16 17  103 
IFC  -  -  1  7 18 26 43 95 
HDNVP  1  1 28 23  5 21  7 85 
EAPVP  -  3  1 12 12 22  9 59 
FPDVP  2  3  3  5 10 10 14 47 
SARVP  - 0 - 0 0  19 2  21 
ECAVP  - - 0 0  10 1 1  12 
LCRVP  - - 0 0 0 0  10  11 
WBIVP  0 0 0 0 2 2 3 8 
DECVP  0 1 1 1 2 1 2 7 
MNAVP  0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
CSRND  - - 0 0 0 0 1 2 
OPCVP  0 1 0 0 0 0 - 1 
PRMVP  - - - - 0 0 0 1 
MIGEX-VPU  0 - 0 0 0 - - 0 
LEGVP  - - - - - - - - 




ANNEX 3.9: WORLD BANK GROUP INSTRUMENTS AND SERVICES 
Mechanisms & Programs 
WBG Instruments and Services 





Public-private partnerships  √  √       √ 
Output-Based Aid    √       √ 
Carbon Finance           √ 
Mitigation of sovereign and project risks     √     √ 
Mitigation of currency, commodity, and 
weather-related risks       √  √  √ 
 
Mechanisms & Programs  FY64–80 FY81–85 FY86–90  FY91–95  FY1996–
2000  FY2001–5 FY2006–9 
Public-private partnerships  √           
Output-Based Aid           √  
Carbon Finance            √ 
Mitigation of sovereign and 
project risks   IFC  PCG   
MIGA PRG; 







Mitigation of currency, 
commodity, and weather-
related risks 
         
Malawi weather 
hedge, CAT 









ANNEX 4: INSURANCE AND GUARANTEES ISSUED BY BILATERALS AND 
MULTILATERALS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2001–7 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
Investment  Insurance   1,464 1,727 1,944  682  627  465  378  7,287 
  CESCE       118  6 217 167 147  655 
 Export Credits Guarantee Department   1,464 1,451 1,255  676  410  298  230  5,785 
  SACE     276  571      847 
Partial Credit Guarantees (PCG)  1,019 1,539 1,429 1,419 1,541 1,735 2,616 3,370 14,668 
  ADB  120 90  500  170   18  110  376  1,384 
  AfDB        10  13   23 
 Agence Francaise de Développement        11  21  29  116    178 
  DEG    - 17  4 60  314 62 49 505 
  EBRD  198 366 387 586 682 650 933  1,144  4,945 
  IADB  175 531 155  85 370 298 396  1,127  3,137 
  IBRD  250  159        409 
  IFC  274 393 231 393 227 136 881 415  2,950 
 Inter-American Investment Corp (IIC)        20  10  91    9  130 
  Nordic  Investment  Bank  3        3 
  Proparco     36 77 14 12 61 85 285 
 Netherlands Development Finance Company      103  74  157  177  44  166  720 
Partial  Risk  Guarantees  (PRG)  1,242 691 639 991  1,465 609 350 586  6,572 
  ADB  251    382 70 10 50 15   778 
  IBRD       30  200   45  275 
  IDA  61     75 70  137 60  115 518 
  OPIC  930 691 257 846  1,355 221 275 426  5,001 
  TF        -   - 
Political Risk Insurance (PRI)  1,430 1,470 1,078 1,189  762  754  709  773  8,163 
  MIGA  1,430 1,470 1,078 1,189  762  754  709  773  8,163 
Guarantee, Unspecified          65  65 
 Agence Francaise de Développement                29  29 
  CESCE          36  36 
Total  3,691 5,165 4,872 5,543 4,449 3,725 4,139 5,171 36,755  
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ANNEX 5: PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE: 
COMMITMENTS AND MULTILATERAL SUPPORT, 2000–7 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007  Total 
Total Investment Commitments for PPI in Developing Countries (US$ million, current prices) 
Energy 34,602    18,924  22,724  23,951  13,146  24,656  33,778   58,224   230,004 
Transport 15,792    11,291  7,764  9,658  13,460  37,104  49,742   51,331   196,141 
Telecom 18,600    13,798  11,446  9,189  16,344  24,421  26,971   30,418   151,187 
Water and sewerage  8,101   3,409 1,706 1,767 5,329 2,173    3,374    4,551   30,412 
All Sectors  77,095   47,422  43,641  44,565 48,280 88,353 113,865    144,524    607,744 
Share of PPI Projects with multilateral support (% of commitments)
Energy  5% 9% 2% 5% 7% 9%  3%  3%  5% 
Water  and  sewerage  1% 7% 4% 8% 5% 6%  2%  4%  4% 
Transport  5% 2% 4% 3% 2% 3%  1%  3%  3% 
Telecom  1% 1% 2% 4% 2% 0%  1%  1%  1% 
All  Sectors  3% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4%  2%  2%  3% 
Share of PPI Projects with multilateral support (% of number)
Energy  24% 17% 11% 20% 17% 40%  18%  16%  21% 
Water  and  sewerage  5% 21%  4% 14% 11% 10%  6%  7%  10% 
Transport  10%  15%  11% 9% 8% 6% 10%  8%  9% 
Telecom  11% 6%  17%  10% 6% 2%  6%  1%  6% 
All  Sectors  15% 14% 12% 13% 10% 15%  10%  8%  12% 
Share of PPI Projects with multilateral support (% of number)
Latin America and the Caribbean  13%  24%  13%  24%  8%  16%  23%  13%  16% 
Europe  and  Central  Asia  23% 12% 18% 15% 15% 24%  10%  9%  15% 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  13% 18% 23% 15% 16% 18%  11%  9%  15% 
South  Asia  29% 0% 0% 0%  11%  12%  8%  4%  7% 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  20% 8% 6% 6% 6% 0%  3% 11%  7% 
East Asia and Pacific  6%  5%  9%  7%  6%  10%  3%  2%  6% 
All  Regions  15% 14% 12% 13% 10% 15%  10%  8%  12% 
Type of Multilateral Support (% of total support)
Loan  40% 42% 38% 39% 78% 56%  57%  51%  51% 
Guarantee  11% 13% 58% 34% 15% 29%  22%  25%  24% 
Syndication  46% 43%  1% 10%  5% 12%  5%  20%  20% 
Equity  2% 0% 1% 4% 1% 3%  6%  2%  2% 
Insurance  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10%  3%  2% 
Risk  management  0% 0% 0%  10% 0% 0%  0%  0%  1% 
Quasi-equity  0% 1% 2% 3% 0% 0%  0%  0%  1% 
Total Investment Commitments for PPI by Agency (US$ million, current prices)
IFC  538   561  263  410  452  418  535   973    4,150 
IADB  930   963    304    392  180   595    3,363 
MIGA  130   298  371  668  177  595  329   362    2,930 
EBRD  91   79  57  236  174  481  104   432    1,652 
EIB  349    63   13  268  722   130      1,544 
ADB  403     75  112  110  157   55   197    1,109 
IDA   58 34 27  168  310 125    148    870 
CAF        23  810      833 
IBRD  150    186  75   256       45    712 
IDB   14  180 20   87  - 100    401 
BCIE   4        2  50      337   393 
Other   10 40      219 102     371 
AFDB  13        191     75      279 
BOAD   4   20   2             27 
IAIC             4      4 






ANNEX 6: ACTIVE AND COMPLETED CATASTROPHE RISK PROJECTS (US$ million) 







Type and Amount of 
Donor support 
Catastrophe Insurance Pooling 
Turkish Catastrophe 
Insurance Pool  Turkey World  Bank  2000  3,000  150 
Contingent loan: 180 
TA, funding of 
premiums 
Caribbean Catastrophic 





2007 500  20 
Loan/grants: 47  
TA + payment of 
insurance premiums 
Index-Based (Parametric) Risk Insurance 
Livestock Insurance  Mongolia  World Bank + 
Japan (PHRD)  2005  2.2  0.11  Contingent loan: 5 
Weather-Based Crop 
Insurance  India World  Bank  2003  600  30  TA 
Weather Insurance  Malawi  World Bank  2005  0.3    TA 
Weather Insurance  Central America  IADB, CABEI, 
World Bank  2008 5  (unclear)    TA 
Weather Insurance  Thailand  World Bank  2007  0.04  0.003  TA 
Weather Insurance  Ethiopia  World Bank  2007  unclear    Loan: 1 
Weather Derivative  Ethiopia  World Bank, 
WFP, USAID  2006 18.6 0.93  Grant: 0.93 (premiums) 
TA 
Ex-Ante Sovereign Financing 
Catastrophe Bond  Mexico  World Bank  2006  160    TA 
Contingent Credit 
Facility  Colombia  World Bank  2005  150    Loan: 150 + TA 




2007  20    Advice paid by CCRIF 
Catastrophe Deferred 
Drawdown Option  Costa Rica  World Bank  2008  65    Loan: 65 (committed) 
Total        4,521    More than 449 
Note: Coverage was assumed to be 20 times premiums, unless actual coverage was provided. 
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ANNEX 7: WORLD BANK CARBON FUNDS: AMOUNTS RAISED, SOURCES, 
























Prototype Carbon Fund  2000  180  115  63.9  1.8  23  31 
Community Development 
Carbon  Fund  2003 128.6  58  45.1 0.8  25 7.1 
BioCarbon Fund Tranche 1  2004  53.8  30  55.8  1.3  14  4.7 
Danish Carbon Fund  2005  75.4 49.5 65.7  1.9  6  3.6 
Spanish Carbon Fund  2005  308  69.9 
1/ 22.7  0.3  13  15 
Umbrella Carbon Facility 
Tranche  1  2006  998.8 749.1  75  3  16 129.3 
Netherlands CDM Facility  2002  .. .. .. ..  1 .. 
Netherlands European Carbon 
Facility  2004  .. .. .. ..  1 .. 
Italian Carbon Fund  2004  155.6  47  30.2  0.4  7  15.4 
BioCarbon Fund Tranche 2  2007  36.1  18.1  50  1  6  .. 
Carbon Fund for Europe  2007  70  14.0 
1/ 20  0.3  5  .. 
Total     2,006.30  1,150.60  57.4  1.3  117  206.1 
1/ Converted from € to US$ at the exchange rate of 1€=1.4US$.  
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ANNEX 8: DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES  
ON INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
1.  On numerous occasions, developing countries have voiced their support for innovative 
and predictable financing of country and global efforts.
59 These have also included strong support 
for the International Finance Facility and its proposal for frontload ODA to provide urgently 
needed financing for development. Notwithstanding these expressions of support, there is need to 
better understand developing country demand for innovative finance. Summarized below are 
highlights of issues and opinions voiced by developing countries in key fora. 
Demand for Market-Based Solutions 
2.  As early 1999 the Group of 77 and China asked for an examination of various solutions: 
  exploration market-driven approaches to financing small size infrastructure projects;  
  partnership between the public and private sectors through leveraging private capital with 
public funds through risk guarantees, insurance, and/or project cost-sharing;  
  privatization of publicly owned assets and companies;  
  increased efforts to develop local capacity, such as microcredit lending and developing local 
bond markets;  
  joint ventures, development bonds with options to be converted to equity;  
  nonmonetary contributions from the private sector;  
  mobilizing private resources;  
  build-operate-transfer under public-private partnership;  
  public-private-NGO collaborations;  
  creation of public-private funds as an equity investment by governments in new ventures; 
  making government equity a key tool in capital creation;  
  review of mechanisms for development financing for government projects.
60 
3.  They also noted that the “multilateral financial institutions, in particular World Bank, 
could play an intermediary role in providing technical assistance to developing countries to 
facilitate their access to international capital markets through guarantees and insurance of projects 
as well as facilitating the exchange of information on securities and bond offering of developing 
countries in the international financial and capital markets.”
 61 The need for guarantees and other 
instruments that support for private sector engagement and PPPs was reiterated in 2007.
62  
4.  A summary of the views expressed by representatives from developing countries during 
consultations for the UN Financing for Development Process are provided below: 
                                                 
59 Declaration at Thirty-First Annual Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 
United Nations Headquarters, New York, 27 September 2007; Consultations for the UN Financing for 
Development Process in 1998, Document A/52/840; Statement by Mr. Mohammad Ali Zarie Zare, New 
York, 7 May 2001. 
60 Statement by H.E. Ambassador June Persaud of Guyana on behalf of the G77 and China on theme 6: 
Innovative sources of financing before the ad hoc open-ended working group on financing for 
development, New York, April 6, 1999. 
61 Statement by H.E. Ambassador June Persaud of Guyana on behalf of the G77 and China on theme 6: 
Innovative sources of financing before the ad hoc open-ended working group on financing for 
development, New York, April 6, 1999. 
62 Statement on behalf of the G77 and China by H.E. Hamid Yar Hiraj, Minister of State of Commerce of 
Pakistan during the thematic discussion at 2007 substantive session of the ECOSOC, Geneva, 3 July 2007.  
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  Asia and the Pacific: The consultations concluded that “the relevance of innovative sources 
lies primarily in their ability to leverage additional private sources of finance for development 
purposes.”
 63 The consultations also highlighted the importance of “increasing the access of 
the poor to financial services,” including microfinance; as well as “new private/public 
partnerships to raise funds”; 
  Latin America and the Caribbean: Multilateral, regional, and subregional banks were asked to 
develop “systems of guarantees or cofinancing mechanisms” in order to provide countries 
that had not benefited from private credit flows with greater market access;
64 
  Europe: Four priority areas were identified for expanding the set of financing solutions, 
including the “savings-investment nexus and inadequate financial intermediation, finance for 
SMEs, and public-private partnerships.”
65  
 
Interest in New Sources of Finance 
5.  In 2005, the G77 and China noted the importance of finding new sources of financing for 
development through “taxation and charges,” such as “cross-border payments taxes; carbon taxes; 
conservation tax and patent rights to protect biodiversity; uniform nationally applied global taxes 
on foreign exchange transactions to regulate capital flow; tax on financial transactions; tax on 
capital flows; brain-drain tax; tax on all international transactions….”
66 More recently, these calls 
were reinforced by developing countries represented on the Leading Group for Solidarity Levies, 
which supports a number of financing mechanisms that increase financial flows, such as the 
solidarity levy on air tickets that finances UNITAID. Other fundraising mechanisms identified by 
the Leading Group was the 1 percent Solidarity levy to finance the Digital Solidarity Fund, 
auctioning of carbon permits taxes on financial transactions and foreign exchange operations, and 
voluntary contributions, such as Voluntary Solidarity Levies and Product Red.
67 
6.  Recent consultations in Africa revealed growing civil society interested in innovative 
financing.
68 Civil society representatives focused on additional funds that could be generated 
from the currency transaction tax, carbon tax, airline levies, and the digital solidarity fund. 
However, developing countries warned not to neglect the importance of traditional sources and 
claimed that “innovative sources of finance should be an addition to ODA and not a substitute.”
69  
Predictability of Financing 
7.  Predictability of financing is another issue developing countries consider important. The 
G77 have asked for financial solutions that are able to cope with volatility. In 2001, the G77 
complained that “existing mechanisms are not able to ensure the continuity of provision of 
resources for operational activities.” It noted “a strong need to increase ODA to match short- and 
                                                 
63 Document A/AC.257/13. 
64 Document A/AC.257/17. 
65 Document A/AC.257/15. 
66 Statement by H.E. Ambassador June Persaud of Guyana on behalf of the G77 and China, New York, 
April 6, 1999; Statement by Ambassador Stafford Neil, permanent representative of Jamaica to the UN, 
chairman of the G77, New York, 25 April 2005. 
67 Conakry Declaration. Contribution to the follow-up conference on financing for development in Doha 
November 29–December 2, 2008. 
68 Seth Lartey, John Foster, and Cheikh Tidiane Touré. 2008. “Breaking the Taboo: Perspectives of African 
Civil Society on Innovative Sources of Financing Development.” London: Commonwealth Foundation. 
69 Document A/AC.257/13.  
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long-terms needs of developing countries. Studying a system where contributions to aid efforts 
are obligatory and the annual flows are predictable should be considered.”
70 
Ownership of Innovative Financing 
8.  Ownership of the financing process has high priority among developing countries. The 
Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol is one such example: a financing solution that 
strengthens country ownership through its source of financing.
71 The Adaptation Fund’s primary 
financing comes not from traditional development assistance, but from a 2 percent share of 
proceeds on project-based emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. Because the 
Adaptation Fund is financed by payers of the levy, it represents a departure from the traditional 
donor-recipient relationship of development finance. Developing countries have successfully 
argued that the source of the 2 percent share justifies a prominent voice for recipients of funds in 
the Adaptation Fund’s governance structure.
72 Accordingly, the Adaptation Fund Board 
comprises a 75 percent majority of developing countries, including the most affected countries 
(small island developing states and least-developed countries).  
9.  Some developing countries have themselves contributed to new financing solutions. For 
example, South Africa committed to pay US$20 million to IFFIm over the next 20 years, and the 
Russian Federation has pledged US$80 million to the pilot Advance Market Commitment for 
vaccines. Several beneficiary countries have implemented the Solidarity Levy on air tickets and 
raised money for UNITAID. Between November 2006 and December 2007, Brazil raised more 
than US$16 million, Chile more than US$5 million, Mauritius US$324,000, and Niger 
US$32,000 from the levy.
73 Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, Republic of Korea, and Madagascar have also 
implemented it. Similarly, Senegal was the first to adopt the so-called “1 percent digital solidarity 
principle” in its procurement.
74 Under this principle, public institutions and private companies can 
obligate themselves to pay 1 percent of the contract value of procurement of ICTs (equipment, 
software, services, and so on) to the Digital Solidarity Foundation. 
                                                 
70 Statement by Mr. Mohammad Ali Zarie Zare, on behalf of the Group of 77, at the Third Session of the 
Preparatory Committee For the International Conference on Financing for Development: Increasing 
international financial cooperation for development through inter alia Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), New York, 7 May 2001. 
71 Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, permanent representative of Pakistan to the UN at the joint 
high-level segment of the 13th session of the COP and the 3rd session of the MOP, Bali, Indonesia, 12 
December 2007. 
72 Submission from Egypt, Philippines, AOSIS, and Indonesia for the UNFCCC workshop on the 
Adaptation Fund, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 3–5 May 2006, Document FCCC/SBI/2006/MISC.7. 
73 Annual Report UNITAID 2007. http://www.unitaid.eu/images/governance/annualreport2007.pdf. 
74 http://www.dsf-fsn.org/cms/content/view/318/1/lang,en/.  
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ANNEX 9: GLOSSARY OF SELECTED INNOVATIVE AND TRADITIONAL 




AccessRH, formerly Minimum Volume Guarantee (MVG) “is a global procurement mechanism 
that helps countries and other buyers get the lowest possible price for supplies by allowing them 
to buy through a master framework agreement with suppliers.”
75 The master framework 
agreement “contracts with manufacturers for specific products, guaranteeing a minimum volume, 
the magnitude of which will depend on the mechanism’s appetite for risk and the forecasts 
provided by the buyers. In exchange for this guaranteed minimum volume, the manufacturer 
would extend favorable terms to buyers making purchases through the master contract.”
76 
Increasing the number of potential buyers, aggregating demand, and providing manufacturers 
with up-front commitments can yield lower unit prices which the operator of the master 
agreement can then pass along to its customers.” AccessRH focuses particularly on smaller-scale 
buyers, which are more likely to face high prices and poor terms. It also targets circumstances 
where low production volumes squeeze manufacturer profit margins so that sales are no longer 
commercially viable.” The underlying financing mechanism is PG4Health. 
Further information:  http://www.rhsupplies.org/  
Reading:  Reproductive Health Supplies Coalition and Dalberg Global 
Development Advisors 2008 
See also:  PG4Health 
Adaptation Fund 
Under the UNFCCC process, the Adaptation Fund is intended as a principal source of adaptation 
support for developing countries and a centerpiece of the international agenda on climate change. 
The Adaptation Fund is designed to finance concrete climate change adaptation projects and 
programs that are country driven and based on needs, views, and priorities of eligible developing 
country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Adaptation Fund’s primary financing comes not from traditional development assistance, but 
from a 2 percent share of proceeds of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued by the Clean 
                                                 
75 http://www.rhsupplies.org/. 
76 Reproductive Health Supplies Coalition and Dalberg Global Development Advisors 2008. 
This glossary summarizes existing and proposed innovative and traditional financial mechanisms and 
instruments for development.  
The range of instruments and mechanisms exceeds the scope of the main paper, which concentrates 
on implemented mechanisms and instruments with proven fund flows. 
The purpose of this annex is to provide a further overview of the currently discussed instruments and 
mechanisms as well as a reference to the main old and new expressions used in development finance. 
The glossary is updated on an ongoing basis by the Multilateral Trusteeship and Innovative Financing 
Department of the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships (CFPMI) Vice Presidency.   
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Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol. The Adaptation Fund’s financial 
base is thus precedent-setting: an international base arising from an international treaty. Using a 
share of the proceeds from CER sales to assist developing countries was envisioned when the 
Kyoto Protocol was agreed in 1997; the Adaptation Fund was allocated a 2 percent share as early 
as 2001.  
The governance of the Adaptation Fund reflects its innovative source of financing. It assigns 
ownership to developing countries. Accordingly, the Adaptation Fund Board comprises a 75 
percent majority of developing countries, including the most-affected countries (small island 
developing states and least-developed countries), and it provides that they can submit proposals 
directly to the Adaptation Fund Board.  
Further information:   http://adaptation-fund.org/ 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/Issuance/SOPByProjectsTable.html  
See also:  Global Taxes 
Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) 
An AMC tackles a longstanding development problem—persistent private sector failures to 
develop and produce products needed in developing countries due to perceptions of insufficient 
demand or market uncertainty. A pilot is being launched in 2009. It focuses on the vaccine 
market, where research, development, and production of vaccines specific to the needs of the 
poorest developing countries are limited by the small number of manufacturers, high cost of 
product development and capacity scale-up, and demand uncertainty. The pilot AMC’s sources of 
funds of US$1.5 billion are ODA and foundation grants—provided under unusually long-term 
payment agreements. The pledge flows are enhanced by an IBRD “guarantee.” The AMC targets 
private sector engagement via a unilateral offer to industry designed to spur development of 
manufacturing capacity to supply needed vaccines. The funds flow to GAVI (which is itself 
portrayed as an innovative public-private partnership) and are used by UNICEF to procure 
vaccines.  
Further information:  http://www.vaccineamc.org 
http://www.worldbank.org/amc  
Reading:  Batson, et al. 2006, Kremer 2000, Kremer and Glennerster 2004, Kremer 
and Zwane 2005, Ridker 2006, Tremonti and Finanze 2005a, 2005b, 
World Bank and GAVI 2006 
Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria (AMFm) 
The Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria (AMFm) is a financing mechanism to make 
artemisinin-combination therapies (ACTs) more available and affordable. ACTs delay emergence 
of resistance to the artemisinin. Without the AMFm, effective treatment may be too expensive or 
simply unavailable to the majority of patients. 
The AMFm will negotiate with ACT manufacturers to reduce the price to the current price 
available to the public sector. The AMFm will provide a copayment to buyers to lower the price 
to a level comparable with less-effective antimalaria alternatives. A core function of the AMFm, 
which serves both the public and private sectors, is the copayment toward purchases of eligible 
antimalarials by first-line buyers. Through the copayment, the AMFm will reduce the prices that 
buyers pay for ACTs, but it will not subsidize manufacturers.  
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The AMFm has been approved by the Board of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RMP). The 
Board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria approved a decision to host 
and manage the AMFm in November 2007. It is projected to be operational in 2009. 
Further information:   http://rbm.who.int 
Reading:  AMFm Task Force of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership 2007 
Arms Trade Tax 
The Arms Trade Tax is a proposal for a global tax to reduce trade in arms and raise money for 
development, disarmament, or compensation of victims. A number of objections have been raised 
against such a tax, including difficulties in achieving compliance; tax evasion; creating an 
incentive for increased illicit trade in arms; and the likelihood that developing countries, as the 
purchasers of armaments, would have to pay a substantial part of the tax.
77 
Reading:   Brzoska 2004 
See also:  Global taxes 
Auctioning/Sales of Emission Permits 
One source of funds from cap and trade mechanisms is the auctioning or sales of emission 
permits. For example, EU Allowances (EUA) under the European Unions European Trading 
System may be auctioned or otherwise sold rather than being distributed to emitters. The 
proceeds could be directed to financing international development. 
An EU Directive recommends that at least half the revenue should be used to fight and adapt to 
climate change and lists a number of purposes, mainly within the EU, but also in developing 
countries.
78 Between January 1, 2008, and November 14, 2008, Germany sold a total of 40 
million EU allowances with an overall value of €933.3 million.
79 Germany decided a “share of 
the income, Euros 120 million in 2008, will be invested in international climate protection 
measures in developing countries. This share will be and must be increased in subsequent 
years.”
80 Also, the United Kingdom and Austria have auctioned emission permits.
81 In general, 
under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, for the first years the majority of the emissions permits 
are supposed to be allocated for free. However, the latest EU Commission proposal suggests that 
from 2013 full auctioning is to be the rule for the power sector and allocating for free is to be 
phased out for industry over the 2013–20 period.
82 
Further information:   http://www.bmz.de/en/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/ 
approaches/joint-financing/innovative_funding_instruments/index.html 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm  
See also:  Cap and Trade 
                                                 
77 Brzoska 2004. 
78 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm.  
79 http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/jahresbericht_kwf_08_en.pdf.  
80 http://www.bmz.de/en/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/approaches/joint-
financing/innovative_funding_instruments/index.html.  
81 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm.  
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/eu/operators/auctioning.htm.  
82 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm.  
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Aviation Taxes 
There have been several proposals for indirect taxes, or equivalent charges, on international 
aviation, from regional and global taxes to coordinated taxes whose proceeds are earmarked 
toward development—as implemented with the Solidarity Levy on Airline Tickets. Several 
arguments favor an aviation tax: it would earn a double dividend, raising funds and also 
internalizing the costs of emissions. “The indirect tax burden on international aviation is very 
low, yet aviation contributes significantly to border-crossing environmental damage, is just as 
proper an object of taxation as any other commodity, and incipient tax competition is likely to 
result in these taxes being set at inefficiently low levels.”
83 A variety of tax bases have been 
proposed, including taxing aviation fuel, ticket values, and departure/arrival taxes. 
Reading:    Keen and Strand 2007, Müller and Hepburn 2006 
See also:  Solidarity Levy on Airline Tickets 
Global Taxes 
Beneficiary Pays Instrument 
See:  Payments for Services 
Blending Loans and Grants 
Blending loans and grants, also called blending arrangements, potentially increases the volume 
and impact of development finance. Blending loans and grants means adapting the level of 
concessionality of funding to the recipient’s needs, thereby using funds in the most careful and 
economical way. Reasons for blending include: global or regional externalities that justify 
additional support to a country, debt distress, and targeting key sectors as part of the push to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals.
84 IBRD and IDA buy-downs are blending 
arrangements.  
Reading:  Development Committee 2005 
See also:  Buy-Downs 
Blended Value 
Blended value refers to blending individual, profit-maximizing, or commercial objectives with 
philanthropic objectives. 
See also:  Blended Value Products 
Blended Value Investing 
Blended Value Investing  
Blended value investments blend profit and philanthropic objectives for investments by aiming 
for financial returns and, at the same time, supporting noncommercial. Social responsible 
investments, impact investments, and program related investments can be considered examples of 
blended value investments. 
                                                 
83 Keen and Strand 2007. 
84 Development Committee 2004.  
  61
Further information:   http://www.blendedvalue.org  
Reading:  Brainard 2006, Global Foundation Leaders Advisory Group 2005, World 
Economic Forum 2006 
See also:  Socially Responsible Investments 
Impact Investments 
Program Related Investments 
Blended Value Products 
Blended value products stimulate voluntary contributions from individuals by combining 
consumption with charity. Consumers make small contributions proportionate to their purchases. 
Examples are (PRODUCT)RED and the Visa GreenCard. Blended value products are similar to 
voluntary solidarity contributions. The difference is that the contribution of blended value 
products is included in the price of the product while voluntary solidarity contributions offer 
consumers with the option to make a voluntary contribution while purchasing.  
Further information:   http://www.joinred.com 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/partners/private/red/ 
https://www.visagreencard.nl/ 
See also   (PRODUCT)RED 
Voluntary Solidarity Contributions 
Buy-Downs 
Buy-downs (also called “credit buy-downs” or “loan buy-downs) are a combination of a loan to a 
developing country and a donor commits to buy down the loan, effectively transforming it to a 
grant. In some cases a buy-down is a blending arrangement that increases the level of 
concessionality of loans. Examples are IBRD buy-downs. In other cases, the instrument, such as 
IDA buy-downs, is linked to results. The commitment to buy-down the loan is triggered by 
predefined results that have to be achieved. The developing country receives funds up front and 
has the insurance that, with successful implementation, a donor will cancel the debt.  
An IBRD-buy-down for a TB project in China piloted this tool in 2003. The objective was to 
increase loan concessionality in response to China’s graduation from IDA and its refusal to 
borrow on IBRD terms for the health sector. DFID grant funds were combined with IBRD into a 
single stream, which reduced the cost of borrowing to roughly 2 percent. This was followed by 
two additional buy-down arrangements in China, one for education and one for rural 
development.  
Results-based IDA buy-downs were initially piloted in Pakistan and Nigeria in projects 
supporting polio eradication, spurred by the global public good character of this initiative. A total 
of eight credits, including supplemental credits, are expected to include buy-downs with funding 
from the Gates Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, Rotary International, and the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control. Seven of these have been approved (for a total of approximately 
US$240 million). 
Reading:   Development  Committee 2004, Hecht and Shah 2006  
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See also:  Results-Based Financing 
Blending between loans and grants 
Cap and Trade 
Cap and trade (also called emissions trading) is a mechanism that sets a cap on emissions and 
allows emitters to trade their contingencies. Contingencies are set by a central authority, such as a 
government or international body and can be either auctioned, sold, or allocated for free to 
emitters. A cap and trade mechanism sets a price on a negative externality, and thereby 
internalizes it.  
Funds from cap and  trade mechanisms for developing countries may result from two sources. 
First, countries can charge the private sector for carbon emissions and auction or sell emissions 
permits and then may transfer the proceeds to developing countries as development assistance 
(see Auctioning/Sales of Emissions Permits.). Second, cap and trade mechanisms may allow for 
trading carbon emissions certificates internationally. Emitters can support emissions reductions 
projects in developing countries to offset their emissions (see Carbon Funds). Furthermore, cap 
and trade mechanisms produce double dividends by raising funds and internalizing a negative 
externality. 
Further information:  http://unfccc.int  
Reading  Capoor and Ambrosi 2008, Olsen 2007, Sandmo 2005 
See also:   Auctioning/sales of Emission Permits 
Carbon Funds 
Carbon Funds 
Typically, carbon funds work as intermediaries that purchase project-based GHG emission 
reductions on behalf of governments and private sector companies in developed countries from 
low-carbon projects in developing countries. Emission reductions are distributed to the Carbon 
Fund’s participants according to their contribution. The World Bank acts as trustee of its carbon 
funds, which purchase project-based emission reductions generated under the framework of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms (i.e., the Clean Development Mechanism and the Joint 
Implementation). 
Further information:  http://carbonfinance.org  
Reading:  Capoor and Ambrosi 2008 
See also:  Cap and Trade  
Carbon-Linked Bonds 
The performance of carbon-linked bonds (also called carbon-indexed bonds) depends on the 
development of the carbon markets. In 2008, the World Bank issued a carbon-linked bond. “By 
purchasing this bond, investors can indirectly participate in the market for GHG emission 
reductions. Investors will also be supporting demand for CERs generated from a specific  
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UNFCCC-registered clean energy project. The market for CERs contributes to a reduction of 
global greenhouse gas emissions and the transition to a low carbon growth economy.”
85 
See also:  Indexed Bonds 
Carbon Tax  
The carbon tax is a tax that could be imposed by an international organization, a country, or a 
subnational governance body on GHG emissions in an area. If imposed by an international 
organization, a carbon tax would be a global tax. A global carbon tax addresses negative 
externalities from greenhouse gas emissions, a global public bad. A carbon tax could serve as an 
alternative implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’s Cap and Trade system. 
Reading:  Hoel 1992, Pearce 1991, Sandmo 2005 
See also:   Cap and Trade 
Global Taxes 
Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF)  
The CCRIF is a parametric insurance facility, owned, operated, and registered in the Caribbean 
for Caribbean governments. It insures government risk and is designed to limit the financial 
impact of catastrophic hurricanes and earthquakes to Caribbean countries by quickly providing 
short-term liquidity when a policy is triggered. It is the world’s first regional insurance fund, 
giving Caribbean governments the unique opportunity to purchase earthquake and hurricane 
catastrophe coverage not available elsewhere and with lowest-possible pricing. The CCRIF 
represents a paradigm shift in the way governments treat risk, with Caribbean governments 
leading the way in predisaster planning.  
In June 2007, at the start of the Atlantic Hurricane Season, the CCRIF was launched. By pooling 
their risk, the governments saved approximately 40 percent on what each would have paid had 
they negotiated individually through commercial insurance markets.”
86 
Further information:  http://www.ccrif.org/ 
Cash on Delivery 
Cash on Delivery (or payments for progress) are a proposal for a results-based financing 
instrument by the Washington-based Center for Development. Donors would commit to pay a 
specific amount for evidence of progress toward agreed development goals. “For example, donors 
could promise to pay governments $20 for every child that is vaccinated, or $100 for every child 
that completes primary school beyond the number that completed school in 2000, or $200 for 
every primary school graduate who passes a competency test. In contrast to output-based aid, 
payments would be made against ‘progress’ toward a goal, not against a prespecified ‘result’ or 
‘goal’ per se.”
87 Developing country governments would report their progress and donors would 
pay the agreed amount accordingly. Performance-based aid links financing to results and can be 
viewed as a form of results-based financing. 
                                                 
85 http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital%2bMarkets/News+for+Investors/CO2LBond.html.  
86 http://www.ccrif.org/main.php?main=9.  
87 Barder and Birdsall 2006.  
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Reading:    Barder and Birdsall 2006 
See also:  Results-Based Instruments 
Catastrophe (Cat) Bonds 
Catastrophe or cat bonds are risk-linked securities that transfer a specified set of risks to 
investors. Cat bonds require the bondholders to forgive or defer some or all payments of principal 
or interest if actual catastrophe losses exceed a specified amount, or trigger. Catastrophe bonds 
have traditionally covered natural disasters.  
Reading:  Cummins and Mahul 2008, Doherty 1997, Hofman and Brukoff 2006 
Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (CAT DDO) 
A CAT DDO is a committed credit line for catastrophe risk by the World Bank. It acts as a source 
of bridge financing that may be disbursed partially or in full if the country declares a state of 
emergency as a result of a natural disaster. This will allow the country to maintain its 
development programs while mobilizing other sources of funding to address the emergency. 
Further information:  http://treasury.worldbank.org  
Reading:  Cummins and Mahul 2008 
See also:  Deferred Drawdown Option 
Catastrophe Swap 
A catastrophe swap exchanges a fixed payment for a part of the difference between insurance 
premiums and the losses caused by insurance claims. 
Reading:  Cummins and Mahul 2008, Torre-Enciso, et al. 2003 
Challenge Grant 
A challenge grant conditions eligibility to receive a grant on predefined conditions. The 
Millennium Challenge Account is an implementation of the concept by the U.S. Government. 
See also:  Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Commodity-Indexed Bond 
A commodity indexed bond is a bond whose repayments are linked to the price of a commodity. 
Commodity linked bonds allow the issuer to mitigate the risk of changing commodity prices. For 
example, a bond linked to changes in oil prices allow oil producers (or oil producing countries) to 
hedge their risk of not being able to repay a loan as a result of falling oil prices. 
Reading: Atta-Mensah  2004 
See also:  Indexed Bonds  
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Concessional Loan 
A concessional loan is a loan with a grant element. Conceptually, the measure of concessionality, 
or grant element, involves calculating the difference between the face value of a loan and the 
present value (or economic value) of debt service repayments, expressed as a percentage of the 
face value of a loan. For the purposes of classifying ODA, loans have been categorized as 
concessional by the OECD if their grant element exceeds 25 percent, using a fixed 10 percent 
discount rate in the present value calculation. 
See also:   Grant 
Loan 
Blending loans and grants 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
Conditional cash transfers provide money to individuals or families contingent on certain 
behavior, such as sending children to school or bringing them to health centers. CCTs strengthen 
the demand side of social services and complement health, education services, and other services. 
Further information:   http://go.worldbank.org/BWUC1CMXM0  
Reading:  De Janvry, et al. 2006; De Janvry and Sadoulet 2006; Fiszbein, et al. 
2009, Heinrich 2007; Rawlings and Rubio 2005; Skoufias, et al. 2006 
See also:  Results-Based Financing 
Results-Based Instruments 
Contingent Loan 
A contingent loan (or contingent credit) is a financing instrument through which funding for a 
specific previously defined event is provided after such event occurs. Deferred Drawdown 
Options on World Bank loans are an application of contingent loans. Also, the International 
Monetary Fund Exogenous Shocks Facility provides financing continent to exogenous 
macroeconomic shocks.  
Reading  Cummins and Mahul 2008 
See also:  Deferred Drawdown Options 
Cat Deferred Drawdown Options 
IMF Exogenous Shocks Facility 
Cool bonds 
Cool bonds are five-year, USD-denominated notes paying a coupon of 3 percent for an initial 
period, and a variable coupon amount for the remaining maturity of the note tied to Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) generated by specified greenhouse gas–reducing projects in China 
and Malaysia. IBRD counterparties hedging exposure to CERs contributes to expansion of carbon 
markets. Daiwa Securities and Mitsubishi UFJ Securities distributed the notes to Japanese 
investors.  
Further information:  http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets/News+for+Inv
estors/CO2LBond.html  
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an umbrella term that means taking corporate 
responsibility for the impact of the company’s activities on all stakeholders: customers, 
employers, suppliers, shareholders, community, and environment. It includes sponsoring and 
philanthropy, ethical products, and pro bono activities. 
Counter-Cyclical Loan (CCL) 
A counter-cyclical loan is a proposed concessional loan that adapts sovereign debt-service 
obligations to their ability to meet these obligations, as measured by their export earnings. The 
proposed loan would have the grace period reduced period from 10 years to 5 years. The 
remaining grace period would be used as an asset the country can draw upon when a bad shock 
occurs. 
Reading:  Cohen, et al. 2008 
See also:  GDP-indexed Bond 
Currency Tax 
The currency tax (also known as currency transaction tax or Tobin Tax) is a levy on international 
foreign exchange transactions. There have been several concrete proposals for a currency tax. The 
first proposals addressed market instability; later proposals were seen as a source to finance the 
Millennium Development Goals and global public goods.  
Tobin Tax: Originally, a currency tax was proposed by the economist James Tobin not primarily 
for its potential revenues but for its ability to stabilize currency markets. It would do so by 
imposing a tax high enough to limit speculation on currency fluctuations. 
Regional proposals: Some proposals suggested starting to implement regional solutions in order 
to show the feasibility of the concept. The currency transaction tax would be implemented only 
for one country or within one region and only for one currency. A euro and a sterling tax have 
been proposed.
88  
Currency Transaction Tax: At the financing for development conference in Doha in November 
2008 a currency transfer tax has been proposed.
89 The tax would generate significant revenues of 
about US$30 to US$60 billion per year but the proposed tax rate of 0.005 percent would be too 
small to distort or even influence the market for currency transactions. Implementation is 
considered to be feasible because the market is fully electronic and tax collection would be 
computerized. 
Currency Transaction Levy: Recently, a Currency Transaction Tax that would be voluntarily 
adopted by some countries, has been called a “Currency Transaction Levy.” 
Reading:  Development Committee 2004, Hillman, et al. 2006, Nissanke 2005, 
Schmidt 1999, 2007, Spahn 2002, Spratt 2006a, 2006b, Tobin 1996 
See also:  Global Taxes 
                                                 
88 Spratt 2006a, 2006b. 
89 http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/pdf/IHP%20Update%2013/. 
Taskforce/Stamp%20Out%20Poverty%20presentation%20-%20Doha%20Side%20Event.pdf.   
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De-Tax 
De-Tax is a proposal combining two elements: (i) participating governments would waive the 
value-added tax (VAT) by 1 percent on the overall price of any good or service sold by sellers 
associated with the initiative; (ii) sellers would—on a voluntary basis—waive a share of their 
profit on designated transactions. A special fund would benefit from the 1 percent of VAT from 
governments as well as related seller contributions. 
See also:  Global Taxes 
Debt Reduction Facility (DRF) for IDA-Only Countries 
The World Bank’s Debt Reduction Facility (DRF) for IDA-Only Countries was established in 
July 1989. It provides grants to eligible countries to buy back at a deep discount their public and 
publicly guaranteed commercial external debt. To date, the DRF has supported 24 operations in 
21 IDA-only countries, extinguishing about US$4.8 billion of external commercial debt principal 
and an estimated US$4.2 billion of associated interest arrears and penalties. The DRF has become 
one of the key instruments to facilitate the participation of commercial creditors in the delivery of 
HIPC Initiative debt relief.  
Further information:  http://go.worldbank.org/2CRHS4N500 
See also:  Debt Relief 
Debt Relief 
“Debt relief is any form of debt reorganization which relieves the overall burden of debt.”
90 Since 
World War II, industrialized countries have entered into debt rescheduling agreements. Later, 
through the Paris Club, they also agreed to provide concessional treatment (i.e., a treatment that 
implies a reduction in the Net Present Value of the consolidated debts) to debt owed by highly 
indebted countries.  In recent years, two major debt relief initiatives have been launched namely, 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI). These two initiatives are the first ones to include multilateral debt relief. Debt relief 
instruments include debt swaps and debt buy-backs. 
Further information:  http://go.worldbank.org/KNZR2IIQG0  
See also:  Debt Reduction Facility 
Debt Swaps 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
Debt for Nature Swaps 
In debt-for-nature swaps, a portion of a country’s foreign debt is forgiven in exchange for local 
investments in conservation measures. Usually, an international NGO purchases debt titles on the 
secondary market. The NGO transfers the debt title to the debtor country. In exchange the country 
agrees to either carry out environmental policies or endow a government bond with the aim of 
funding conservation programs. 
                                                 
90 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=558.   
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Reading:  Deacon and Murphy 1997, Hansen 1989 
See also:  Debt Swap 
Diaspora Bonds 
A diaspora bond is a sovereign debt instrument to raise financing from a country’s overseas 
diaspora. Israel and India have raised US$35–$40 billion with diaspora bonds. Diaspora bonds 
can have two objectives: they can keep the diaspora affiliated with their original home country 
and they can offer countries possibilities to raise funds that are partially concessional because a 
diaspora member is likely to accept under-market interest rates for patriotic reasons. 
Reading:  Chander 2001, Ketkar and Ratha 2007 
Debt2Health 
Debt2Health is a debt conversion scheme piloted by Germany, Indonesia, and the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In the first Debt2Health operation, Germany cancelled 
Indonesian debts of €50 million, Indonesia paid €25 million to the Global Fund, and the Global 
Fund in turn agreed to spend this contribution on projects in Indonesia. The novel aspect of this 
mechanism is that a multilateral organization can more ensure appropriate usage of funds 
received from debt conversion. Another Debt2Health Swap with Pakistan, Germany, and the 
Global Fund has been implemented. Debt2Health initiatives with Kenya and Peru and the Global 
Fund and Germany are planned.  
Further information:  http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/funds_raised/ 
innovative_financing/initiatives/debt2health/  
Reading:  Cassimon, et al. 2008 
See also:   Debt Swap 
Debt Relief 
Debt Swap 
A debt swap (also called debt-for-development swaps) provides development financing “through 
the exchange of a foreign-currency-denominated debt for local currency, typically at a substantial 
discount. The process normally involves a foreign NGO that purchases the debt from the original 
creditor at a substantial discount using its own foreign currency resources, and then resells it to 
the debtor country government for the local currency equivalent (resulting in a further discount). 
The NGO in turn spends the money on a development project, previously agreed upon with the 
debtor country government.”
91 
Reading:  Edwards 1992, Kaiser, et al. 1996 
See also:   Debt2Health 
Debt Relief 
                                                 
91 OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/index.htm.   
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Deferred Drawdown Option (DDO) 
A Deferred Drawdown Option is an option to a contingent IBRD loan that gives middle income 
countries flexibility and options to deal with adverse events such as natural catastrophes, 
downturns in economic growth, or adverse changes in commodity prices or terms of trade. The 
product gives the borrower the option of deferring disbursements of a loan for up to three years, 
provided that overall program implementation and the macroeconomic framework remain 
adequate. Exercising the DDO would give borrowers access to long-term IBRD resources if 
market borrowing becomes difficult and a financing need materializes.
92 
Further information:  http://treasury.worldbank.org  
See also:  Cat Deferred Drawdown Option 
Contingent Loan 
Digital Solidarity Levy  
The digital solidarity levy is a proposal for a semi-obligatory levy on public entities’ information 
and communication technology (equipment, software, services, etc.). Public institutions including 
national and subnational governments and private companies obligate themselves to pay 1 percent 
of the contract value of procurement of information and communication technology to the Digital 
Solidarity Foundation. Senegal is the first national government that applies this so-called “1% 
digital solidarity principle” to its procurements. 
Further information  http://www.digital-solidarity.org  
Reading:  Weber and Menoud 2008 
Eco notes 
Eco notes are six-year Euro-denominated notes issued by IBRD with a coupon of 3 percent plus a 
potential additional return linked to an ABN-Amro index of “green” equities. The notes raised 
funds for IBRD at attractive rates, while raising awareness for funding “green” activities. At the 
same time, hedging activities of IBRD’s swap counterparties supported capital to “green” 
companies in the index. Eco notes are a form of socially responsible investing. 
See also:  Sustainable Investing 
Emissions Trading 
See:  Cap and  Trade 
Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
In 1996, the World Bank and IMF launched the HIPC Initiative to create a framework in which 
all creditors, including multilateral creditors, can provide debt relief to the world’s poorest and 
most heavily indebted countries, and thereby reduce the constraints on economic growth and 
poverty reduction imposed by the debt-service burdens in these countries. The Initiative was 
modified in 1999 to provide three key enhancements: Deeper and broader relief, faster relief, and 
stronger link between debt relief and poverty reduction. To date, 35 HIPC countries have reached 
their decision points, of which 24 have reached the completion point. 
                                                 
92 http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Financial+Products/FAQs/Deferred+Drawdown+Option.html.   
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Further information:  http://go.worldbank.org/YJUSTQSGG1  
Reading:   International Development Association and International Monetary Fund 
2008, World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006 
See also:  Debt relief 
Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) 
European Union MDG Contract 
The European Union MDG Contract is a form of budget support launched in 2008 with three key 
features: (i) It is more predictable and provides longer term (six years) support; (ii) it provides 
flexibility as it is fixed for the first three years, but may be adjusted in the second half of the term 
following a mid-contract review of performance with respect to MDG-related indicators; and (iii) 
it is performance based, because “in case of unsatisfactory trends in the eligibility areas for 
budget support, macroeconomic stability, public financial management and implementation of 
poverty reduction strategy, the temporary withholding of a limited share of the annual allocation 
until the re-establishment of a satisfactory trend would be possible if considered necessary to 
support the dialogue process.”
93 
Further information:  http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/aid/mdg-contract_en.cfm  
GDP-indexed Bond 
A GDP-indexed bond is a sovereign bond whose interest rate and/or repayments vary with a 
country’s rate of economic growth. If economic growth is low, interest and/or principal payments 
are low; if it is high, interest payments are high. Therefore, countries with poor economic 
performance which are less likely to be able to serve their debt face a lower burden from serving 
GDP-indexed bonds. The instrument allows to hedge debt payments against economic recessions. 
The first GDP-indexed bond was issued by Bulgaria in 1994, followed by other countries. 
Reading  Borensztein and Mauro 2004, Borensztein and Mauro 2002, Griffith-
Jones and Sharma 2006, Shiller 2003b, 2005 
See also:  Indexed Bonds 
Global Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond Program (Gemloc) 
Gemloc is a US$ 5 billion local currency bond for investment in up to 40 emerging bond 
markets,
94 launched in October 2007 by the World Bank Group together with private partners. 
Gemloc supports the development of local currency bond markets in developing countries. The 
objective is that more institutional investment from local and global investors can flow into local 
currency bond markets.  
Further information:  http://www.gemloc.org  
See also:  Local Currency Lending 
                                                 
93 http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/aid/mdg-contract_en.cfm.  
94 Grant 2007.  
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Global Development Bond 
A Global Development Bond would mobilize private capital investment to developing countries. 
Certain risks of the bond would be mitigated through guarantees or insurance by governments or 
agencies. The bond would “not work like foreign aid or other public sector funding (trade, 
investment, risk mitigation) programs, but will complement them, leverage their funds and further 
their goals.”
95 
Reading: Eckhart  2004 
Global Lottery 
National lotteries are a source of income for national charities. A global lottery would direct the 
proceeds from a lottery towards international development. Two forms of a global lottery have 
been proposed: (i) an international agency would organize a new and genuinely international 
lottery; or (ii) or an international agency would receive a share of proceeds from national 
lotteries.  
Reading:  Addison and Chowdhury 2005, Morgan 2000 
See also:  Global Premium Bond 
Global Premium Bond  
A premium bond (or lottery bond is a proposal for a debt instrument whereby people buy savings 
bonds that do not disburse the interest proceeds but interest proceeds are paid into a lottery. The 
winners of that lottery would receive payments. Two proposals for a Global Premium Bond exist: 
(i) A single global bond or coordinated national bonds would direct a share of the proceeds of the 
lottery toward development. The bond would not lend to developing countries. (ii) A single 
global bond or coordinated national bonds would lend directly to developing countries. These 
would receive financing for more favorable term because premium bonds usually pay lower 
interest to investors than comparable conventional bonds. Investors would have to bear the 
developing country credit risk.  
Reading:  Addison and Chowdhury 2005 
Global Taxes 
A number of global taxes have been proposed, including carbon and other environmental taxes; 
aviation taxes on the ticket price, flight distance, or jet fuel; a currency tax (the original currency 
tax proposal was the Tobin Tax); a tax on arms trade; a tax on international shipping; a trade tax 
on internationally traded goods; a surtax on profits of multinational corporations; a tax on 
financial transactions of bonds, stocks, and derivatives; a surcharge on domestic taxation; charges 
on use of outer space, such as a satellite tax; charges on information exchange: mail, 
telecommunication, or the Internet (bit tax); royalties on minerals mined in international waters; 
charges for exploration in or exploitation of Antarctica; charges for fishing in international 
waters; charges for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
The proposed global taxes vary in their ambition of including a great number of countries and of 
being a true tax with obligatory long-term payments. Usually, a tax is considered an obligatory 
                                                 
95 Eckhart 2004.  
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mechanism imposed on the payer of the tax. Some of the global tax proposals are regional, such 
as a proposed tax on currency transactions within the Euro area. Others are solidarity 
contributions of countries that voluntarily are implementing the tax, such as the Solidarity Levy 
on Airline Tickets. Recently, globally coordinated and nationally on a voluntary basis 
implemented taxes have been called “levies” or “solidarity levies” The 2 percent levy on carbon 
finance for the Adaptation Fund currently is an obligatory tax on the issuance of Certified 
Emissions Reduction under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Global taxes deliver stable and predictable long-term funding to finance international 
development. Most global tax proposals are designed to raise additional financing and, at the 
same time, produce a “double dividend” by offsetting a global public bad.  
Reading:   Boadway 2005, Development Committee 2004, 2005, Frankman 1996, 
Mendez 1992, Technical Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms 
2004, Wachtel 2000, Zedillo and High-level Panel on Financing for 
Development 2001, Zee 2006 
See also:  Adaptation Fund 
Arms Trade Tax 
Aviation Tax 
Cap and Trade 
Carbon Tax 
Currency Tax 
Digital Solidarity Levy 
Solidarity Levy on Airline Taxes 
Solidarity Levies 
Grant 
In development finance a grant is defined as a transfer made in cash, goods, or services for which 
no repayment is required.
96 
Green bonds  
Green bonds are six-year, Swedish kronor notes paying investors a 3.5 percent annual interest rate 
and raising funds at a spread of 0.25 percent over comparable-maturity Swedish government 
paper issued by IBRD. They enabled IBRD to raise funds at an attractive cost despite the 
challenging market environment. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) underwrote the issue 
and distributed mainly to Scandinavian institutional investors, who were attracted to the 
investment because the proceeds would be credited to a special account at IBRD that supports 
World Bank loan disbursements on qualifying climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. 
Green bonds are a form of socially responsible investing. 
Further information:  http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets/News+for+Inv
estors/GreenBond.html 
 
See also:  Sustainable Investing 
                                                 
96 OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1143.   
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Guarantees 
A guarantee is an agreement by a guarantor to assume the responsibility for the performance of an 
action or obligation of another person or legal entity by agreeing to compensate the beneficiary in 
the event of nonperformance. In development finance it is mostly an instrument that mitigates 
political, regulatory, and foreign exchange risks of investors including the risk of expropriation 
and nationalization without compensation, war, and restrictions on the conversion of currencies. 
Both, equity and debt investments can be guaranteed.
97 The terms of a guarantee can cover the 
whole or only a partial risk in the event of nonperformance. 
The World Bank offers three kinds of guarantees:  
–  Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs) cover private lenders against the risk of a public entity 
failing to perform its obligations with respect to a private project. PRGs ensure payment 
in the case of default resulting from the nonperformance of contractual obligations 
undertaken by governments or their agencies in private sector projects. 
–  Partial Credit Guarantees (PCGs) cover private lenders against all risks during a specific 
period of the financing term of debt for a public investment. PCGs are specially designed 
to extend maturity and improve market terms. 
–  Policy-Based Guarantees (PBGs) help to improve governments’ access to capital markets 
in support of social, institutional, and structural policies and reforms. PBGs are offered to 
countries with a strong track record of performance with a satisfactory social, structural, 
and macroeconomic policy framework and a coherent strategy for gaining (or regaining) 
access to international financial markets. 
Further information:  www.worldbank.org/guarantees/  
www.miga.org  
Reading:  Winpenny, et al. 2005 
HIPC 
See:  Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
IMF Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) 
“The Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) provides policy support and financial assistance to low-
income countries facing exogenous shocks.” After some modifications in September 2008, the 
ESF has two components: (i) “A rapid-access component under which a country can access fairly 
quickly, up to 25 percent of its quota for each exogenous shock;” and (ii) “a high-access 
component…with access up to 75 percent of quota for each arrangement in normal 
circumstances.” Access will be determined on a case-by-case basis and the conditionality is 
tailored to IMF members’ needs and circumstances.
98 
Further information:  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/esf.htm  
Reading:  Bulir and Hamann 2006 
See:   Contingent loans 
                                                 
97 World Bank guarantees only cover debt, although a “deemed loan” special scheme can cover equity. 
98 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/esf.htm.   
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Impact Investments 
Impact investments generate both social value and financial returns. “Impact investment is private 
equity, debt and/or real estate investment that generates measurable financial as well as social or 
environmental returns beyond comparable industry standard investments. Impact investors and 
their investees explicitly seek to generate both financial and these extra-financial returns.”
99 The 
difference to social responsible investing is that investors search for investment opportunities that 
actively seek impact. A recent report estimates that impact investing could grow to 1 percent of 
total professionally managed assets within the next five to ten years with a market of about 
US$500 billion.
100 
Examples include microfinance bonds, which securitize micro credits and sell them on the 
international capital markets or direct investments in microfinance institutions; the Media 
Development Loan Fund (MDLF), which invests in media institutions in emerging markets; and a 
US$500 million equity investment fund to invest in companies in the health sector, which IFC 
plans to set up. New communication technology also enables person-to-person socially 
responsible investments. Kiva.org (without interest payments) and MyC4.com (partially 
concessional with lower than market rate interest payments) allow investors to give micro loans 
directly to entrepreneurs in developing countries on a personal basis. 





Reading:  Monitor Institute 2009 
See also:  Blended Value Investments 
Person-to-Person Giving 
Index-based Insurance 
See:    Parametric  insurance 
Indexed Bonds 
Indexed bonds tie the performance (schedule or amount of payment of interest and/or of 
repayment of principal) to the performance of an index. The instrument allows debtors to hedge 
against risks deriving from fluctuations of the index. Common indices are inflation and GDP but 
also a carbon-indexed bond has been piloted by the World Bank in cooperation with a private 
sector partner. 
Reading:    Fischer 1975, Shiller 2003b, 2005 




                                                 
99 http://www.rockfound.org/efforts/impact_investing/RIIC_recommendations_final.pdf. 
100 Monitor Institute 2009.  
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Inflation-Indexed Bonds 
An inflation-indexed bond’s performance is tied to the inflation rate. An inflation-
indexed bond would allow investors to make investments that are independent from 
inflation. 
 
Reading:  Shiller 2003a, Wrase 1997 
See also:  Indexed Bonds 
Insurance 
Risk-transfer mechanism that fully or partially compensates for the loss or damage caused by the 
insured event. In general insurance, compensation is normally proportionate to the loss incurred. 
See also:  Parametric insurance 
International Finance Facility (IFF) 
The International Finance Facility (IFF) is a proposal for a frontloading instrument of future 
development aid by the United Kingdom. The IFF relies on long-term ODA commitments as 
assets that underpin the issuance of bonds in the international capital markets and leverage 
immediate resources for development assistance. The result of an IFF is the frontloading of future 
development assistance. It was first proposed in 2003 as an instrument to help fill the financing 
gap for the Millennium Development Goals and at the same time respond to near-term fiscal 
constraints facing donors. 
A first IFF has been piloted with the IFF for Immunisation (IFFIm). Other proposals have 
included an IFF for adaptation to climate change
101 and an IFF for mitigation adaptation and clean 
technology.
102 
Further information:  http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_21_03.htm  
Reading  Conceição, et al. 2005; Development Committee 2004; HM Treasury 
2004; Mavrotas 2005; Tang and Yeoh 2007; World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum 2007 
See also:  International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) 
International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) 
The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) is an IFF supported by long-term, 
legally binding grants from sovereign donors (France, Italy, Norway, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). IFFIm was established as a new supranational in 2006, with 
some US$5 billion in assets paid over 20 years. IFFIm’s first triple-A rated US$1 billion bond 
issuance funded immunization programs of the GAVI Alliance. The World Bank is IFFIm’s 
Treasury Manager.  
Further information:  http://www.iff-immunisation.org/ 
                                                 
101 Tang and Yeoh 2007. 
102 World Business Council for Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum 2007.  
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Reading:  Barder and Yeh 2006, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
(GAVI) 2004, Lob-Levyt and Affolder  
See also:  International Finance Facility 
Line of Sovereign Credit 
A line of sovereign credit would provide automatic access to a line of credit at a predetermined 
interest rate. Whenever a country experiences liquidity problems it could draw from its line of 
credit. A line of credit would provide a country with flexible access to volatile and unpredictable 
demand for financing. Other than contingent loans, the access to funding through a line of 
sovereign credit would not be linked to exogenous shocks and triggers. 
Reading:  Cordella and Levy Yeyati 2006, Plaut and Melnik 2003 
See also:  Contingent loans 
Loan 
In development finance a loan (also credit) is defined as a transfer made in cash, goods, or 
services for which repayment is required.
103 
Local Currency Lending 
Local currency lending refers to loans that are denominated in recipient countries currencies. 
(Traditionally, development assistance is denominated in donors’ currencies). Local currency 
lending avoids currency risks of borrowers. Local currency bond markets for sovereign and 
private debt have developed quickly over the last years but are still not available for some of the 
least developed countries.  
Further information:  Burger and Warnock 2006, 2007 
See Also:  Global Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond Program (GEMLOC) 
Macro Markets (Macro Derivatives)  
In macro markets, claims on aggregate national incomes, fractions of the GDP, real estate, or 
income of various groups of a country are traded. Macro markets allow individuals to hedge 
against risks that derive from the macroeconomic environment (for example, personal income is 
correlated to GDP and expenses to housing prices).  
Reading:   Gürkaynak and Wolfers 2005, Jakab 2006, Shiller 1993, 2003b, 2005 
Microfinance 
Microfinance offers poor people access to basic financial services, such as loans, savings, money 
transfer services, and microinsurance. The roots of modern microfinance are in the 1970s when 
first programs in Bangladesh, Brazil, and a few other countries began to provide small loans to 
groups of poor women, using the group’s savings as collateral. Different types of microfinance 
providers have emerged including nongovernment organizations; cooperatives; community-based 
development; commercial and state banks; insurance and credit card companies; 
                                                 
103 OECD: http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965544.   
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telecommunications and wire services; and post offices. Today, multiple loan products are 
available: providing working capital for small businesses, larger loans for durable goods, loans 
for children’s education, and loans to cover emergencies. Also, many microfinance providers 
have started to collect deposits. 
Further Information:   http://www.cgap.org/  
Reading:  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, Hardy, et al. 2002, Pretes 
2002, Roodman and Qureshi 2006, World Bank 2009 
See also:  Microinsurance 
Microinsurance 
Microinsurance provides protection of low-income people against specific risks, such as natural 
disaster and illness or death in exchange for regular premium payments, proportionate to the 
likelihood and cost of the risk involved. Often, microinsurance is an extension of existing 
microfinance provision or is coordinated with health care service delivery. Typical products are 
life insurance, health insurance, agricultural insurance, and livestock insurance. 
Reading:  Churchill, et al. 2006; Matthäus-Maier and Von Pischke 2008; Pui Lee, 
et al. 2000; Sabri 2003 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a United States financing facility that offers poor 
countries challenge grants. Grants are provided only on measurable success in or progress toward 
achieving predefined objectives and targets having to do with good governance, economic 
freedom, and investments in people. Before a country can become eligible to receive assistance, 
MCC looks at their performance on independent and transparent policy indicators. MCC selects 
eligible countries for Compact Assistance. Countries that have demonstrated significant 
improvement in policy indicators but do not yet qualify for a Compact grant may be eligible for 
Threshold Program assistance.  
Further information:  http://www.mcc.gov 
Reading:  Brainard 2003, Radelet 2003 
Minimum Volume Guarantee (MVG) 
See: AccessRH 
Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) 
At the July 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, G8 leaders pledged to cancel the debt of 
the world’s most-indebted countries, the majority of which are located in Africa. The aim of this 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was to reduce further the debt of HIPCs and provide 
additional resource to help them reach the Millennium Development Goals. 
The MDRI is separate from the HIPC Initiative but linked to it operationally. Under the MDRI, 
three multilateral institutions—the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Fund (AfDF)—provide  
  78
100 percent debt relief on eligible debts to countries having reached the HIPC completion point. 
In 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank joined IDA, IMF, and the AfDF. Unlike the 
HIPC Initiative, the MDRI does not involve participation of official bilateral or commercial 
creditors, or of multilateral institutions other than the above-mentioned. 
Further information:  http://go.worldbank.org/QR2YE1KBV0  
Reading: International  Development  Association and International Monetary Fund 
2008 
See also:   Debt relief 
Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
NetGuarantee 
NetGuarantee is a proposal by Malaria NO MORE for a financing mechanism that would 
accelerate access to malaria prevention tools. It would allow procuring goods and services right 
after development aid has been committed, omitting the time lag of signing grant agreements. The 
procurement process for malaria tools usually starts 10 or more months after the Global Fund to 
Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria has approved a project because of the grant signature 
process.
104 NetGuarantee would provide guarantees on behalf of countries to issue procurement 
tenders before the grant has been signed. NetGuarantee would make development assistance 
available much faster. 




Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
ODA consists of “grants or loans to…developing countries which are: (a) undertaken by the 
official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; 
(c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a grant element (q.v.) of at least 25 per 
cent].”
105 




“Output-Based Aid (OBA) is a strategy for using explicit performance-based subsidies to support 
the delivery of basic services where policy concerns would justify public funding to complement 
or replace user-fees. Affordability concerns for particular groups of users, positive externalities, 
or the infeasibility of imposing direct user-fees represent examples of the types of policy concerns 
that have motivated governments to use public funds to support the delivery of basic services. 
OBA involves delegating service delivery to a third-party, typically private firms, but also public 
utilities, NGOs, and community-based organizations, under contracts that tie disbursement of the 
                                                 
104 http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/partnership/board/meetings/ppt/15pbm/s4_1.pdf.  
105 http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965586.   
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public funding to the services or outputs actually delivered.”
106 Like results-based financing, 
output-based aid links financing to projects results. 
Further information:  http://www.gpoba.org  
See also:   Results Based Financing (RBF) 
Parametric insurance 
Parametric insurance (also called index-based insurance) does not indemnify the individual loss 
by the policyholder, but consists of an ex ante agreement to make a payment upon a parametric 
index that is assumed to proxy the actual loss. An example is weather insurance based on specific 
parameters, such as rainfall. 
Reading:  Cummins and Mahul 2008, Skees, et al. 2005 
See also:   Insurance 
Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs) 
See: Guarantees 
Partial Credit Guarantees (PCGs)  
See: Guarantees 
Patent Buy-Outs 
In a patent buy-out a government offers a private holder of a patent a monetary compensation for 
transferring the property right to the public domain. Advanced commitments to patent buy-outs 
can spur investments and research and development into new technologies. 
Reading:  Hopenhayn, et al. 2006; Kremer 1998; Outterson 2006 
See also:  Prize 
Advanced Market Commitment 
Patent pool 
Patent Pools 
In a patent pool several companies cross-license their patents. Patent pools can help increase the 
access to research and development intense technologies, such as for affordable drugs and 
vaccines. Recently, UNITAID decided to establish a patent pool for medicines with an initial 
focus in the area of pediatric antiretrovirals (ARVs) and new combinations.
107 
Further information:  http://www.unitaid.eu/  
                                                 
106 http://www.gpoba.org/oba/index.asp.  
107 http://www.unitaid.eu/index.php/en/NEWS/UNITAID-moves-towards-a-patent-pool-for-
medicines.html.   
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See also:  Patent Buy-Out 
Prizes 
Advanced Market Commitment 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is a financing instrument that internalizes 
externalities in the environmental sector on a local basis. The underlying principle is that those 
who provide environmental services get paid for doing so (“provider gets”) and those who benefit 
from environmental services pay for their provision (“user pays”). 
Further information:  http://go.worldbank.org/51KUO12O50  
Reading:  Alix-Garcia, et al. 2008; Antle and Stoorvogel 2008; Bulte, et al. 2008a; 
Bulte, et al. 2008b; Graff-Zivin and Lipper 2008; Horan, et al. 2008; 
Pagiola, et al. 2005; Pagiola, et al. 2008; Wunder 2008; Zilberman, et al. 
2008 
Payments for Progress 
See:  Cash on delivery 
Payments for Services 
Payments for services also known as “beneficiary pays” instruments are direct payments for 
goods or services, by those who profit from their provision. Payments for services can be blended 
with other sources of financing, which subsidize them. Payments for services are an option when 
service benefits can be attributed to a person or organization and when those beneficiaries are 
financially strong enough to pay for the services.  
See also:  Payments for Environmental Services (PES) 
Performance-Based Aid 
Performance-based aid ties disbursement of funds to project or program performance. Major aid 
agencies with performance-based aid allocations include the International Development 
Association (IDA), the Global Fund to Fight Aids Malaria and Tuberculosis, and the GAVI 
Alliance. Performance-based aid links financing to results and can be viewed as a form of results-
based financing.  
See also:   Results-Based Instruments 
Performance-Based Grants (GAVI Alliance) 
GAVI Immunisation Services Support (GAVI ISS) provides funding to countries on the basis of 
children the country has immunized. After an upfront investment phase, “countries are eligible to 
receive US$20 for each additional child they reach with three doses of diphtheria-tetanus-
pertussis (DTP3) vaccine, as compared to the previous year’s target. Thereafter, GAVI ensures 
transparency and accountability through an intensive proposal and performance review process, 
and an independent audit of each country’s data collection and reporting system.”
108 The example 
of GAVI ISS highlights one of the problems with performance-based aid, results-based financing, 
                                                 
108 http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/ISS_evaluation.pdf.   
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and output-based aid: Financial flows are linked to the measurement of outputs. Recently, the 
GAVI ISS has been accused of being exploited through systematic overreporting.
109  
Further information:  http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/ISS_evaluation.pdf  
Reading:  Lim, et al.  
See also:   Results-Based Instruments 
Performance-Based Funding (Global Fund) 
“The Global Fund was created around the concept of ‘performance-based funding.’ Essentially 
this means that only those grant recipients who can demonstrate measurable and effective results 
will be able to receive additional funding. In other words, initial funding is awarded solely on the 
basis of the technical quality of applications, but continued and renewed funding is dependent on 
proven results and targets achieved. In order to measure performance, the Global Fund has put in 
place a rigorous system of measurement and evaluation. This begins at the time a grant agreement 
is signed, when targets and indicators are agreed upon between recipients and the Global Fund. 
Results are tracked at every point in the process, from disbursement requests to performance 
updates and on through requests for continued funding at the two-year point of the grant. Since 
targets are set according to the resource levels and ambitions of each country, the Global Fund’s 
performance-based funding system provides a platform for grant recipients to demonstrate—and 
prove—their achievements.”
110 
Further information:   http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/about/replenishment/berlin/ 
Global_Fund_Backgrounder.pdf  
See also:   Results-Based Instruments 
Performance-Based Funding (International Development Association) 
“The main factor that determines the allocation of IDA resources among eligible countries is each 
country’s performance in implementing policies that promote economic growth and poverty 
reduction. This is assessed by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which for 
the purposes of resource allocation is referred to as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI). 
The IRAI and portfolio performance together constitute the IDA Country Performance Rating 
(CPR). In addition to the CPR, population and per capita income also determine IDA 
allocations.”
111 
Further information:   http://www.worldbank.org/IDA  
See also:   Results-Based Instruments 
Person-to-person (P2P) giving 
Person-to-person (P2P) giving means that individual donors give directly to individual recipients. 
The internet expanded the use of P2P giving into new directions. For example, two online 
platforms that allow for direct microfinance investments to entrepreneurs in developing countries 
                                                 
109 Lim, et al.  
110 http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/about/replenishment/berlin/Global_Fund_Backgrounder.pdf.  
111 http://go.worldbank.org/F5531ZQHT0.   
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are Kiva.org (without interest payments) and MyC4.com (with partially concessional, lower than 
market rate interest payments). 
Further information:   http://www.kiva.org  
http://www.myC4.com; 
See also:  Private Giving 
PG4Health 
PG4Health (formerly pledge guarantee) “is a global financing mechanism that will allow 
recipients of international donor assistance to obtain short-term commercial credit by essentially 
using their pending donor “pledges” as collateral…When disbursements do finally come through, 
the loan amount and associated costs are then simply deducted at the source, with the donor, in 
effect, paying off the loan. This innovative aspect of the Pledge Guarantee reduces risk, 
eliminates the need to tie up money in costly revolving funds, and makes possible more reliable 
and predictable funding flows.”
112 PG4Health is a proposed financing mechanism for AccessRH. 
Further information:  http://www.rhsupplies.org/  
Reading:  Reproductive Health Supplies Coalition and Dalberg Global 
Development Advisors 2008 




Private giving or philanthropy means donating monetary funds, goods, services, time, and/or 
effort to support a socially or environmentally beneficial cause. By definition, there is no 
financial or material reward to the donor. Private giving generates substantial sources for 
development, estimated to be several billion of dollars annually. Estimates range from US$17 
billion from DAC donors in 2001 to US$34 billion by the United States only (including faith-
based organizations and education at universities within the United States) in 2007. 
Reading:  Brainard and Chollet 2008, Conceição and Merlen 2005, Development 
Assistance Committee 2003, Hudson’s Center for Global Prosperity 
2008, Koch 2008, Micklewright and Wright 2005, NCVO and CAF 
2007, Scott 2003 
Policy Based Guarantees (PBGs) 
See: Guarantees 
                                                 
112 http://www.rhsupplies.org/working_groups/systems_strengthening/global_financing_and_procurement.html.   
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Prizes 
Prizes are an incentive to stimulate investment in research and development to meet a specified 
scientific or technological challenge. Prizes are awarded to an individual or organization that 
makes a predefined scientific discovery or develop a new technology. 
In the area of development financing and financing global public good initiatives, such as the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation’s “Grand Challenges in Global Health” and the European Union’s 
“Renewable Energy Partnerships” promise prizes of technological achievements. 
Further information:  http://www.gcgh.org/  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/res/renewable_energy_partnerships/index_en.
htm  
Reading:  Harford 2008; Hopenhayn, et al. 2006; Leonardt 2007; Stiglitz 2006 
See also:  Patent Buy-Out 
Patent Pools 
Advanced Market Commitment 
Pro Bono Activities  
Often, the private sector can be more effective providing goods and services rather than financial 
aid, using their capacity for the greater good by linking their activity to the cause they support and 
using pro bono activities to motivate their employees. A good example is Google, which gave 1 
percent of its shares and is giving 1 percent of its profits to its foundation Google.org and 
encourages its employees to spent 1 percent of their time on charitable projects. 
Further information:   http://www.google.org  
(PRODUCT)RED 
(PRODUCT)RED is a successful example of Blended Value Products. It was launched in 2006 
and raises funds for HIV/AIDS programs in Africa through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Partner corporations including American Express, Apple, Converse, 
Dell, Emporio Armani, GAP, Hallmark, and Microsoft design and sell RED products and make 
corresponding contributions. By the end of 2008, contributions from corporate partners totaled 
more than $120 million. 
Further information:  http://www.joinred.com 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/partners/private/red/ 
See also:  Blended Value Products 
Program-Related Investments (PRIs) 
“Program-related investments (PRIs) are investments made by foundations to support charitable 
activities that involve the potential return of capital within an established time frame. PRIs 
include financing methods commonly associated with banks or other private investors, such as 
loans, loan guarantees, linked deposits, and even equity investments in charitable organizations or  
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in commercial ventures for charitable purposes.”
113 Foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation and Google.org, are leveraging their grants with PRI. 
Further information:  http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/faqs/html/pri.html 
See also:  Blended Value Investments 
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) 
A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) involves the private sector in aspects of the provision of 
infrastructure and services that have traditionally been provided by the government.
114 Private 
companies finance projects and provide expertise to ease fiscal constraints and increase 
efficiency. By engaging the private sector and giving it defined responsibilities, governments 
broaden their options for delivering better services.  
The range of options for Public-Private Partnerships has expanded enormously over the past 30 
years. Agreements between public and private entities take many shapes and sizes for both new 
and existing services. At one end of the spectrum is a management or service contract, where a 
private company is paid a fee for a service. At the other end is full privatization or divestiture 
(outright sale), where a government sells assets to a private company. Outsourcing has become 
another popular option; here a private company might handle an aspect of service, such as billing, 
metering, transport, or even cleaning.  
Hybrid models of Public-Private Partnership have seen explosive growth in recent years, 
especially with the development of a more diversified pool of emerging market investors and 
operators with local expertise. These models often rely on simpler contractual arrangements and 
blend public and private money to diversify risks.  
In development finance, vertical funds with a governance structure that includes national 
governments and the private sector sometimes are called PPPs. Examples are the Global Fund to 
Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI Alliance.  
Further Information:  http://www.ppiaf.org  
Reading:  Engel, et al. 2007; Osborne 2000; Yescombe 2002, 2007 
Remittances 
Remittances from migrants to citizens in their home countries are considered as one of the main 
pillars of transfer of funds to developing countries. In 2007, documented remittances to 
developing countries were estimated to be about US$240 billion, with unreported remittances 
making that figure even larger. In some countries (Tajikistan, Moldova, Tonga) remittances make 
up one-third of the country’s GDP.  
Reading:   Chami, et al. 2005; Maimbo and Ratha 2005; Ratha and Xu 2008; 
Solimano 2005 
                                                 
113 http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/faqs/html/pri.html.  
114 http://www.ppiaf.org/content/view/118/153/.   
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Results-Based Financing (RBF) 
Results-Based Financing (RBF) refers to a range of mechanisms designed to enhance the 
performance of aid through incentive-based payments. RBF has been used most extensively in the 
area of health systems. RBF is an umbrella term that includes Output-Based Aid, provider 
payment incentives, performance-based inter-fiscal transfers, and incentives to households for 
adopt health-promoting behaviors. What these mechanisms have in common is that a principal 
entity provides a financial or in-kind reward, conditional on the recipient undertaking a set of 
predetermined actions or achieving a predetermined performance goal.
115 
A specific application of RBF can be seen in the World Bank managed Norwegian Health Results 
Innovation Grant. “The Norwegian Health Results Innovation Grant to the World Bank is 
designed to support governments to achieve the goals outlined in their national health plan 
through an increased focus on results. By shifting the emphasis of governments from distribution 
and use of resources and inputs to organizing the system in a different way to achieve results, 
RBF creates incentives and promotes greater accountability of service providers, improved 
management, improved efficiency and equity of service delivery, and strengthened health 
information systems. It can also facilitate greater involvement of the NGO and private sectors in 
service delivery.” 
Further information:  http://go.worldbank.org/04UNXY1MS0  
Reading:     Barder and Birdsall 2006, Oxman and Fretheim 2008 
See also:     Results-Based Instruments 
Results-Based Instruments 
A number of instruments are results- and performance based: 
See also:   Results-Based Financing 
Performance-Based Aid 
Conditional Cash Transfers  
Buy-Downs 
Output-Based Aid 
Cash for Delivery 
Millennium Challenge Account 
Performance-Based Grants (GAVI Alliance) 
Performance-Based Funding (Global Fund) 
Performance-Based Funding (International Development Association) 
Securitization of Future Flow Receivables 
Securitization of future flow receivables is the pooling of future flow receivables, such as hard 
currency receivables from commodity trade, airline tickets and credit card receivables, to back the 
issuance of securities on the capital markets. Securitization reduces investors’ risks and therefore 
potentially opens developing countries’ access to lending on the capital markets and brings down 
cost of capital. 
Reading:   Ketkar and Ratha 2004, Ketkar, et al. 2001 
                                                 
115 http://go.worldbank.org/04UNXY1MS0.  
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Social Funds 
“Social funds are multisectoral programs that provide financing (usually grants) for small-scale 
public investments targeted at meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable communities, and at 
contributing to social capital and development at the local level. They serve as innovators and 
demonstrators of new methods of decentralized participatory decision-making, management, and 
accountability that may be adopted for broader application by public sector organizations ...”
116 
Further information:   www.worldbank.org/socialfunds  
Reading:   Garnier and Imschoot 2003; Rawlings, et al. 2004; Tendler 2000 
Sustainable Investing (SI) 
Sustainable investing (or ethical or socially responsible investing) blends for-profit investing with 
social or environmental criteria for investing. Typically, investment decisions are based on social 
responsibility ratings or on benchmarks that exclude corporate securities from investments. 
Sometimes, the term SRI includes investments that actively seek having a social impact (see 
impact investing). In the USA, assets in socially screened portfolios are estimated to have equaled 
$2.71 trillion in 2007, an increase over the $2.16 trillion counted in 2003.
117 
The World Bank’s and other multilateral development bank’s bond issuances offer sustainable 
and socially responsible investments. World Bank debt issues are the funding source for 
development loans and have provided financing for more than 4,000 development projects in 
more than 130 countries through more than US$400 billion in lending.
118 The World Bank’s bond 
offerings that are geared towards sustainable investors include COOL bonds, Eco notes, and 
Green bonds. By the end of 2008, the World Bank has sold bonds that are based on the 
developmental purpose of the use of funds of US$ 2.146,47 million[[accuracy of number]]. 
Further information:   http://www.socialinvest.org 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets/About+Debt+Se
curities/SRI.html  
Reading:  Cumming and Johan 2007; Hill, et al. 2007; Sparkes and Cowton 2004; 
Zakri Y. Bello 2005 





Solidarity Levy on Airline Tickets 
The solidarity tax on airline tickets is an example of a financing instrument that has many 
elements of a global tax, but has been established as a nationally implemented, globally 
coordinated tax. The solidarity tax on airline tickets has been in effect in France in since mid-
2006, and implemented since then in Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, Republic of Korea, 
                                                 
116 www.worldbank.org/socialfunds. 
117 Social Investment Forum 2008. 
118 http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets/About+Debt+Securities/SRI.html.  
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Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, and Norway. Another 15 countries are in the process of 
implementing the tax. Although the levy has many elements of a global tax, it is based on 
voluntary participation and voluntary contributions by member countries.  
The funds are used to finance UNITAID, an international purchase facility for drugs and 
treatments for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The contributions to UNITAID’s budget for 
2008, financed primarily through air ticket taxes, are expected to be [[US]]$364 million.  
Further information:  http://www.unitaid.eu/  
See also:  Global Taxes 
Solidarity Levies 
Solidarity Levies 
Globally coordinated and nationally on a voluntary basis implemented taxes that direct their 
proceeds to development are often called “Solidarity Levies.” 
See also:  Global Taxes 
Solidarity Levy on Airline Tickets 
Currency Tax 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) 
Sovereign Wealth Funds are country-owned investment funds allowing domestic and 
international investments in a wide range of financial products such as government and corporate 
bonds, stock, commodities, real estate, as well as financial derivatives. An SWF is a backloading 
instrument saving funds for the future and providing independence from external financing. 
Reading:  Butt, et al. 2008; Reisen 2008; Truman 2007 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 
“The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement the existing 
official reserves of member countries. SDRs are allocated to member countries in proportion to 
their IMF quotas…Its value is based on a basket of key international currencies.”
119 The 
innovative financing discussion has led to two types of proposals for leveraging SDRs for 
development purposes. First, more SDRs should be allocated to developing countries allowing 
them to fall back on them in case of immediate liquidity needs
120; second, developed countries 
should transfer part of their SDRs to developing countries as additional concessional support. 
Reading:   Aryeetey 2005, Pollak and Clark 2005 
Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative 
Recovery of stolen public assets from developing countries could reclaim resources that have 
supported poverty reduction. StAR was launched jointly by the World Bank and United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on September 17, 2007 in New York City at an event 
chaired by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. StAR’s objective is to reduce barriers to 
                                                 
119 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.  
120 The IMF’s reallocation of SDR and voting power, discussed in Mach 2008, would respond to this 
proposal.  
  88
asset recovery and thereby encourage and facilitate more systematic and timely return of stolen 
assets.  Luxembourg has started directing recovered funds from illicit activities to bilateral ODA.  
Further information:  http://www.worldbank.org/star  
Reading: World  Bank  2007 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) 
The supplemental reserve facility is a nonconcessional lending facility to respond to very short-
term financing on a large scale due to macroeconomic shocks. It was introduced in 1997 by the 
IMF in response to the Asian financial crisis. 
Further information:   http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm  
Swaps 
A swap is a derivative in which two parties agree to exchange one stream of cash flows today 
against another stream in the future. Swaps can be used to hedge risks including interest rate, 
currency, and commodity price risks. In development financing, for example, the World Bank 
offers currency, interest rate, and commodity price swaps. 
Further information:   http://treasury.worldbank.org/  
UNITAID 
“UNITAID is an international drug purchase facility, established to provide long-term, 
sustainable and predictable funding to increase access and reduce prices of quality drugs and 
diagnostics for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in developing countries.” 
“Long term commitment and the purchasing of high volume of drugs and diagnostics allows 
UNITAID to get lower prices as manufacturers are encouraged to increase their production which 
results in economies of scale.”
121 UNITAID receives funding predominantly from the Solidarity 
Levy on Airline Tickets. 
Further information:   http://www.unitaid.eu/  
See also:  Solidarity Levy on Airline Tickets 
Voluntary Solidarity Contribution (VSC) 
A voluntary solidarity contribution is a voluntary copayment by consumers when purchasing 
goods or services. The contribution is collected with the sales process. Examples are a VSC on 
airline tickets and on mobile phones. VSCs are similar to blended value products but the 
consumer has the choice to contribute.  
See also:  Blended Value Products 
Voluntary Solidarity Contribution (VSC) on Airline Tickets 
                                                 
121 http://www.unitaid.eu/.  
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Voluntary Solidarity Contribution (VSC) on Airline Tickets 
A proposal to raise funds by introducing a VSC providing individuals and corporations who 
purchase airline tickets with the opportunity to voluntarily donate a small sum for every ticket 
purchased; the levy would not be mandatory for consumers.  
Further information:   www.who.int/phi/UNITAID_Jan09.ppt 
See also:  Voluntary Solidarity Contribution (VSC) 
Vouchers 
A voucher is a certificate, usually issued by a government by which users can pay for a specific 
service at a service provider of their choice, rather than assigning the user to a service provider. 
Vouchers are typically used in the education or health sector. Voucher programs are explicitly 
aimed at improving service quality by increasing users’ choices therefore increasing competition.  
Proponents of vouchers argue that vouchers promote free market competition among service 
providers. Opponents criticize vouchers for the potentially ambiguous effect on the poor: 
Voucher schemes tend to increase sorting—for example with richer students concentrating in the 
private schools.
122 
Reading:  Elson-Rogers and European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training 2000, World Bank 2005 
Weather derivatives 
Weather derivatives are linked to an index that measures weather related risks such as low rainfall 
or drought. Unlike insurance, weather derivatives do not cover the loss from weather related 
events but the value of the derivative changes depending on movements of the underlying index. 
Weather derivatives may avoid moral hazard problems that come with insurance products 
because the value of the derivative solely depends on exogenous variables, for example rainfall 
Reading:  Cao and Wei 2004; Hess, et al. 2002; Turvey 2001 
 
                                                 
122 World Bank 2004.  
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